高管薪酬对公司绩效的动态影响研究
发布时间：2019-06-21 01:18
【摘要】：高管薪酬与公司绩效之间的关系一直以来都是国内外学术界研究的重要课题。薪酬激励是使得高管人员提高贡献程度,提高公司绩效,预防产生自利行为的重要方式。高管薪酬从根本上讲是对资源的再优化配置,反映激励水平和方式。激励往往能起到持续作用于对象主体的目的,高管薪酬作为激励高管的方式,对公司绩效的影响不止于当期。在经济管理现代化的今天,因系统环境及政策传导的影响,经济活动主体的计划、决策与行动往往需要一定的过程。同时经济变量的相关反应会因为人们日常生活习惯的延续以及技术条件或者制度限制而产生滞后现象,通常会发生自变量与因变量的变动关系不同步等,且这种不同步关系可能表现为滞后、延滞或者持续效应。本文立足于我国独有的经济制度环境,基于公司治理相关的角度,在代理理论、波特与劳勒综合激励理论、管理层权利理论、和锦标赛理论的基础上,探讨了高管薪酬从不同维度影响公司绩效的关联过程和作用机理。并结合我国沪深A股上市公司的实践,研究高管薪酬对公司绩效的影响,从高管薪酬的水平、结构、差距三个方面分别探究其对公司绩效的影响。与现有研究不同的是,本研究不但关注的高管薪酬对公司当期绩效的影响,还关注这种影响的动态性、持续性,即当年的高管薪酬对后续年份公司绩效的影响。研究发现高管薪酬水平对公司绩效具有持续的促进作用,随着高管薪酬水平的提高,公司当期和未来绩效都会积极反应。而薪酬结构中的短期激励方式货币,对当年的公司绩效具有正向促进作用,但这种作用不会持续到后续年份。另外,在货币薪酬基础上加入了高管持股和在职消费的薪酬结构,相较于只有货币薪酬的结构对公司绩效的影响更弱;薪酬结构中的股权激励在当期并没有表现出对公司绩效的影响,而在与未来绩效的关系中却显著,呈现出滞后性。高管薪酬差距也具有持续促进公司绩效的作用,并且呈现出动态的提高。因此公司在设置高管薪酬时,应充分考虑其对公司绩效的影响,合理提高薪酬水平、注重结构中的货币薪酬与在职消费,并进一步挖掘股权的长期激励作用和适当的设置主要高管与普通高管之间的薪酬差距,使其能够在最大程度上激励高管们为公司的发展贡献力量。
[Abstract]:The relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance has always been an important topic in academic circles at home and abroad. Salary incentive is an important way for executives to improve their contribution, improve corporate performance and prevent self-interest behavior. Executive compensation is fundamentally the re-optimization of the allocation of resources, reflecting the level and mode of incentive. Incentive often plays a continuous role in the object of the purpose, executive compensation as a way to motivate executives, the impact on corporate performance is not only in the current period. In today's modernization of economic management, due to the influence of system environment and policy transmission, the planning, decision-making and action of the main body of economic activities often need a certain process. At the same time, the related reactions of economic variables will lag because of the continuation of people's daily living habits and the limitations of technical conditions or institutions. Usually, the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables will not be synchronized, and this out-of-sync relationship may show lag, delay or continuous effect. Based on the unique economic system environment of our country, based on the angle of corporate governance, on the basis of agency theory, Porter and Laughler's comprehensive incentive theory, management right theory and tournament theory, this paper discusses the related process and mechanism of executive compensation affecting corporate performance from different dimensions. Combined with the practice of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in China, this paper studies the influence of executive compensation on corporate performance, and explores its influence on corporate performance from three aspects: the level, structure and gap of executive compensation. Different from the existing research, this study not only pays attention to the impact of executive compensation on the current performance of the company, but also pays attention to the dynamic and sustainable impact of this impact, that is, the impact of executive compensation in that year on the performance of the company in the following years. It is found that the level of executive compensation has a continuous role in promoting corporate performance. With the improvement of executive compensation level, the current and future performance of the company will respond positively. The short-term incentive currency in the salary structure has a positive role in promoting corporate performance in that year, but this effect will not continue into subsequent years. In addition, on the basis of monetary compensation, the salary structure of executive shareholding and on-the-job consumption is added, which has a weaker influence on corporate performance than only the structure of monetary compensation. The equity incentive in the compensation structure does not show the impact on corporate performance in the current period, but in the relationship with future performance, it shows a lag. Executive pay gap also continues to promote corporate performance, and presents a dynamic improvement. Therefore, when setting up executive compensation, the company should fully consider its influence on the performance of the company, reasonably improve the salary level, pay attention to the monetary compensation and on-the-job consumption in the structure, and further excavate the long-term incentive role of equity and the pay gap between the main executives and the ordinary executives, so that it can encourage the executives to contribute to the development of the company to the greatest extent.
【学位授予单位】：华东交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F275
本文编号：2503676
[Abstract]:The relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance has always been an important topic in academic circles at home and abroad. Salary incentive is an important way for executives to improve their contribution, improve corporate performance and prevent self-interest behavior. Executive compensation is fundamentally the re-optimization of the allocation of resources, reflecting the level and mode of incentive. Incentive often plays a continuous role in the object of the purpose, executive compensation as a way to motivate executives, the impact on corporate performance is not only in the current period. In today's modernization of economic management, due to the influence of system environment and policy transmission, the planning, decision-making and action of the main body of economic activities often need a certain process. At the same time, the related reactions of economic variables will lag because of the continuation of people's daily living habits and the limitations of technical conditions or institutions. Usually, the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables will not be synchronized, and this out-of-sync relationship may show lag, delay or continuous effect. Based on the unique economic system environment of our country, based on the angle of corporate governance, on the basis of agency theory, Porter and Laughler's comprehensive incentive theory, management right theory and tournament theory, this paper discusses the related process and mechanism of executive compensation affecting corporate performance from different dimensions. Combined with the practice of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in China, this paper studies the influence of executive compensation on corporate performance, and explores its influence on corporate performance from three aspects: the level, structure and gap of executive compensation. Different from the existing research, this study not only pays attention to the impact of executive compensation on the current performance of the company, but also pays attention to the dynamic and sustainable impact of this impact, that is, the impact of executive compensation in that year on the performance of the company in the following years. It is found that the level of executive compensation has a continuous role in promoting corporate performance. With the improvement of executive compensation level, the current and future performance of the company will respond positively. The short-term incentive currency in the salary structure has a positive role in promoting corporate performance in that year, but this effect will not continue into subsequent years. In addition, on the basis of monetary compensation, the salary structure of executive shareholding and on-the-job consumption is added, which has a weaker influence on corporate performance than only the structure of monetary compensation. The equity incentive in the compensation structure does not show the impact on corporate performance in the current period, but in the relationship with future performance, it shows a lag. Executive pay gap also continues to promote corporate performance, and presents a dynamic improvement. Therefore, when setting up executive compensation, the company should fully consider its influence on the performance of the company, reasonably improve the salary level, pay attention to the monetary compensation and on-the-job consumption in the structure, and further excavate the long-term incentive role of equity and the pay gap between the main executives and the ordinary executives, so that it can encourage the executives to contribute to the development of the company to the greatest extent.
【学位授予单位】：华东交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F275
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