混合所有制陷阱真的存在吗——来自我国民营类上市公司跨所有制并购的微观证据

发布时间：2019-07-21 12:47

【摘要】：虽然混合所有制从理论上能提高产权效率,但我国混合所有制改革却困难重重,究其原因可能在于民营企业在改革过程中所面临的"陷阱说"。本文以民营企业参与混合所有制改革为背景,实证检验其跨所有制并购的经济绩效。结果发现:民营企业参与混合所有制改革并不意味着制度或交易陷阱的普遍存在,跨所有制并购能有效提升并购后的组织绩效,这种绩效提升与民营资本能否取得控制权无关;进一步分析还发现,如相较于属地和多元化并购,异地和专业化的跨所有制并购效果更好,由此证明相较于治理层面隐性的控制权归属,经营层面的地域选择与行业协同才是其业绩实现的必备条件。研究结论既有效破除了"混改陷阱说",也为民营企业积极参与混合所有制改革提供了可行的路径选择。
[Abstract]:Although mixed ownership can improve the efficiency of property rights in theory, there are many difficulties in the reform of mixed ownership in China, which may be due to the "trap theory" faced by private enterprises in the process of reform. Based on the participation of private enterprises in the reform of mixed ownership, this paper empirically tests the economic performance of cross-ownership mergers and acquisitions. The results show that the participation of private enterprises in the reform of mixed ownership does not mean that there is a common system or transaction trap. Cross-ownership mergers and acquisitions can effectively improve the organizational performance after mergers and acquisitions, which has nothing to do with whether private capital can obtain control. Further analysis also finds that compared with territorial and diversified mergers and acquisitions, the effect of cross-ownership mergers and acquisitions in different places and specialties is better, which proves that compared with the implicit ownership of control at the governance level, the regional choice and industry coordination at the management level are the necessary conditions for the realization of its performance. The research conclusion not only effectively eliminates the "mixed reform trap theory", but also provides a feasible path choice for private enterprises to actively participate in the reform of mixed ownership.
【作者单位】：长沙理工大学经济与管理学院;山东大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目“制度环境、子公司并购与企业集团内部资本配置效率”(71302091) 国家社科基金重大项目“完善现代文化市场体系与培育骨干文化企业研究”(14ZDA051);国家社科基金重点项目“文化企业兼并重组的实现路径及效应评价研究”(14AGL012) 山东省社科规划会计专项“企业集团内部资本市场构建及运行机理研究”(11DKJJ05) 山东大学人文社科青年团队项目“区域文化、管理层风险偏好与企业并购行为选择”(I FYT17041)的共同资助
【分类号】：F271;F276.5

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