国有企业高管政治晋升与并购绩效研究
发布时间：2018-09-10 17:09
【摘要】：在公司治理过程中一直存在两个悖论:国有企业高管作为职业经理人,虽然薪酬相对较低,但是企业业绩却在高速增长。纵观并购大潮主并购方乐于积极主动的寻找目标公司,花费大量金钱、资本实施并购,但是往往绩效很差,违背股东财富最大化的目标。到底是什么样动机和原因影响了高管的选择?与此同时,研究表明国有企业资本保值增长率并没有对高管的升迁产生显著正的影响,这表明目前国有企业的发展方式仍然是“规模导向型”;国有企业职位的高管薪酬没有对国有企业高管的升迁产生显著的影响,国有企业高管职业经理人身份弱化,更像是政府官员而非职业经理人。纵观30多年的历史,国有企业的发展功不可没,在面临改革深水区时,核心问题就是解决国有企业公司治理问题;高管的激励机制成为改革的重中之重;由于国有企业高管身份特殊,具备“准官员”身份,使得研究政治晋升问题有着“标新立意”的意义。以“锦标赛晋升机制”作为视角,国资委作为委任国有企业高管的直接负责人,考核标准单一;这使得国有企业高管谋求企业资本以及规模的扩张,实现企业的发展能更好地实现企业和个人的双赢具备可能性。从另一方面说,国有企业由于背景特殊,与政府有着不可分割的依赖粘性,即使国有企高管具备的职业经理人身份,其向政府“寻租”可以为企业的发展谋求更好的条件以及更多的便利。以上逻辑表明,国有企业高管追求政治晋升在现实中具备可行性和必要性。作为国有企业高管在面临能够实现政治晋升机会时,探索能够实现扩张“规模”性质的管理活动可以解决委托-代理问题的先天矛盾。并购行为作为扩张规模挖掘企业核心竞争能力的手段之一,国企高管如何应用该手段?在以往相关文献回顾的基础上,实证研究探讨了高管政治晋升、并购规模、并购规模以及并购绩效。研究样本选取的是2004至2013年间沪、深A股上市的国有控股上市公司,实证结果显示:面对不同程度的政治晋升可能性,相比较其他方式,并购是国有企业高管选择的最普遍方式。多数发生政治晋升行为的高管都在发生变更前的1-2年进行过并购行为。存在高管政治晋升的主并购方企业对于并购规模的选择正相关性,可能性越大的国企高管,并购规模就越大。主并购方企业一旦进行并购选择,在就会在企业动态的过程中,不断增加资本投入量,值得注意的是并购规模呈现“倒U型”曲线,到达了峰值临界点之后,扩张规模可能适得其反,背离目标。虽然国有企业高管出发点在于利用政府“扶持之手”实现企业的发展、个人的升迁。但不可否认的是,从长远来看并购绩效不容乐观,发生政治晋升行为的国有企业其并购绩效相对较差。本文的研究意义在于强调了并购行为的风险,需要完善国有企业并购项目的选择;对于国企高管来说,“问责制度”不够明晰,多数高管只需要对担任高管期间业绩负责,使得其仅仅将担任职业经理人作为升迁的跳板。不可否认的是,管理者行为对于企业具有滞后性,类似主并购方企业并购行为的考察要延长时间跨度,否则会造成国有资产的流失和浪费。从理论来说,政治晋升是一种隐性激励,需要和显性激励发挥协同作用,通过声誉、自我实现等改善公司治理质量,国企高管为了实现“准官员”的政治升迁,会在意“企业家”身份的未来,有助于分析一些国有企业的行为。
[Abstract]:There are always two paradoxes in the process of corporate governance: state-owned enterprise executives as professional managers, although the salary is relatively low, but corporate performance is growing at a high speed. At the same time, the research shows that the growth rate of capital preservation in state-owned enterprises does not have a significant positive impact on the promotion of senior executives, which indicates that the development mode of state-owned enterprises is still "scale-oriented"; the executive compensation in state-owned enterprises is not. State-owned enterprises have a significant impact on the promotion of senior executives in state-owned enterprises. The status of senior executives in state-owned enterprises is weakened, more like government officials than professional managers. Incentive mechanism has become the top priority of the reform; because of the special status of senior executives in state-owned enterprises and the status of "quasi-official", the study of political promotion has the meaning of "innovative ideas". On the other hand, because of the special background, state-owned enterprises have an inseparable dependence on the government, even if state-owned enterprise executives have the status of professional managers, they "seek" the government. The above logic shows that the pursuit of political promotion by executives of state-owned enterprises is feasible and necessary in reality. As executives of state-owned enterprises, when faced with the opportunity to achieve political promotion, it is possible to explore management activities that can expand the "scale" nature. Solving the congenital contradiction of the principal-agent problem. As one of the means to expand the scale and tap the core competitiveness of enterprises, how do the executives of state-owned enterprises use this method? Based on the review of relevant literature, this paper empirically studies the political promotion of executives, the scale of mergers and acquisitions, the scale of mergers and acquisitions and the performance of mergers and acquisitions. From 2004 to 2013 in Shanghai, Shenzhen A-share listed state-owned listed companies, the empirical results show that: in the face of varying degrees of political promotion possibilities, compared with other ways, mergers and acquisitions are the most common choice of state-owned enterprise executives. The choice of M&A scale is positively correlated with the choice of M&A scale by the main merger and acquisition enterprises with political promotion. The larger the possibility of the executives of state-owned enterprises, the larger the scale of M&A. After the peak of the critical point, the expansion of the scale may be counterproductive, deviating from the goal. Although the starting point of state-owned enterprise executives is to use the government's "hands" to achieve the development of enterprises, personal promotion. But it is undeniable that in the long run, the performance of mergers and acquisitions is not optimistic. The significance of this study is to emphasize the risk of mergers and acquisitions, need to improve the choice of state-owned enterprise mergers and acquisitions projects; for state-owned enterprise executives, "accountability system" is not clear enough, most executives only need to be responsible for the performance of senior executives, so that they will only serve as professional managers as a springboard for promotion. In theory, political promotion is a kind of implicit incentive, which needs to cooperate with explicit incentive to improve corporate governance through reputation and self-realization. Quantity, in order to achieve the political promotion of "prospective officials", executives of state-owned enterprises will care about the future of "entrepreneurship", which helps to analyze the behavior of some state-owned enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：辽宁大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F276.1;F271;F275;F272.91
本文编号：2235084
[Abstract]:There are always two paradoxes in the process of corporate governance: state-owned enterprise executives as professional managers, although the salary is relatively low, but corporate performance is growing at a high speed. At the same time, the research shows that the growth rate of capital preservation in state-owned enterprises does not have a significant positive impact on the promotion of senior executives, which indicates that the development mode of state-owned enterprises is still "scale-oriented"; the executive compensation in state-owned enterprises is not. State-owned enterprises have a significant impact on the promotion of senior executives in state-owned enterprises. The status of senior executives in state-owned enterprises is weakened, more like government officials than professional managers. Incentive mechanism has become the top priority of the reform; because of the special status of senior executives in state-owned enterprises and the status of "quasi-official", the study of political promotion has the meaning of "innovative ideas". On the other hand, because of the special background, state-owned enterprises have an inseparable dependence on the government, even if state-owned enterprise executives have the status of professional managers, they "seek" the government. The above logic shows that the pursuit of political promotion by executives of state-owned enterprises is feasible and necessary in reality. As executives of state-owned enterprises, when faced with the opportunity to achieve political promotion, it is possible to explore management activities that can expand the "scale" nature. Solving the congenital contradiction of the principal-agent problem. As one of the means to expand the scale and tap the core competitiveness of enterprises, how do the executives of state-owned enterprises use this method? Based on the review of relevant literature, this paper empirically studies the political promotion of executives, the scale of mergers and acquisitions, the scale of mergers and acquisitions and the performance of mergers and acquisitions. From 2004 to 2013 in Shanghai, Shenzhen A-share listed state-owned listed companies, the empirical results show that: in the face of varying degrees of political promotion possibilities, compared with other ways, mergers and acquisitions are the most common choice of state-owned enterprise executives. The choice of M&A scale is positively correlated with the choice of M&A scale by the main merger and acquisition enterprises with political promotion. The larger the possibility of the executives of state-owned enterprises, the larger the scale of M&A. After the peak of the critical point, the expansion of the scale may be counterproductive, deviating from the goal. Although the starting point of state-owned enterprise executives is to use the government's "hands" to achieve the development of enterprises, personal promotion. But it is undeniable that in the long run, the performance of mergers and acquisitions is not optimistic. The significance of this study is to emphasize the risk of mergers and acquisitions, need to improve the choice of state-owned enterprise mergers and acquisitions projects; for state-owned enterprise executives, "accountability system" is not clear enough, most executives only need to be responsible for the performance of senior executives, so that they will only serve as professional managers as a springboard for promotion. In theory, political promotion is a kind of implicit incentive, which needs to cooperate with explicit incentive to improve corporate governance through reputation and self-realization. Quantity, in order to achieve the political promotion of "prospective officials", executives of state-owned enterprises will care about the future of "entrepreneurship", which helps to analyze the behavior of some state-owned enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：辽宁大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F276.1;F271;F275;F272.91
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 武文超;;国企管理层政治晋升激励与会计盈余质量研究[J];会计之友;2016年17期
2 赵立彬;赵妍;;高管年龄与公司并购——基于政治晋升激励视角[J];投资研究;2016年07期
3 余绪鹏;;官员晋升锦标赛:经济增长的政治逻辑——基于相关文献的梳理与分析[J];华东经济管理;2016年06期
4 曹伟;杨德明;赵璨;;政治晋升预期与高管腐败——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J];经济学动态;2016年02期
5 葛结根;;并购支付方式与并购绩效的实证研究——以沪深上市公司为收购目标的经验证据[J];会计研究;2015年09期
6 宋淑琴;代淑江;;管理者过度自信、并购类型与并购绩效[J];宏观经济研究;2015年05期
7 郭广珍;张平;;政治晋升、财政分权与地方政府消费性支出:理论与实证分析[J];世界经济文汇;2014年04期
8 王曾;符国群;黄丹阳;汪剑锋;;国有企业CEO“政治晋升”与“在职消费”关系研究[J];管理世界;2014年05期
9 陈仕华;姜广省;卢昌崇;;董事联结、目标公司选择与并购绩效——基于并购双方之间信息不对称的研究视角[J];管理世界;2013年12期
10 田高良;韩洁;李留闯;;连锁董事与并购绩效——来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据[J];南开管理评论;2013年06期
相关硕士学位论文 前3条
1 张晨宇;晋升机会对薪酬差距的影响研究[D];西南财经大学;2014年
2 盘宇章;财政分权改革、政治晋升与公共支出结构[D];西南财经大学;2011年
3 李丽;基于BHAR法的上市公司并购长期绩效的实证研究[D];南京航空航天大学;2007年
，本文编号：2235084
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/guanlilunwen/jixiaoguanli/2235084.html
