管理层权力、内部控制质量与并购绩效研究
发布时间：2018-11-28 17:42
【摘要】：并购一直是资本市场上经久不衰的话题,通过并购企业不仅可以扩大自身市场占有率,创造价值增值,而且可以优化配置资源、提质增效,同时向市场释放经济新活力。管理层作为并购方案的制定者和实施者,从并购方案的选择到并购方案的具体实施,再到并购整合等各个阶段,他们的行为动机直接影响企业并购的效果。在管理者利益动机下,管理层会选择一些有违于股东意愿的高风险项目;由于信息不对称等原因,股东又不能及时全面监督和控制管理层的投资决策。而企业内部控制的主要目的是从监督和制衡两方面制约企业不道德风险,进而降低代理成本,牵制管理层权力滥用;完善的内部控制不仅可以优化并购战略目标的选择,还可以减少利益冲突。基于此,本文着重研究管理层权力、内部控制质量以及二者共同作用对企业并购绩效的影响。本文以2008年-2015年已实际完成并购行为的2163家收购方企业为研究样本,以委托代理理论、寻租理论与不完全契约理论为依据,建立多元回归模型,研究管理层权力、内部控制质量对并购绩效的作用机理,验证所有权和经营权分离的经营模式下,管理层权力实力雄厚是否会追求个人利益最大化而影响并购绩效;高质量内部控制是否提供良好并购环境从而优化并购绩效;不同质量内部控制作用在管理层权力上,对并购效果和业绩是否产生有效影响。实证研究结果发现:在追逐私人利益的欲望诱惑下,管理层权力的肆意扩张对并购绩效的提升具有抑制作用;高质量内部控制有效监督和制衡并购活动的进行,对并购绩效的提升具有明显的促进作用;有效内部控制通过控制措施制约管理层权力的滥用,使其无法凌驾于内部控制之上,进而限制管理层权力过大对并购绩效提升的抑制作用。本文研究结论表明管理层权力、内部控制质量会对并购绩效产生影响,且内部控制制度对管理层权力具有监督作用,有利于提高并购绩效。由此可见,企业需加强治理结构建设,形成合理薪酬契约制度,缓解实物中存在的代理问题和“权力寻租”问题;同时要加强并购交易内部控制制度的建设,提高企业内部控制质量。
[Abstract]:M & A has been an enduring topic in the capital market. M & A enterprises can not only expand their own market share, create value added value, but also optimize the allocation of resources, improve quality and efficiency, at the same time release new economic vitality to the market. As the framers and implementers of the M & A scheme, the managers' behavior motivation influences the effect of M & A directly from the choice of the M & A scheme to the concrete implementation of the M & A scheme, and to the M & A integration stage. Under the motivation of managers' interests, the management will choose some high-risk projects which are contrary to the wishes of shareholders, and because of the information asymmetry, shareholders can not supervise and control the management's investment decisions in a timely and comprehensive manner. The main purpose of enterprise internal control is to restrict the enterprise immoral hazard from two aspects of supervision and balance, and then reduce the agency cost and restrain the abuse of management power. Perfect internal control can not only optimize the choice of strategic goal of M & A, but also reduce conflicts of interest. Based on this, this paper focuses on the influence of management power, internal control quality and their combined effects on corporate M & A performance. This paper takes 2163 acquirers who have actually completed mergers and acquisitions from 2008 to 2015 as research samples, based on principal-agent theory, rent-seeking theory and incomplete contract theory, establishes a multi-regression model to study the power of management. The function mechanism of internal control quality on M & A performance, to verify that under the management mode of separation of ownership and management right, whether the management power strength will pursue the maximization of personal interests and affect the M & A performance; Whether the internal control of high quality provides a good environment for M & A to optimize the performance of M & A; whether the effect of internal control of different quality has an effective influence on the effect and performance of M & A on the power of management. The empirical results show that: under the temptation of pursuing private interests, the wanton expansion of management power can inhibit the improvement of M & A performance; The high quality internal control effectively supervises and checks and balances the merger and acquisition activity, has the obvious promotion function to the merger and acquisition performance enhancement; Effective internal control restricts the abuse of management power through control measures, which makes it impossible to override the internal control, and then limits the restraining effect of excessive management power on the improvement of M & A performance. The conclusion of this paper shows that the power of management and the quality of internal control will influence the performance of M & A, and the system of internal control can supervise the power of management, which is helpful to improve the performance of M & A. It can be seen that enterprises should strengthen the construction of governance structure, form a reasonable salary contract system, and alleviate the problems of agency and "power rent seeking" existing in real objects. At the same time, we should strengthen the construction of internal control system of M & A transactions and improve the quality of internal control of enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：吉林财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F272.91;F275
本文编号：2363737
[Abstract]:M & A has been an enduring topic in the capital market. M & A enterprises can not only expand their own market share, create value added value, but also optimize the allocation of resources, improve quality and efficiency, at the same time release new economic vitality to the market. As the framers and implementers of the M & A scheme, the managers' behavior motivation influences the effect of M & A directly from the choice of the M & A scheme to the concrete implementation of the M & A scheme, and to the M & A integration stage. Under the motivation of managers' interests, the management will choose some high-risk projects which are contrary to the wishes of shareholders, and because of the information asymmetry, shareholders can not supervise and control the management's investment decisions in a timely and comprehensive manner. The main purpose of enterprise internal control is to restrict the enterprise immoral hazard from two aspects of supervision and balance, and then reduce the agency cost and restrain the abuse of management power. Perfect internal control can not only optimize the choice of strategic goal of M & A, but also reduce conflicts of interest. Based on this, this paper focuses on the influence of management power, internal control quality and their combined effects on corporate M & A performance. This paper takes 2163 acquirers who have actually completed mergers and acquisitions from 2008 to 2015 as research samples, based on principal-agent theory, rent-seeking theory and incomplete contract theory, establishes a multi-regression model to study the power of management. The function mechanism of internal control quality on M & A performance, to verify that under the management mode of separation of ownership and management right, whether the management power strength will pursue the maximization of personal interests and affect the M & A performance; Whether the internal control of high quality provides a good environment for M & A to optimize the performance of M & A; whether the effect of internal control of different quality has an effective influence on the effect and performance of M & A on the power of management. The empirical results show that: under the temptation of pursuing private interests, the wanton expansion of management power can inhibit the improvement of M & A performance; The high quality internal control effectively supervises and checks and balances the merger and acquisition activity, has the obvious promotion function to the merger and acquisition performance enhancement; Effective internal control restricts the abuse of management power through control measures, which makes it impossible to override the internal control, and then limits the restraining effect of excessive management power on the improvement of M & A performance. The conclusion of this paper shows that the power of management and the quality of internal control will influence the performance of M & A, and the system of internal control can supervise the power of management, which is helpful to improve the performance of M & A. It can be seen that enterprises should strengthen the construction of governance structure, form a reasonable salary contract system, and alleviate the problems of agency and "power rent seeking" existing in real objects. At the same time, we should strengthen the construction of internal control system of M & A transactions and improve the quality of internal control of enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：吉林财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F272.91;F275
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