建筑市场中寻租行为的制度分析
发布时间：2018-07-14 08:21
【摘要】：改革开放以来，我国建筑业经过长期高速发展取得了长足的进步，成为国民经济的重要支柱。然而由于我国建筑市场尚不完善和市场转轨过程中的价格双轨制运行，使得建设领域成为寻租活动发生的重灾区，尤其在当前工程投资规模大、建设项目多、建设速度快的背景下，建筑市场中寻租问题更加突出。 论文采用现代经济学的寻租理论对我国建筑市场中的寻租活动进行了分析，界定了寻租的内涵并对寻租与寻利、寻租与腐败进行了区分，认为寻租行为产生的根源在于制度缺陷，而不能简单归结为市场失灵和政府失灵。论文对建筑市场中的规划设计、招投标、监理及验收等环节中寻租活动的表现进行了阐述，并从经济学原理上阐明了寻租行为造成的严重危害。建筑市场中的寻租活动不仅导致社会财富损失和社会资源的极大浪费，市场机制运作效率低下，还会毒化社会风气，瓦解社会规范，严重损害政府威信并导致信任危机。 在对我国建筑市场中的寻租现象进行深入剖析的基础上，从制度经济学的角度阐述了建筑市场中寻租行为产生的制度根源，在新制度经济学的视角下深入分析我国建筑市场中寻租行为的成因，指出正式制度的缺陷和非正式制度的弱化以及路径依赖是导致建筑市场中寻租行为泛滥的根本原因。运用制度创新理论，通过建立租金消散机制、完善建筑市场体制、培育建筑行业中介组织和强化反寻租的内在约束机制，，构建反寻租的制度体系，从而减少和杜绝建筑市场中寻租活动的发生。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the construction industry of our country has made great progress after a long period of rapid development, and has become an important pillar of the national economy. However, due to the imperfect construction market in our country and the double-track price operation in the course of market transition, the construction field has become a major disaster area for rent-seeking activities, especially in the current large scale of project investment and construction projects. Under the background of fast construction, the problem of rent-seeking in the construction market is more prominent. This paper analyzes the rent-seeking activities in the construction market of our country by using the rent-seeking theory of modern economics, defines the connotation of rent-seeking, and distinguishes between rent-seeking and profit-seeking, rent-seeking and corruption. The author thinks that the root of rent-seeking behavior lies in the system defect, which can not be simply attributed to market failure and government failure. This paper expounds the performance of the rent-seeking activities in the construction market, such as planning and design, bidding, supervision and acceptance, and expounds the serious harm caused by the rent-seeking behavior from the economic principle. The rent-seeking activities in the construction market not only lead to the loss of social wealth and great waste of social resources, but also to the inefficient operation of the market mechanism, but also poison the social atmosphere, disintegrate the social norms, seriously damage the authority of the government and lead to the crisis of trust. On the basis of deeply analyzing the phenomenon of rent-seeking in the construction market of our country, this paper expounds the institutional origin of the rent-seeking behavior in the construction market from the angle of institutional economics. From the perspective of new institutional economics, this paper analyzes the causes of rent-seeking behavior in the construction market of our country, and points out that the defects of formal institution, the weakening of informal institution and the path dependence are the fundamental reasons for the proliferation of rent-seeking behavior in the construction market. By establishing the mechanism of rent dissipation, perfecting the construction market system, cultivating the intermediary organization of the construction industry and strengthening the internal restraint mechanism of anti-rent-seeking, the system of anti-rent-seeking is constructed by using the theory of institutional innovation. In order to reduce and eliminate the building market rent-seeking activities.
【学位授予单位】：天津商业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F426.92
本文编号：2121046
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up, the construction industry of our country has made great progress after a long period of rapid development, and has become an important pillar of the national economy. However, due to the imperfect construction market in our country and the double-track price operation in the course of market transition, the construction field has become a major disaster area for rent-seeking activities, especially in the current large scale of project investment and construction projects. Under the background of fast construction, the problem of rent-seeking in the construction market is more prominent. This paper analyzes the rent-seeking activities in the construction market of our country by using the rent-seeking theory of modern economics, defines the connotation of rent-seeking, and distinguishes between rent-seeking and profit-seeking, rent-seeking and corruption. The author thinks that the root of rent-seeking behavior lies in the system defect, which can not be simply attributed to market failure and government failure. This paper expounds the performance of the rent-seeking activities in the construction market, such as planning and design, bidding, supervision and acceptance, and expounds the serious harm caused by the rent-seeking behavior from the economic principle. The rent-seeking activities in the construction market not only lead to the loss of social wealth and great waste of social resources, but also to the inefficient operation of the market mechanism, but also poison the social atmosphere, disintegrate the social norms, seriously damage the authority of the government and lead to the crisis of trust. On the basis of deeply analyzing the phenomenon of rent-seeking in the construction market of our country, this paper expounds the institutional origin of the rent-seeking behavior in the construction market from the angle of institutional economics. From the perspective of new institutional economics, this paper analyzes the causes of rent-seeking behavior in the construction market of our country, and points out that the defects of formal institution, the weakening of informal institution and the path dependence are the fundamental reasons for the proliferation of rent-seeking behavior in the construction market. By establishing the mechanism of rent dissipation, perfecting the construction market system, cultivating the intermediary organization of the construction industry and strengthening the internal restraint mechanism of anti-rent-seeking, the system of anti-rent-seeking is constructed by using the theory of institutional innovation. In order to reduce and eliminate the building market rent-seeking activities.
【学位授予单位】：天津商业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F426.92
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