促销环境下考虑程序公平关切的供应链运作协调研究
发布时间：2018-11-18 11:56
【摘要】：传统供应链管理文献都是以理性人假设作为研究基础。随着经济和信息技术的不断发展,旧的研究范式已经不能够解释现实中的所有问题。近年来,有限理性理论凭借着强大的现实解释力逐渐成为理论主流。根据有限理性的观点,决策者的决策行为是理性的,但会受制于知识、时间等因素造成的个人处理信息能力的局限性,而决策过程会受到决策者不同的行为偏好的影响。公平关切就是一种典型的行为偏好,广泛地存在于决策者间的交互中。很多商业案例和学术研究中都可以看到它的存在。在过去的几十年里,对公平关切行为偏好的观察主要包括两个维度——分配公平关切和程序公平关切。分配公平关切指人们不仅偏好更高的绝对收益,也会偏好与其他人的收益相比更高的绝对收益。而程序公平关切则是指人们追求公平过程,更在乎分配结果产生的程序是否公平。尽管很多的研究者通过数理模型和实证调查的方式对供应链中的分配公平关切行为进行了研究,但却少有文献从供应链层面上对程序公平关切进行研究,但大量的实际案例说明程序公平与分配公平对维持供应链关系同样重要。因此,本文首次建立了程序公平关切行为供应链模型,具体探讨了程序公平关切行为对供应链决策的作用机理和考虑程序公平关切的供应链的协调问题,并对程序公平关切和分配公平关切这两种行为对供应链的影响进行了比较。本文的模型被设定于促销环境中,具体研究由一个供应商和一个具有程序公平关切的零售商组成的Stackelberg博弈问题。参考相关文献,我们使用参与度(engagement)来刻画公平过程。作为领导者,供应商拥有决定是否使用公平过程的决策权力;作为追随者,零售商会判断决策程序是否公平。当公平过程没被使用时,当零售商的实际利润低于程序公平参考点时,程序公平关切会降低零售商的效用。根据建立的模型,本文可以被分为两个部分:第三章首先分析供应商和零售商各自的决策过程并求得了博弈均衡结果,在此基础上研究了程序公平关切行为对供应链决策和绩效的作用,最后分析了程序公平关切行为供应链的协调性。第四章比较了相同模型背景下零售商的程序公平关切行为和分配公平关切行为对供应链决策和绩效的影响。本文的主要结论如下:(1)在供应链的促销环境下,无论零售商是否具有程序公平关切,供应商都不会使用公平过程。(2)在零售商程序公平关切行为作用下,当零售商对程序不公平的厌恶超出一定程度时,零售商并不能从程序公平关切行为中受益,但供应链整体效率总能得到提高。(3)供应商可以通过补贴零售商通道费用的方式,使用一个批发价格使程序公平关切行为供应链实现协调。(4)分配公平关切行为更有益于零售商个体利润提高,而程序公平关切行为更有利于供应链整体绩效提高。本文是对供应链中程序公平关切的初步的基础性研究,同时,它也与现实中商业运作行为紧密相关。因此,本文不仅拓展了公平关切行为和供应链关系的相关学术研究,也为现实中的供应链决策提供了有用的管理启示。
[Abstract]:The traditional supply chain management literature is based on the rational hypothesis. With the development of economy and information technology, the old research paradigm has not been able to explain all the problems in the reality. In recent years, the theory of limited reason has gradually become the mainstream of the theory with the powerful realistic explanation. According to the view of limited reason, the decision-making behavior of the decision-maker is rational, but is subject to the limitation of the ability of the individual to deal with the information caused by the factors such as knowledge and time, and the decision-making process can be influenced by the different behavior preference of the decision-maker. The fair concern is a typical behavior preference that is widely present in the interaction between decision-makers. It can be seen in many business cases and academic studies. Over the past few decades, the observation of the preference for equitable concern mainly includes two dimensions _ the distribution of equitable concerns and procedural fairness concerns. The distribution of fair concerns means that people not only prefer higher absolute benefits, but also have higher absolute returns than others. While procedural fairness concerns the pursuit of a fair process, more care is given to whether the process of distribution is fair. Although many researchers have studied the distribution of fair concerns in the supply chain through the way of mathematical model and empirical investigation, there is little literature to study the procedural fairness at the supply chain level, However, a large number of practical cases indicate that the fairness and distribution of the process are equally important to the maintenance of supply chain relationships. Therefore, the paper first set up a supply chain model of the procedural fairness concern behavior, and specifically discusses the role mechanism of the process fairness concern behavior on the supply chain decision and the coordination problem of the supply chain, which takes into account the fairness of the process, The effects of these two acts on the supply chain were compared and the procedural fairness concerns and the distribution of fair concerns were compared. The model of this paper is set in the promotion environment, and the Stackelberg game problem, which is composed of a supplier and a retailer with procedural fairness, is studied. With reference to the relevant literature, we use the engagement to characterize the fairness process. As a leader, the supplier has the right to decide whether to use the decision-making power of the fair process; as a follower, the retailer will judge whether the decision-making process is fair. When the fair process is not used, the procedural fairness concerns the effectiveness of the retailer when the actual profit of the retailer is lower than the program's fair reference point. Based on the established model, this paper can be divided into two parts: the third chapter first analyzes the decision-making process of the supplier and the retailer and obtains the game equilibrium result, and then studies the role of the program's fair-concern behavior on the decision-making and performance of the supply chain, Finally, the coordination of the program's fair and concerned behavior supply chain is analyzed. The fourth chapter compares the behavior of the retailer in the background of the same model and the effect on the decision-making and performance of the supply chain. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) Under the promotion environment of the supply chain, no matter whether the retailer has the procedural fairness, the supplier will not use the fair process. (2) Under the action of the retailer's process of fairness and concern, when the retailer's aversion to the process is beyond a certain level, the retailer cannot benefit from the procedural fairness concerns, but the overall efficiency of the supply chain can always be improved. (3) The supplier can use an out-of-the-art form of subsidizing the cost of the retailer's channels to coordinate the process's equitable and concerns-driven supply chain. (4) The distribution of equitable concerns is more beneficial to the increase in the individual profits of the retailer, while the procedural fairness concerns are more conducive to the improvement of the overall performance of the supply chain. This paper is a basic research on the fairness of the process in the supply chain, and it is also closely related to the commercial operation in the real world. Therefore, this paper not only expands the relevant academic research of the relationship between the fair-concerned behavior and the supply chain, but also provides useful management inspiration for the supply chain decision-making in the real world.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274
本文编号：2339981
[Abstract]:The traditional supply chain management literature is based on the rational hypothesis. With the development of economy and information technology, the old research paradigm has not been able to explain all the problems in the reality. In recent years, the theory of limited reason has gradually become the mainstream of the theory with the powerful realistic explanation. According to the view of limited reason, the decision-making behavior of the decision-maker is rational, but is subject to the limitation of the ability of the individual to deal with the information caused by the factors such as knowledge and time, and the decision-making process can be influenced by the different behavior preference of the decision-maker. The fair concern is a typical behavior preference that is widely present in the interaction between decision-makers. It can be seen in many business cases and academic studies. Over the past few decades, the observation of the preference for equitable concern mainly includes two dimensions _ the distribution of equitable concerns and procedural fairness concerns. The distribution of fair concerns means that people not only prefer higher absolute benefits, but also have higher absolute returns than others. While procedural fairness concerns the pursuit of a fair process, more care is given to whether the process of distribution is fair. Although many researchers have studied the distribution of fair concerns in the supply chain through the way of mathematical model and empirical investigation, there is little literature to study the procedural fairness at the supply chain level, However, a large number of practical cases indicate that the fairness and distribution of the process are equally important to the maintenance of supply chain relationships. Therefore, the paper first set up a supply chain model of the procedural fairness concern behavior, and specifically discusses the role mechanism of the process fairness concern behavior on the supply chain decision and the coordination problem of the supply chain, which takes into account the fairness of the process, The effects of these two acts on the supply chain were compared and the procedural fairness concerns and the distribution of fair concerns were compared. The model of this paper is set in the promotion environment, and the Stackelberg game problem, which is composed of a supplier and a retailer with procedural fairness, is studied. With reference to the relevant literature, we use the engagement to characterize the fairness process. As a leader, the supplier has the right to decide whether to use the decision-making power of the fair process; as a follower, the retailer will judge whether the decision-making process is fair. When the fair process is not used, the procedural fairness concerns the effectiveness of the retailer when the actual profit of the retailer is lower than the program's fair reference point. Based on the established model, this paper can be divided into two parts: the third chapter first analyzes the decision-making process of the supplier and the retailer and obtains the game equilibrium result, and then studies the role of the program's fair-concern behavior on the decision-making and performance of the supply chain, Finally, the coordination of the program's fair and concerned behavior supply chain is analyzed. The fourth chapter compares the behavior of the retailer in the background of the same model and the effect on the decision-making and performance of the supply chain. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) Under the promotion environment of the supply chain, no matter whether the retailer has the procedural fairness, the supplier will not use the fair process. (2) Under the action of the retailer's process of fairness and concern, when the retailer's aversion to the process is beyond a certain level, the retailer cannot benefit from the procedural fairness concerns, but the overall efficiency of the supply chain can always be improved. (3) The supplier can use an out-of-the-art form of subsidizing the cost of the retailer's channels to coordinate the process's equitable and concerns-driven supply chain. (4) The distribution of equitable concerns is more beneficial to the increase in the individual profits of the retailer, while the procedural fairness concerns are more conducive to the improvement of the overall performance of the supply chain. This paper is a basic research on the fairness of the process in the supply chain, and it is also closely related to the commercial operation in the real world. Therefore, this paper not only expands the relevant academic research of the relationship between the fair-concerned behavior and the supply chain, but also provides useful management inspiration for the supply chain decision-making in the real world.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274
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