供应中断和合同违约对钢铁企业采购库存策略的影响

发布时间：2018-05-22 09:24

本文选题：铁矿石 + 供应中断　；参考：《上海交通大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：钢铁工业是国民经济的基础工业,其发展关系到我国乃至全世界经济的健康发展。作为钢铁生产的重要原材料,铁矿石的稳定供应关系到整个产业的发展。目前,我国铁矿石的进口量占到全球铁矿石贸易量的50%以上,但是由于铁矿石国际贸易的寡头垄断,使得中国钢铁企业在铁矿石定价中处于被动地位。与此同时,中国钢铁企业还要面临铁矿石供应的中断风险,令采购和库存的成本不断攀升。在短期内无法改变上游寡头垄断的背景下,如何优化策略以降低采购和库存成本就成为了钢铁企业保持竞争力的关键。通过阅读与铁矿石贸易、供应链相关的文献并且收集相关的行业信息,了解铁矿石国际贸易和现货市场的具体情况,分析了钢铁行业供应链的主要环节,包括国际与国内的铁矿石供应商、钢铁生产企业和钢铁需求市场,同时分析比较了铁矿石合约市场与现货市场的关系以及可能出现的供应中断风险。铁矿石的采购与库存是钢铁企业保证生产并控制成本的重要策略,本文寻找并建立符合实际的模型来对钢铁企业的采购与库存策略进行研究,建立了有供应中断风险及允许合同违约的模型并列出钢铁企业在不同情况下的成本与收益。首先围绕着铁矿石供应中断情况下钢铁生产企业的采购与库存进行分析,介绍了供应中断的几种情况以及其对钢铁企业的影响,以钢铁企业的采购库存成本为目标函数建立了模型并求解。同时利用实际情况下的数据进行数值分析,对结果进行了分析,发现只要合约价低于现货价,钢铁企业就能接受一定程度的供应中断风险而选择合约供应商,反之而言,合约商也会在保证供应能力的前提下借此提高价格以接近现货价。然后考虑到当前的铁矿石交易市场中,现货价的波动使得钢铁企业和铁矿石供应商都有选择违约的可能,双方会在成本和收益间找出一个平衡点,来使自身利润最大化。于是建立模型分别站在铁矿石供应商和钢铁企业的角度在允许违约条件下考虑期望收益,推导出结果,找出双方都愿意接受的合同条款设定的违约补偿比例和合约价。通过对实际数据的仿真运算,发现铁矿石供应商会陷入高价供货的高利润与合同违约净收益的矛盾中;同样,钢铁企业会陷入低价采购的成本优势和合同违约净收益的矛盾。在合同违约的补偿比例小于10%范围内,铁矿石供应商和钢铁企业可以接受的合约条款是合约价略高于现货价均值。最后,本文总结了在供应中断及合同违约情况下钢铁企业的策略选择,并给出合理建议。
[Abstract]:Iron and steel industry is the basic industry of national economy, and its development is related to the healthy development of economy of our country and the whole world. As an important raw material in iron and steel production, the stable supply of iron ore relates to the development of the whole industry. At present, China's iron ore imports account for more than 50% of the global iron ore trade, but because of the oligopoly of international iron ore trade, Chinese iron and steel enterprises are in a passive position in iron ore pricing. Meanwhile, Chinese steelmakers also face the risk of disruptions in iron ore supply, pushing up the cost of procurement and inventory. Under the background that the upstream oligopoly cannot be changed in the short term, how to optimize the strategy to reduce the purchasing and inventory costs has become the key to keep the iron and steel enterprises competitive. By reading the documents related to iron ore trade and supply chain and collecting relevant industry information to understand the specific situation of iron ore international trade and spot market, this paper analyzes the main links of iron and steel industry supply chain. It includes international and domestic iron ore suppliers, steel producers and steel demand market, and analyzes and compares the relationship between iron ore contract market and spot market and the possible risk of supply interruption. The procurement and inventory of iron ore is an important strategy for iron and steel enterprises to ensure production and control costs. This paper looks for and establishes a practical model to study the purchasing and inventory strategy of iron and steel enterprises. The model of supply interruption risk and contract breach is established, and the cost and benefit of steel enterprises under different conditions are listed. Firstly, the paper analyzes the purchasing and inventory of iron and steel production enterprises under the condition of iron ore supply interruption, and introduces several situations of supply interruption and its influence on iron and steel enterprises. Taking the purchasing inventory cost of iron and steel enterprise as the objective function, the model is established and solved. At the same time, using the actual data for numerical analysis, the result is analyzed. It is found that as long as the contract price is lower than the spot price, the steel enterprise can accept a certain degree of supply interruption risk and choose the contract supplier. Contractors will also raise prices to close to spot prices while ensuring supply capacity. Then considering that in the current iron ore trading market, the fluctuation of spot prices makes it possible for both iron and steel enterprises and iron ore suppliers to default selectively, both sides will find a balance between cost and income to maximize their profits. Therefore, the model is established from the point of view of iron ore suppliers and iron and steel enterprises respectively, considering the expected income under the conditions of allowing default, deducing the results, and finding out the default compensation ratio and the contract price that both parties are willing to accept. Through the simulation of the actual data, it is found that iron ore suppliers will fall into the contradiction between the high profit of high price supply and the net income of contract breach; similarly, the iron and steel enterprise will fall into the contradiction between the cost advantage of low price purchase and the net income of contract breach. Within a range of less than 10 percent of the compensation for contract defaults, iron ore suppliers and steelmakers can accept contract terms that are slightly above the spot average. Finally, this paper summarizes the strategic choice of iron and steel enterprises in the case of supply interruption and contract breach, and gives some reasonable suggestions.
【学位授予单位】：上海交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F274;F426.31

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