管理者过度自信、债务容量与并购溢价
发布时间：2018-09-19 13:58
【摘要】：政策利好与经济转型的双重驱动,国内并购交易规模在最近十年大幅提升,并购重组已逐渐成为资本市场中企业实现跨越式发展的重要方式。并购交易市场火热的背后隐藏着高溢价的隐性地雷,过高的溢价支付影响了资本市场中公司的并购效率与并购绩效,但企业高层管理者仍然热衷支付高额并购溢价。一般说来,企业高管在并购相关决策中起着举足轻重的作用,除了必要的经济利益驱动,高层管理者的个体特质与认知偏差也会深刻影响并购决策的最终走向,过度自信的管理者较易高估自己的管理能力从而产生决策偏差,因此从行为金融学角度研究管理者的并购溢价支付行为具有较强的理论与现实意义。同时,管理者过度自信的企业较其他企业更偏好债务融资,负债能力的大小对管理者的经营决策也有着重要影响,所以本文从企业的债务容量或者说债务能力角度出发,研究管理者过度自信与并购溢价的关系。本文以2007-2015年的并购交易事件为研究对象,结合现有文献的研究结果梳理了目前管理者过度自信、债务容量与并购溢价的研究现状,基于前景理论、高阶理论与自我归因偏差理论分析了管理者过度自信对并购溢价支付的影响,同时从融资优序理论、委托代理理论与债务约束角度出发分析了债务容量的调节作用,从而提出了本文的三个假设。通过理论与实证分析,本文得出以下结论:管理者过度自信的公司在并购决策中更容易支付较高溢价;管理者过度自信的民营企业比国有企业更可能支付高溢价;管理者过度自信的公司支付较高溢价,债务容量在其中起着正向调节作用。债务容量的大小影响公司的举债成本与难易程度,而过度自信的管理者一般偏好债务融资,债务容量大的公司更容易获得低成本且限制小的可支配债务资本,所以在并购决策中,债务容量大的管理者过度自信公司更容易发生过度支付行为。根据上述研究成果,本文提出了四点建议:首先是完善公司的内部治理机制,适当限制职业经理人的控制权;其次是建立高层管理者学习与进修机制,建立良好的学习机制;第三是改进管理者激励与考核机制,减少管理者的盲目性;最后要完善债权人对企业经营管理决策的监管机制。
[Abstract]:The domestic M & A transaction scale has been greatly increased in the last ten years, and M & A has gradually become an important way for enterprises to achieve leapfrog development in the capital market. There is a hidden mine of high premium behind the hot M & A market. The excessive premium payment affects the efficiency and performance of M & A in the capital market, but the top managers are still keen to pay the high M & A premium. Generally speaking, corporate executives play an important role in M & A related decisions. Besides the necessary economic benefits driving, the individual characteristics and cognitive bias of senior managers will also profoundly affect the final trend of M & A decisions. Overconfident managers tend to overestimate their management ability, which leads to decision deviation. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study managers'M & A premium payment behavior from the perspective of behavioral finance. At the same time, enterprises with overconfidence of managers prefer debt financing more than other enterprises, and the size of debt ability also has an important impact on managers' management decisions, so this paper starts from the perspective of debt capacity or debt capacity of enterprises. To study the relationship between manager overconfidence and M & A premium. Taking the M & A events from 2007 to 2015 as the research object, this paper combs the current research status of managers' overconfidence, debt capacity and M & A premium, based on the prospect theory, combined with the research results of the existing literature. Higher order theory and self-attribution deviation theory analyze the influence of manager overconfidence on M & A premium payment. At the same time, from the perspective of financing order theory, principal-agent theory and debt constraint theory, this paper analyzes the regulating effect of debt capacity. Thus, three hypotheses of this paper are put forward. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions: managers overconfident companies are more likely to pay a higher premium in M & A decisions, private enterprises with managers overconfidence are more likely to pay a high premium than state-owned enterprises. Overconfident managers pay a higher premium, and debt capacity plays a positive role. The size of debt capacity affects the cost and ease of borrowing, while overconfident managers tend to prefer debt financing, and companies with large debt capacities are more likely to have access to low-cost and limited disposable debt capital. Therefore, in the M & A decision, overconfident managers with large debt capacity are more likely to overpay. Based on the above research results, this paper puts forward four suggestions: first, to perfect the internal governance mechanism of the company, and to restrict the control rights of professional managers; secondly, to establish the learning and learning mechanism of senior managers and establish a good learning mechanism. The third is to improve the incentive and appraisal mechanism of managers to reduce the blindness of managers, and finally to perfect the supervision mechanism of creditors on the decision-making of enterprise management.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.91;F275;F271.4
[Abstract]:The domestic M & A transaction scale has been greatly increased in the last ten years, and M & A has gradually become an important way for enterprises to achieve leapfrog development in the capital market. There is a hidden mine of high premium behind the hot M & A market. The excessive premium payment affects the efficiency and performance of M & A in the capital market, but the top managers are still keen to pay the high M & A premium. Generally speaking, corporate executives play an important role in M & A related decisions. Besides the necessary economic benefits driving, the individual characteristics and cognitive bias of senior managers will also profoundly affect the final trend of M & A decisions. Overconfident managers tend to overestimate their management ability, which leads to decision deviation. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study managers'M & A premium payment behavior from the perspective of behavioral finance. At the same time, enterprises with overconfidence of managers prefer debt financing more than other enterprises, and the size of debt ability also has an important impact on managers' management decisions, so this paper starts from the perspective of debt capacity or debt capacity of enterprises. To study the relationship between manager overconfidence and M & A premium. Taking the M & A events from 2007 to 2015 as the research object, this paper combs the current research status of managers' overconfidence, debt capacity and M & A premium, based on the prospect theory, combined with the research results of the existing literature. Higher order theory and self-attribution deviation theory analyze the influence of manager overconfidence on M & A premium payment. At the same time, from the perspective of financing order theory, principal-agent theory and debt constraint theory, this paper analyzes the regulating effect of debt capacity. Thus, three hypotheses of this paper are put forward. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions: managers overconfident companies are more likely to pay a higher premium in M & A decisions, private enterprises with managers overconfidence are more likely to pay a high premium than state-owned enterprises. Overconfident managers pay a higher premium, and debt capacity plays a positive role. The size of debt capacity affects the cost and ease of borrowing, while overconfident managers tend to prefer debt financing, and companies with large debt capacities are more likely to have access to low-cost and limited disposable debt capital. Therefore, in the M & A decision, overconfident managers with large debt capacity are more likely to overpay. Based on the above research results, this paper puts forward four suggestions: first, to perfect the internal governance mechanism of the company, and to restrict the control rights of professional managers; secondly, to establish the learning and learning mechanism of senior managers and establish a good learning mechanism. The third is to improve the incentive and appraisal mechanism of managers to reduce the blindness of managers, and finally to perfect the supervision mechanism of creditors on the decision-making of enterprise management.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.91;F275;F271.4
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