配额交易制下发电厂商市场行为选择研究

发布时间：2018-05-07 05:47

本文选题：配额交易 + 市场行为　；参考：《华北电力大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：伴随着中国经济的快速发展,中国能源消费总量持续上升,2011年全社会用电量累计达46928亿千瓦时,同比增长11.7%。而经济与资源环境协调发展,要求中国全力推进可再生能源发电产业的发展。中国的可再生能源发电产业已初具规模,具备了运用配额制发展可再生能源发电的市场环境和政策基础。可再生能源“十二五”规划中提出,为实现可再生能源发电目标,制定和实施可再生能源配额制,分配和落实可再生能源电量占总电量指标。在新的配额交易机制下,发电厂商的市场行为决定着该制度的实施效果如何,因此其市场行为的研究就显得尤为重要。本文首先从理论层面介绍了配额交易机制的理论基础和影响机理,以及国内外配额机制实施的经验。然后运用产业组织经济学的SCP理论,从市场供需、集中度、进入退出壁垒和纵向生产一体化等角度深入分析了中国电力市场结构。然后,在此基础上,分析了配额交易机制下中国电力市场中发电厂商的市场行为,主要运用托宾的q值理论研究厂商的投资行为,运用寡头博弈的思想研究了发电厂商的最优投资规模,最后运用理性预期仿真模型讨论了在允许绿色证书存储情况下,市场中的绿色证书供给同绿色证书价格之间的关系,并与不允许存储的情况进行对比,探讨绿色证书存储对于价格的波动性以及存储的影响。结论如下：第一,企业的投资行为,受到罚金额度、绿色证书价格以及新建可再生能源发电厂边际成本大小的制约,企业会在三者中选择成本最小的做出投资选择；第二,在寡头垄断电力市场中,企业在选择自己的最优投资规模时,应当充分考虑企业的边际成本,竞争对手的边际成本以及配额比例和绿色证书的价格；第三,允许绿色证书存储情况下,在市场上绿色证书供给达到一定范围时,才会有厂商进行存储,此时市场上的绿色证书价格要高于不允许绿色证书存储的情况,降低了市场中绿色证书价格的波动性。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of China's economy, China's total energy consumption continues to rise, with the total social electricity consumption reaching 4.6928 trillion kilowatt-hours in 2011, an increase of 11.7 percent over the same period last year. The coordinated development of economy and resources and environment requires China to promote the development of renewable energy generation industry. China's renewable energy power generation industry has begun to take shape and has the market environment and policy basis for the use of quota system to develop renewable energy generation. In the 12th Five-Year Plan of Renewable Energy, it is proposed that in order to achieve the goal of renewable energy generation, the quota system of renewable energy should be formulated and implemented, and the renewable energy quantity should be allocated and implemented. Under the new quota trading mechanism, the market behavior of power generation firms determines the effect of the implementation of the system, so the study of market behavior is particularly important. This paper first introduces the theoretical basis and influence mechanism of quota trading mechanism from the theoretical level, as well as the experience of the implementation of quota mechanism at home and abroad. Then, using the SCP theory of industrial organization economics, the structure of China's electricity market is deeply analyzed from the perspectives of market supply and demand, concentration degree, entry and exit barriers and vertical production integration. Then, on this basis, the paper analyzes the market behavior of power generation firms in China's electricity market under the quota trading mechanism, mainly using Tobin's Q value theory to study the investment behavior of the manufacturers. Using the idea of oligopoly game, this paper studies the optimal investment scale of power generation firm, and finally discusses the relationship between green certificate supply and green certificate price in the market under the condition of allowing green certificate storage by using rational expectation simulation model. In this paper, the effect of green certificate storage on price fluctuation and storage is discussed by comparing with the situation that storage is not allowed. The conclusions are as follows: first, the investment behavior of the enterprise is restricted by the fine amount, the price of the green certificate and the marginal cost of the new renewable energy power plant. In the oligopoly power market, enterprises should take into account the marginal cost of the enterprise, the marginal cost of the competitors, the quota ratio and the price of the green certificate when choosing their optimal investment scale. If green certificates are allowed to be stored, when the supply of green certificates in the market reaches a certain range, some manufacturers will store them. At this time, the price of green certificates in the market is higher than that in which green certificates are not allowed to be stored. Reduced the volatility of green certificate prices in the market.
【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F426.61

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