产权性质、管理层权力与薪酬差距激励效应——基于政府补助的中介作用

发布时间：2018-10-22 10:17

【摘要】：薪酬差距激励效应一直是理论研究和实证研究的热点。锦标赛理论和行为理论忽略了管理层权力的影响,因而对薪酬差距激励效应的解释能力有限。将管理层权力引入研究框架,以政府补助为中介变量,检验管理层权力通过政府补助作用于薪酬差距的具体过程和经济后果,以及公司内外部机制的治理作用。特别地,考虑中国特殊的制度环境,国有企业改革导致管理层权力不断提升和膨胀,基于产权性质的视角展开对比研究。以2010年至2014年沪深A股上市公司7 999个观测值为样本,运用SAS 9.2和多元回归方法进行实证研究。研究结果表明,在管理层权力的作用下,政府补助加剧高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距,与民营企业相比,国有企业获得的政府补助更能加大薪酬差距;进一步地,将薪酬差距分解为管理层从政府补助中攫取的权力性薪酬差距和剔除政府补助影响后的薪酬差距后发现,权力性薪酬差距起负向激励效应,降低企业未来绩效,并且在国有企业中权力性薪酬差距的负向激励效应更强;剔除政府补助影响后的薪酬差距能够起到正面激励效应,提高企业未来绩效,并且该效应不因产权性质的不同而改变。深入研究还发现,以董事会和政府干预为代表的内外部机制能够起到有效的治理作用,董事会规模越小、独立董事比例越高、董事会会议次数越多、政府干预程度越高,权力性薪酬差距的负向激励效应越弱。研究结论不仅为薪酬差距激励效应的研究提供理论上的补充,也为上市公司制定更优的薪酬契约和完善的治理机制提供理论依据和指导。
[Abstract]:The incentive effect of salary gap has always been the focus of theoretical and empirical research. Tournament theory and behavior theory ignore the influence of management power, so the ability to explain the incentive effect of salary gap is limited. This paper introduces the management power into the research framework, taking government subsidy as the intermediary variable, examines the concrete process and economic consequences of the executive power acting on the pay gap through the government subsidy, and the governance function of the internal and external mechanism of the company. In particular, considering the special institutional environment of China, the reform of state-owned enterprises leads to the continuous promotion and expansion of management power, and a comparative study based on the nature of property rights is carried out. Based on the data of 7,999 A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2014, the empirical study was carried out by using SAS 9.2 and multiple regression method. The results show that, under the influence of management power, government subsidies aggravate the pay gap between executives and ordinary employees. Compared with private enterprises, the government subsidies to state-owned enterprises can increase the pay gap. The pay gap is divided into the power pay gap which the management takes from the government subsidy and the compensation gap after excluding the influence of the government subsidy. It is found that the power pay gap plays a negative incentive effect and reduces the future performance of the enterprise. And in state-owned enterprises, the negative incentive effect of the power pay gap is stronger; excluding the influence of government subsidies, the pay gap can play a positive incentive effect, improve the future performance of enterprises, and this effect does not change according to the nature of property rights. It is also found that the internal and external mechanism represented by the board of directors and government intervention can play an effective governance role. The smaller the board size, the higher the proportion of independent directors, the more the number of directors' meetings, the higher the degree of government intervention. The negative incentive effect of power pay gap is weaker. The conclusion not only provides a theoretical supplement for the study of the incentive effect of salary gap, but also provides theoretical basis and guidance for the listed companies to formulate better salary contract and perfect governance mechanism.
【作者单位】：同济大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71202032)~~
【分类号】：F271;F272.92

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