我国新能源上市公司过度投资问题探讨

发布时间：2018-08-02 18:15

【摘要】：能源是现代经济的重要支撑，在环境保护、资源供应等多重压力下，新能源成为全球各国不约而同的选择，近年来中国新能源特别是风电、光伏等产业呈爆发式发展。2010年9月8日，原国务院总理温家宝主持召开国务院常务会议，审议并通过《国务院关于加快培育和发展战略性新兴产业的决定》，将新能源、节能环保、新一代信息技术、生物、高端装备制造、新材料和新能源汽车7个产业列为现阶段的重点发展对象。金融危机发生后，中央大刀阔斧投入4万亿资金推动投资，瞬间燃起了地方政府的投资建设热情，各地的新能源基地如同雨后春笋般涌现。一些地方政府和新能源企业，对新能源产业发展之路多少都怀着“骑驴看唱本”的心态，新能源的投资建设偏重制造性，，忽视技术研发，缺乏核心竞争力，资源浪费严重，产能过剩的预期已经出现。以风电产业为例，2011年我国年度新增1893万千瓦风电，占据全球新增装机容量的一半，至此，我国风电产业已累计完成装机容量6237万千瓦，继续保持全球最大风电国家的地位。但由于装机过快增长及并网技术未解决，造成风机闲置严重，仅2011年新增的装机容量就有近30%因未能上网而被浪费。新能源上市公司作为新能源行业发展的主力军，其过度投资行为不仅会影响新能源产业的持续、健康、稳定发展，还会对企业自身的成长产生不利影响，最终侵害广大股东的利益。研究新能源上市公司的过度投资程度，分析该行为产生的原因并探讨如何防治过度投资行为，是确保新能源产业健康发展的现实需要。本文主要采用规范研究方法，以定性和定量相结合的手段对我国新能源上市公司的过度投资问题进行分析。本文的写作思路是：从上市公司过度投资的一般理论入手，分析我国新能源上市公司过度投资的表现，并进行数量估算，通过分析我国新能源上市公司过度投资行为产生的原因，提出抑制我国新能源上市公司过度投资的思路和相关对策。本文除引言外共分三章探讨我国新能源上市公司过度投资问题，其框架如下：第一章是新能源上市公司过度投资行为的一般理论概述。主要包括新能源、新能源上市公司、过度投资、新能源上市公司过度投资的基本概念约定，解释新能源上市公司过度投资的理论基础。第二章是我国新能源上市公司过度投资的现实分析。首先，阐述了我国新能源上市公司发展的一般概况。其次，分析了其过度投资的表现，包括三个方面：盲目投资，行业发展不平衡；投资效率低，资源浪费严重；投资项目集中，产业链不完整。再次，对新能源上市公司过度投资进行数量估计。最后，从内部和外部两方面对该行为产生的原因进行分析。外部原因有：新能源产业促进制度不完善；新能源行业本身尚未形成严格的准入制度；地方政府助推新能源重复投资；我国资本市场融资制度不健全，资本市场中小投资者利益缺乏制度保护。内部原因有：新能源产业技术要求高；股东、经理和债权人之间的代理冲突；新能源上市公司内部权力制衡难如人意；经营者过度自信，片面迎合投资者预期；对经营者的激励方式单一，激励约束机制不完善。第三章为防治我国新能源上市公司过度投资行为的建议。主要包括防治我国新能源上市公司过度投资的整体设想和防治上市公司过度投资行为的具体建议。具体建议包括以下几个方面：规范政府对新能源上市公司的行政指导行为；改革地方官员考核制度，弱化政府不适当的干预动机；完善与上市公司投融资相关的法律制度；进一步增强新能源上市公司信息披露的透明度；规范新能源上市公司投资决策程序；形成有利于抑制过度投资的新能源上市公司人才激励机制；优化新能源上市公司股权结构，强化战略投资者在公司治理中的作用；提高新能源上市公司董事会和监事会的独立性。
[Abstract]:Energy is the important support of modern economy. Under the pressure of environmental protection and resource supply, new energy has become the same choice in the world. In recent years, China's new energy, especially wind power, photovoltaic and other industries, has been developing rapidly in September 8th. The Prime Minister of the State Council, Wen Jiabao, held the standing meeting of the State Council to consider and pass it. "The State Council's decision to speed up the cultivation and development of strategic emerging industries, the new energy, energy conservation and environmental protection, the new generation of information technology, biological, high-end equipment manufacturing, new materials and new energy vehicles 7 industries are listed as the focus of development at the present stage. After the financial crisis, the central government invested 4 trillion funds to promote investment in a flash. With the enthusiasm of local government investment and construction, new energy bases have sprung up like bamboo shoots after the rain. Some local governments and new energy enterprises have the mentality of "riding a donkey to watch", and the investment and construction of new energy is more manufacturing, neglecting technology research and development, lack of core competitiveness and waste of resources. In the wind power industry, in 2011, China added 18 million 930 thousand KW wind power, taking up half of the new installed capacity in the world. At this point, China's wind power industry has completed the total installed capacity of 62 million 370 thousand kilowatts, and continues to maintain the status of the world's largest wind power country. In 2011, only 30% of the new installed capacity was wasted because of failure to surf the Internet. As the main force of the new energy industry, the overinvestment behavior of the new energy listed companies will not only affect the sustainable, healthy and stable development of the new energy industry, but also have a negative impact on the growth of the enterprise itself. It is the real need to ensure the healthy development of the new energy industry by studying the extent of the excessive investment of the new energy listed companies, analyzing the causes of the behavior and discussing how to prevent the excessive investment.
This paper mainly uses the normative research method to analyze the overinvestment problem of China's new energy listed companies by means of qualitative and quantitative methods. The writing idea is: starting with the general theory of overinvestment of listed companies, this paper analyzes the performance of the overinvestment of the new energy listed companies in China, and carries on the quantity estimation, through the division of the listed companies. This paper analyzes the causes of Over-investment of New Energy Listed Companies in China, and puts forward some ideas and Countermeasures to restrain Over-investment of New Energy Listed Companies in China.
In addition to the introduction, this paper is divided into three chapters to explore the problem of over investment in China's new energy listed companies. The framework is as follows:
The first chapter is the general theory of overinvestment behavior of new energy listed companies. It mainly includes the basic concepts of new energy, new energy listed companies, overinvestment and overinvestment of new energy listed companies, and explains the theoretical basis of overinvestment of new energy listed companies.
The second chapter is the actual analysis of over investment of China's new energy listed companies. First, it expounds the general situation of the development of the new energy listed companies in China. Secondly, it analyses the performance of its overinvestment, including three aspects: blind investment, unbalance of industry development, low investment efficiency, serious waste of resources, investment projects centralization, industrial chain not. Thirdly, the number of over investment of new energy listed companies is estimated. Finally, the reasons are analyzed from two aspects, both internal and external. The external reasons are: the new energy industry promotion system is not perfect; the new energy industry itself has not formed a strict access system; the local government boosts the new energy to repeat investment; China's capital market financing system is not sound, and the interests of small and medium investors in the capital market are not protected. The internal reasons are: the high technical requirements of the new energy industry, the agency conflict between the shareholders, the managers and the creditors; the internal power balance of the new energy listed companies is not so satisfactory; the overconfidence of the battalion is expected to meet the investors unilaterally; The incentives for managers are single, and the incentive and restraint mechanisms are not perfect.
The third chapter is the suggestion to prevent the overinvestment behavior of the new energy listed companies in China, including the overall idea of preventing the overinvestment of the new energy listed companies in China and the concrete proposals to prevent the overinvestment behavior of the listed companies. Reform the assessment system of local officials, weaken the improper government intervention motivation, improve the legal system related to the investment and financing of listed companies, further enhance the transparency of information disclosure of new energy listed companies, standardize the investment decision procedure of new energy listed companies, and form the talents of new energy listed companies which are favorable for overinvestment. Incentive mechanism, optimizing the ownership structure of the new energy listed companies, strengthening the role of strategic investors in corporate governance, and improving the independence of the board of directors and the board of supervisors of the new energy listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F426.2;F275;F276.6

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