装配系统中的收益共享契约及其风险探究
发布时间：2018-08-14 13:23
【摘要】：随着大数据时代的降临和科学技术的飞速发展,经济全球化已成常态,国内外市场的竞争趋于白热化,愈加强劲的竞争对手和日益复杂的竞争环境将会成为企业不得不面对的两大难题。现如今,任何一种产品的生产都不是由一个公司来完成的,而是由不同的企业协作完成的。'这一系列相互联系、相互制约的企业网络就构成了供应链。企业想要在产品市场占据一席之地,其最强有力的保障就是所在的供应链。本文主要探讨的是装配系统的供应链协同机制,这个问题是供应链中的具有鲜明特点的案例。文章构建了由一个装配商和n个零件供应商的装配系统模型。对于装配系统中的供应商/装配商而言,都希望个人利益实现最大化,但是在这种"自私"的前提下会使供应链整体效益低下。供应链协同机制是以整体最优化为目标,使得装配商和零件供应商在独自决策的时候不仅仅想到自身利益的最大化,还能够顾全供应链整体的利益,物尽其用实现整体绩效的最大化。这种完美的协同机制就是供应链契约,契约有很多种形式,本文主要讨论了基于收益共享契约下的装配系统供应链协同问题。在模型中,当最终产品售出时,装配商需要从得到的收益当中拿出一部分给予供应商作为收益共享,供应商根据自身的成本结构和收益共享的多少来决定最终交货量。这是一个Stackelberg博弈的过程,装配商作为双方博弈的领导者,有权利设定共享因子并且根据零件供应商的反馈适当的调整契约因子,供应商作为跟随者,根据装配商制定的契约调整自身的交货量,这是装配商和零件供应商两者之间的博弈过程。我们发现,装配商在可供选择的契约集合中,一定存在一个帕累托最优契约,尽管这个契约不一定保证整个供应链达到协同,但最终能够实现系统内所有的参与者状态达到最优,进而系统总收益达到最优。若供应链契约中只加入收益共享因子,我们能够得到这样的结论:系统在集中决策时的最终产品交货量是最大的,然而在各企业分散决策情况下是很难达到这个水平的,往往是低于这个最优水平。我们将零件供应商在集中决策下的最优交货量和分散决策下的进行比较,发现分散决策系统的交货量往往低于集中决策系统的交货量,如此单一的契约无法使供应链达到协同。这是因为,信息的不对称导致供应商在独自做决策时,只考虑自身利益的最大化,仅仅只是为了降低自身的损失就减少了零件交货量,进而导致最终产品的供货量减少。为了使供应链实现协同,本文对收益共享契约进行了补充,加入了剩余补偿因子,即对未售出的最终产品,装配商也要付给零件供应商一部分报酬作为补偿,即所谓的剩余补偿,由此我们得到了完美的供应链协调机制---"收益共享+剩余补偿"契约。这个契约不仅可以使供应链达到协同,还可以促进供应商的交货量增加,进一步使系统的总收益最大化。大多数文献资料都是基于报童模型的基础上来探讨利益最优化,目标函数是预期利润函数,以此来寻求系统最优。本文从一个新的出发点思考问题,从相反的角度考虑,系统总收益最大化也等价于系统总损失最小化,目标函数也需要相对应地改为损失函数。现实情况中,零件供应商交付的零件不一定能够完全被装配,由于之前的论述中我们假设未装配的零件不存在,因此我们忽略了这部分损失,在接下来文章中我们从最小损失的角度构造了损失函数,分析了供应商和装配商的方差,并确定了使得系统达到最优情况下供应商方差和装配商方差的关系。以往的文献资料所探讨的模型有一定的局限性,绝大部分都假设供应链参与者是风险中性的,与现实生产生活的特性不符。基于供应商的自身性质导致其更倾向于风险规避的,供应商对市场的风险变化非常敏感,为保证自身的利益它们期望市场的风险尽可能的小,由此可以看出,供应商一般都是风险规避者。为了使本文的模型更加具有实践性,文章基于CVaR进一步探究了风险规避供应商的最优交货量,发现供应商的最优交货量依赖于收益共享因子和风险规避系数,随着收益共享因子的增加而增加,同样也随着风险规避系数的增加而增加进一步还发现风险规避供应商的最优交货量要小于风险中性供应商的交货量。
[Abstract]:With the advent of the era of big data and the rapid development of science and technology, economic globalization has become the norm, the competition in the domestic and foreign markets tends to be white-hot, more and more powerful competitors and increasingly complex competition environment will become the two major problems that enterprises have to face. Nowadays, any kind of product production is not by a company. The supply chain is formed by a series of interrelated and mutually restrictive enterprise networks. If an enterprise wants to occupy a place in the product market, the most powerful guarantee is the supply chain. This paper constructs an assembly system model with one assembler and N parts suppliers. For the suppliers/assemblers in the assembly system, they all want to maximize their personal interests, but on the premise of this selfishness, the overall benefit of the supply chain will be low. With the goal of global optimization, the assembler and part supplier not only think about maximizing their own interests, but also can take into account the overall interests of the supply chain and maximize the overall performance by making full use of the whole. In the model, when the final product is sold, the assembler needs to take part of the revenue from the final product and give it to the supplier as revenue sharing. The supplier decides the final delivery according to its cost structure and the amount of revenue sharing. In the process of Lberg game, the assembler, as the leader of the game, has the right to set the sharing factor and adjust the contract factor according to the feedback of the supplier. The supplier, as the follower, adjusts the delivery quantity according to the contract made by the assembler. This is the game process between the assembler and the supplier. It is found that there must be a Pareto optimal contract in the optional contract set. Although this contract does not necessarily guarantee the coordination of the whole supply chain, it can ultimately achieve the optimal state of all participants in the system, and then the total revenue of the system can be optimal. If only the revenue sharing factor is added to the supply chain contract. Subsequently, we can draw the conclusion that the final product delivery of the system is the largest in the centralized decision-making, but it is difficult to reach this level in the case of decentralized decision-making, often lower than this optimal level. It is found that the delivery volume of decentralized decision system is often lower than that of centralized decision system, so a single contract can not achieve coordination in supply chain. In order to coordinate the supply chain, this paper supplements the revenue sharing contract and adds the residual compensation factor, i.e. the assembler pays part of the compensation to the supplier of the unsold final product, which is called residual compensation. This contract can not only coordinate the supply chain, but also increase the delivery of suppliers and further maximize the total revenue of the system. From a new point of view, the maximization of the total revenue of the system is equivalent to the minimization of the total loss of the system, and the objective function needs to be changed to the loss function. In the previous discussion, we assumed that the unassembled parts did not exist, so we neglected this loss. In the following article, we constructed the loss function from the point of view of minimum loss, analyzed the variance of supplier and assembler, and determined the relationship between the variance of supplier and that of assembler under the optimal conditions. The models discussed in the literature have some limitations. Most of them assume that the participants in the supply chain are risk-neutral, which is inconsistent with the characteristics of real production and life. In order to make the model more practical, this paper further explores the optimal delivery volume of risk-averse suppliers based on CVAR. It is found that the optimal delivery volume of suppliers depends on the revenue sharing factor and the risk aversion coefficient, with the receipt. The increase of profit sharing factor also increases with the increase of risk aversion coefficient. It is also found that the optimal delivery volume of risk aversion supplier is less than that of risk neutral supplier.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274
本文编号：2182989
[Abstract]:With the advent of the era of big data and the rapid development of science and technology, economic globalization has become the norm, the competition in the domestic and foreign markets tends to be white-hot, more and more powerful competitors and increasingly complex competition environment will become the two major problems that enterprises have to face. Nowadays, any kind of product production is not by a company. The supply chain is formed by a series of interrelated and mutually restrictive enterprise networks. If an enterprise wants to occupy a place in the product market, the most powerful guarantee is the supply chain. This paper constructs an assembly system model with one assembler and N parts suppliers. For the suppliers/assemblers in the assembly system, they all want to maximize their personal interests, but on the premise of this selfishness, the overall benefit of the supply chain will be low. With the goal of global optimization, the assembler and part supplier not only think about maximizing their own interests, but also can take into account the overall interests of the supply chain and maximize the overall performance by making full use of the whole. In the model, when the final product is sold, the assembler needs to take part of the revenue from the final product and give it to the supplier as revenue sharing. The supplier decides the final delivery according to its cost structure and the amount of revenue sharing. In the process of Lberg game, the assembler, as the leader of the game, has the right to set the sharing factor and adjust the contract factor according to the feedback of the supplier. The supplier, as the follower, adjusts the delivery quantity according to the contract made by the assembler. This is the game process between the assembler and the supplier. It is found that there must be a Pareto optimal contract in the optional contract set. Although this contract does not necessarily guarantee the coordination of the whole supply chain, it can ultimately achieve the optimal state of all participants in the system, and then the total revenue of the system can be optimal. If only the revenue sharing factor is added to the supply chain contract. Subsequently, we can draw the conclusion that the final product delivery of the system is the largest in the centralized decision-making, but it is difficult to reach this level in the case of decentralized decision-making, often lower than this optimal level. It is found that the delivery volume of decentralized decision system is often lower than that of centralized decision system, so a single contract can not achieve coordination in supply chain. In order to coordinate the supply chain, this paper supplements the revenue sharing contract and adds the residual compensation factor, i.e. the assembler pays part of the compensation to the supplier of the unsold final product, which is called residual compensation. This contract can not only coordinate the supply chain, but also increase the delivery of suppliers and further maximize the total revenue of the system. From a new point of view, the maximization of the total revenue of the system is equivalent to the minimization of the total loss of the system, and the objective function needs to be changed to the loss function. In the previous discussion, we assumed that the unassembled parts did not exist, so we neglected this loss. In the following article, we constructed the loss function from the point of view of minimum loss, analyzed the variance of supplier and assembler, and determined the relationship between the variance of supplier and that of assembler under the optimal conditions. The models discussed in the literature have some limitations. Most of them assume that the participants in the supply chain are risk-neutral, which is inconsistent with the characteristics of real production and life. In order to make the model more practical, this paper further explores the optimal delivery volume of risk-averse suppliers based on CVAR. It is found that the optimal delivery volume of suppliers depends on the revenue sharing factor and the risk aversion coefficient, with the receipt. The increase of profit sharing factor also increases with the increase of risk aversion coefficient. It is also found that the optimal delivery volume of risk aversion supplier is less than that of risk neutral supplier.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274
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