国防装备采办合同定价模型及策略研究

发布时间：2018-01-04 08:41

本文关键词：国防装备采办合同定价模型及策略研究　出处：《南京航空航天大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：市场经济条件下的装备采办是一种典型的委托代理关系。虽然当前我国装备采办体制发生了重大变化，合同制管理的模式初步建立，但与市场经济的发展要求仍不相适应，装备采办市场主体行为仍欠规范，现阶段装备采办中的委托代理关系尚不完善，合同定价中信息不对称的情况依然存在，，由此诱发的代理问题如逆向选择和道德风险行为等严重的制约了采办效益的提高。论文基于委托代理一般理论，以军方和国防承包商的收益为着眼点，对完善装备采办委托代理关系以及合同定价模型及定价策略问题进行了研究。在装备采办的内涵及其原理分析的基础上，对我国装备采办中的委托代理关系分析得出其改进的可能方向；基于委托代理理论，构建了垄断条件下装备采办合同定价模型，重点研究信息不对称情况下，逆向选择和道德风险对合同定价策略的影响；构建了竞争条件下地装备采办合同定价模型，重点研究信息不对称情况下努力水平可观察和不可观察两种情况下的合同定价策略。研究均表明，信息不对称的出现，降低了军方装备采办的效益，资源配置的最优水平发生了偏移。
[Abstract]:Purchase of equipment under the condition of market economy is a typical principal-agent relationship. Although China's current equipment acquisition system has undergone major changes, the initial establishment of system management mode of the contract, but the requirements of the development of market economy and is not fit for the main equipment acquisition market behavior, is still not standardized principal-agent relationship at the present stage of equipment acquisition the situation is still not perfect, the information asymmetry in the pricing of the contract still exists, which induced agency problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard behavior restricts the acquisition efficiency.
The general principal-agent theory based on the military and defense contractors return as the starting point, to improve the equipment acquisition of principal-agent relationship and contract pricing model and pricing strategy are studied. Based on the analysis of the connotation and principle of the equipment acquisition, the principal-agent relationship between China's equipment procurement analysis may be improved direction; based on the principal-agent theory, constructs the monopoly conditions of equipment acquisition contract pricing model, focusing on the condition of information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral risk of contract pricing strategy influence; constructing the competitive conditions of equipment acquisition contract pricing model, focusing on the situation of information asymmetry to the level of observable and unobservable contract pricing strategy under the two conditions. Research shows that information asymmetry, reduce the efficiency of military equipment acquisition, The optimal level of resource allocation has been offset.

【学位授予单位】：南京航空航天大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F274;F426.4

【参考文献】