混合所有制企业的股东利益冲突、股权混合模式与公司绩效

发布时间：2019-01-14 13:35

【摘要】：一直以来,股东利益冲突问题都是公司治理研究中一个经久不衰的课题,从股东与管理层间的利益冲突,到大股东与中小股东间的利益冲突,再到大股东间的利益冲突。但是,目前来看相较其他两种类型的利益冲突,对大股东间利益冲突的研究尚显不足。而在公司治理实践中,上市公司中的股权之争屡见不鲜,使我们不得不重视对大股东间利益冲突的研究。大股东间的利益冲突可能源于持股数量的差异,但更可能的是源于股东身份属性的不同,股东的异质性会影响股东间的关系,进而加剧股东间的利益冲突。因此,在国有大股东与非国有大股东并存的混合所有制企业中,所面临的股东利益冲突问题较之单一性质的企业将更为复杂。在混合所有制改革进程不断推进的当下,对由股东异质性所引起的国有大股东与非国有大股东之间的利益冲突的研究是其中一项极具现实意义的研究课题。本文以2009-2015年沪市A股中的混合所有制企业为研究样本,以持股近似度和持股关注度这两个新指标来衡量混合所有制企业中国有大股东与非国有大股东间的利益冲突,同时兼顾大股东与中小股东间的利益冲突,以股利支付率和资金净占用率作为其代理变量,进而研究混合所有制企业中的股东利益冲突、股权混合模式对公司绩效的影响。结果发现:①股东利益冲突会影响公司绩效。总体上,无论是代表国有大股东与非国有大股东间利益冲突的变量持股近似度和持股关注度,还是代表大股东与中小股东间利益冲突的变量股利支付率和资金净占用率,都与公司绩效负相关,说明股东利益冲突对公司绩效具有负面作用。特别是,国有大股东和非国有大股东的持股比例及其对公司的关注程度越接近,就越不利于公司绩效的提高。②不同的股权混合模式对混合所有制企业绩效的影响不同,并非所有的股权混合模式都能促进公司绩效的提升。国有大股东和非国有大股东持股比例差距适中的股权混合模式有利于提升公司绩效;两类股东持股比例差异过大或过小的股权混合模式均不利于提高公司绩效。因此,在混合所有制改革过程中,不宜过分强调异质性股东间的制衡作用,而应通过合理设计股权混合模式,有效化解大股东利益冲突,更好地发挥国有资本和非国有资本各自的优势。
[Abstract]:All along, the conflict of interest of shareholders is an enduring problem in the study of corporate governance, from the conflict of interest between shareholders and management, to the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders, and then to the conflict of interests between large shareholders and large shareholders. However, compared with the other two types of conflicts of interest, the research on the conflicts of interest among major shareholders is still insufficient. However, in the practice of corporate governance, there is a lot of controversy about the ownership of listed companies, which makes us pay more attention to the study of the conflicts of interest among the major shareholders. The conflict of interest among large shareholders may be due to the difference in the number of shareholders, but it is more likely to be due to the different identity of shareholders, the heterogeneity of shareholders will affect the relationship between shareholders, and then aggravate the conflict of interest among shareholders. Therefore, in the mixed ownership enterprises with the coexistence of state-owned large shareholders and non-state-owned large shareholders, the conflict of interests of shareholders will be more complex than that of the enterprises with a single nature. As the process of mixed ownership reform continues to advance, the research on the conflict of interest between the large state-owned shareholders and the non-state-owned major shareholders caused by the heterogeneity of shareholders is one of the most significant research topics. This paper takes the mixed ownership enterprises in Shanghai Stock Exchange 2009-2015 as the research sample, and measures the conflicts of interest between the large shareholders and the non-state-owned large shareholders of the mixed ownership enterprises in China by using the two new indexes of shareholding approximation and stock ownership concern. At the same time, taking into account the conflict of interest between the major shareholders and the minority shareholders, the paper takes the dividend payment rate and the net occupancy rate of funds as the proxy variables, and then studies the conflict of interest of the shareholders in the mixed ownership enterprises and the influence of the mixed equity mode on the performance of the company. The results show that: 1 shareholder conflict of interest will affect the performance of the company. On the whole, whether it is the degree of similarity and concern of shareholding on behalf of the conflict of interest between the major state-owned shareholder and the non-state-owned major shareholder, or the variable dividend payment rate and net occupancy rate of the capital, which represents the conflict of interest between the major shareholder and the minority shareholder. Both of them are negatively related to corporate performance, indicating that shareholders' conflict of interest has a negative effect on corporate performance. In particular, the more the proportion of large state-owned shareholders and non-state-owned major shareholders and the degree of concern to the company are close, the more unfavorable to the improvement of corporate performance. 2 different mixed stock ownership models have different effects on the performance of mixed ownership enterprises. Not all of the mixed equity models can promote corporate performance. The shareholding mixed mode with moderate difference between state-owned and non-state-owned major shareholders is beneficial to the improvement of corporate performance, while the two types of shareholding mixed mode with too large or too small shareholding ratio are not conducive to improving corporate performance. Therefore, in the process of mixed ownership reform, the checks and balances among heterogeneous shareholders should not be overemphasized, but the conflicts of interests of large shareholders should be effectively resolved by reasonably designing the mixed mode of equity ownership. Better give play to the respective advantages of state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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