扩大风电消纳能力模式的博弈分析与机制研究

发布时间：2018-01-13 21:14

本文关键词：扩大风电消纳能力模式的博弈分析与机制研究　出处：《华北电力大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：核能的不安全性和化石能源的不可再生性，决定了未来我国能源的巨大需求在很大程度上要寄希望于可再生能源，而风能资源的丰富性和分布的集中性为我国大规模开发风能资源提供了可能。近几年，随着国家可再生能源法和一系列相关支持政策的出台，我国风能资源得到了大幅度地开发。但是，由于风能资源与消纳市场呈逆向分布，使得当下风电发展面临的主要问题就是消纳能力不足。因而，寻求可行的扩大风电消纳能力的模式，并制定有针对性的机制体系保证其实施，对满足能源的巨大需求以及提高风电企业经济效益具有重要意义。首先，本论文分析了影响风电消纳能力的因素和风电消纳模式的选择原则，指出风电打捆外送模式是风电消纳的理想选择；而风电打捆外送模式的多个参与方复杂的利益关系和各个参与方缺乏合理的利益分配机制成为了风电打捆外送模式运行的主要障碍。其次，分析了各参与方在不同利益驱动下的行为选择，在将风电打捆外送模式的参与方进行分组的基础上，，建立了博弈论分析模型，剖析了风电打捆模式各个参与方相互之间复杂的利益关系以及在不同的情况下各自的行为选择趋向。然后，针对参与者各方缺乏合理的利益分配机制的问题，建立了DEAgame模型，解决了风电打捆外送模式下超额利益的分配问题，并通过实例分析，验证了该模型的可行性。最后，在前述分析成果的基础上，从风电打捆外送并网发电规划、打捆电源并网运行和风电并网价格与结算三个方面，提出了扩大风电消纳能力机制体系的构建要求和基本框架，并对重要的机制做了具体介绍。本文利用博弈论所研究出的主要成果和所提出相关机制体系建设，旨在保障风电打捆外送模式持续顺利运行，从而扩大风电消的纳能力和提高风电企业经济效益，希望能为有关部门在解决风电消纳问题上提供参考。
[Abstract]:Non renewable energy safety and fossil energy, determines the huge demand of our energy future to hope for renewable energy to a great extent, and may provide a concentration of the abundance and distribution of wind energy resources for the development of large-scale wind energy resources in China. In recent years, with the National Renewable Energy Law and a series of related support policies, China's wind energy resources has been greatly developed. However, because of wind energy resources and the consumptive market was reverse distribution, so that when the main problems facing the development of wind power is not sufficient consumptive capacity. Therefore, seeking feasible to expand wind power accommodation mode, and make the the mechanism of the system to ensure its implementation, and has important significance to meet the huge demand for energy and improve the economic benefits of wind power companies.
First, this paper analyzes the influence factors of the selection principle of absorptive capacity of wind power and wind power consumptive mode, points out that wind power bale delivery mode is the ideal accommodation of wind power and wind power; multiple parties complex interests and each bale delivery mode in lack of cooperation profit allocation mechanism the wind power has become a major obstacle to bale delivery mode. Secondly, analyzes the participation behavior in different profit driven selection in wind power were grouped based in bale delivery mode, establishes a game theory analysis model, analysis of the binding mode of wind power each participant between complex interests and their behavior in different situations preference. Then, the participants lack of reasonable interest distribution problems, DEAgame model is established to solve the wind bale delivery Distribution of excess interests of the mode, and through the example analysis, and verifies the feasibility of this model. Finally, based on the above analysis results, from wind power bale delivery grid planning, three aspects of bundle of power grid operation and wind power price and settlement, put forward requirements of the construction of the expansion of the wind power accommodation mechanism system and basic framework, and the important mechanism in detail.
The main results of this research by using game theory and put forward the related mechanism of system construction, continue to run smoothly to ensure wind power supply mode of bundling, the capability to expand wind power dissipation and improve the economic benefits of wind power enterprises, hoping to provide a reference for the relevant departments in the wind consumptive problem.

【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F426.2;F224.32

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