基于减排框架的最优技术政策选择研究
发布时间：2018-09-08 19:39
【摘要】：基于减排框架,本文分别引入研发补贴政策、研发卡特尔(简称"RD卡特尔")、竞争研发联盟(简称"RJV竞争")及卡特尔研发联盟(简称"RJV卡特尔")等四种技术政策,构建了一个多阶段博弈模型,研究单一技术政策、技术组合政策情形下双寡头企业减排研发绩效、利润及社会福利水平,并进一步利用数值模拟方法探讨政府和企业最优的技术政策选择,政府和企业最优技术政策选择结果的差异及其影响因素。研究结论表明:首先,从政府角度来看,组合政策的效果总是相对优于单一技术政策,并且政府最优的技术政策选择为RJV卡特尔与补贴组合政策。其次,无论溢出率取何值,政府和企业最优的技术政策选择都是一致的。最后,排污税取值影响政府和企业最优技术选择的一致性,当排污税较小时,企业最优的技术政策选择为RJV竞争与补贴组合政策(或RJV竞争政策);当排污税较大时,企业最优的技术选择为单一的技术政策。为了使政府和企业的最优技术政策选择一致,政府应选择一个合适的排污税。
[Abstract]:Based on the framework of emission reduction, this paper introduces four kinds of technology policies, namely, R & D subsidy policy, R & D cartel (referred to as "RD cartel"), competitive R & D alliance (RJV competition) and cartel R & D alliance (RJV cartel). A multi-stage game model is constructed to study the performance, profit and social welfare of duopoly enterprises in the case of single technology policy and technology combination policy. Furthermore, the numerical simulation method is used to discuss the optimal technology policy choice between government and enterprise, the difference between government and enterprise optimal technology policy choice and its influencing factors. The results show that: first of all, from the point of view of government, the effect of portfolio policy is always better than that of single technology policy, and the optimal choice of technology policy is RJV cartel and subsidy combination policy. Secondly, no matter what the spillover rate is, the optimal choice of technology policy between government and enterprise is the same. Finally, the value of emission tax affects the consistency of the optimal technology choice between the government and the enterprise. When the emission tax is small, the optimal technology policy choice of the enterprise is RJV competition and subsidy combination policy (or RJV competition policy), and when the emission tax is larger, the optimal technology policy choice is RJV competition and subsidy policy (or RJV competition policy). The optimal technology choice of enterprises is a single technology policy. In order to make the optimal technology policy choice of government and enterprise consistent, the government should choose a suitable emission tax.
【作者单位】： 西安交通大学管理学院;
【基金】：基金项目:《胶州市排污权有偿使用和交易机制设计研究》(2014S060)
【分类号】：F273.1;F275
本文编号：2231499
[Abstract]:Based on the framework of emission reduction, this paper introduces four kinds of technology policies, namely, R & D subsidy policy, R & D cartel (referred to as "RD cartel"), competitive R & D alliance (RJV competition) and cartel R & D alliance (RJV cartel). A multi-stage game model is constructed to study the performance, profit and social welfare of duopoly enterprises in the case of single technology policy and technology combination policy. Furthermore, the numerical simulation method is used to discuss the optimal technology policy choice between government and enterprise, the difference between government and enterprise optimal technology policy choice and its influencing factors. The results show that: first of all, from the point of view of government, the effect of portfolio policy is always better than that of single technology policy, and the optimal choice of technology policy is RJV cartel and subsidy combination policy. Secondly, no matter what the spillover rate is, the optimal choice of technology policy between government and enterprise is the same. Finally, the value of emission tax affects the consistency of the optimal technology choice between the government and the enterprise. When the emission tax is small, the optimal technology policy choice of the enterprise is RJV competition and subsidy combination policy (or RJV competition policy), and when the emission tax is larger, the optimal technology policy choice is RJV competition and subsidy policy (or RJV competition policy). The optimal technology choice of enterprises is a single technology policy. In order to make the optimal technology policy choice of government and enterprise consistent, the government should choose a suitable emission tax.
【作者单位】： 西安交通大学管理学院;
【基金】：基金项目:《胶州市排污权有偿使用和交易机制设计研究》(2014S060)
【分类号】：F273.1;F275
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