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电子产品零售商双渠道协调机制研究

发布时间:2018-08-10 20:18
【摘要】:在电子产品行业,电子商务渠道正在成为越来越重要的销售渠道,因此,不少传统零售巨头为进一步巩固主导地位,开始接受网络渠道和传统实体渠道并存的双渠道策略,形成零售商双渠道的新模式。本文主要研究零售商双渠道这一新模式下的渠道协调问题。 零售商双渠道研究有别于传统的双渠道研究,传统双渠道研究的是制造商线上渠道与零售商线下渠道的协调问题,而零售商双渠道研究的是同时有线上线下的双渠道零售商的协调问题。双渠道零售商作为一个零售整体,可以接触更多的潜在顾客,但与此同时这一模式也引入了更多的管理思考。传统实体零售商新增电子商务渠道成为双渠道零售商,而双渠道之间总是存在竞争关系,因此即使是一个零售巨头的双渠道仍然会因为一个渠道的价格变动影响另一个渠道的需求,此时,双渠道零售商面临水平冲突问题,如果水平冲突得不到有效的控制,形成恶性竞争,将极大损害零售商的利益。另一方面,营销渠道是由许多追求各自利益最大化的公司所组成,而这些利益总是相互竞争和冲突的,所以渠道成员之间往往会产生垂直冲突。 针对零售商双渠道存在的渠道冲突问题,本文在综述前人研究的基础上,做了以下五方面的工作: 首先,在对零售商双渠道模式的理论研究中,总结了零售商双渠道四个特点,即产品同质化、配送多样化、保障一体化、渠道冲突化。 其次,针对双渠道零售商产品同质化的特点,进一步分析其库存策略,结论表明,库存共享机制相比独立库存机制,能有效降低库存量,凸显了传统实体零售商转型成为双渠道零售商后的库存优势。 第三,针对零售商双渠道冲突的特点,提出以定价作为研究对象协调冲突。本文从市场特性、零售商特性和产品特性三个方面,阐述了差别定价的成功条件。根据这些成功条件表明,电子产品的双渠道零售商是适宜使用差别定价,从而协调双渠道冲突,进一步提升零售商利润。 第四,双渠道零售商的实体渠道和电子商务渠道存在水平冲突,本文采用销售努力补偿激励的机制进行协调。电子商务模式的初期一般都需要有大量的人力和财力的投入,以增加影响力,因此,在零售商电子商务渠道成立初期,零售商实体渠道会对电子商务渠道的销售努力做一定比例的补偿,以帮助电子商务渠道快速发展。零售商双渠道水平协调研究表明,拥有实体、电子商务双渠道的零售商,通过设置合理的实体渠道及电子商务渠道的价格,并且实体渠道对电子商务渠道销售努力给予一定水平的补偿,可以增加销量,减少由于电子产品短生命周期特点带来的风险,优化零售商水平销售渠道结构,协调水平渠道冲突。 第五,双渠道零售商与供应商之间存在垂直冲突,本文通过收益共享契约进行协调。利用契约的方式对零售商和制造商进行垂直协调,使得整体供应链利润实现优化,是目前使用较为广泛的手段之一。本文采用收益共享契约,通过零售商将自身收益的一部分分享给制造商,以换取较低批发价格的方式,对渠道进行垂直协调。研究表明,经收益共享契约协调后的供应链整体利润上升,双渠道零售商和制造商的利润也上升,整体供应链得到优化。
[Abstract]:In the electronic products industry, e-commerce channels are becoming more and more important sales channels. Therefore, many traditional retail giants begin to accept the dual-channel strategy of network channel and traditional entity channel to further consolidate their dominant position and form a new retailer dual-channel model. Channel coordination under the mode.
Retailer's dual channel research is different from the traditional dual channel research. The traditional dual channel research is the coordination between the online channel of the manufacturer and the offline channel of the retailer. Traditional physical retailers add e-commerce channels to become dual-channel retailers, and there is always competition between the two channels, so even a retail giant's dual channels can still affect another channel because of price changes in one channel. At this time, the two-channel retailers are faced with the problem of level conflict. If the level conflict can not be effectively controlled, the formation of vicious competition will greatly damage the interests of retailers. There is often a vertical conflict among members.
Aiming at the problem of channel conflict in retailers'dual channels, this paper has done the following five aspects on the basis of reviewing the previous studies.
Firstly, in the theoretical study of retailer's dual-channel model, four characteristics of retailer's dual-channel are summarized, that is, homogenization of products, diversification of distribution, integration of guarantee and conflict of channels.
Secondly, aiming at the characteristics of product homogeneity of dual-channel retailers, the inventory strategy is further analyzed. The results show that the inventory sharing mechanism can effectively reduce inventory compared with the independent inventory mechanism, which highlights the inventory advantages of the traditional entity retailers after the transformation into dual-channel retailers.
Thirdly, aiming at the characteristics of the two-channel conflict of retailers, this paper puts forward pricing as the research object to coordinate the conflict. This paper expounds the successful conditions of differential pricing from three aspects: market characteristics, retailer characteristics and product characteristics. Dual channel conflict will further enhance the retailer's profit.
Fourthly, there is a level conflict between the entity channel and the e-commerce channel of the dual-channel retailer. This paper uses the compensation incentive mechanism of sales effort to coordinate. The retailer's two-channel horizontal coordination research shows that the retailer with entity and e-commerce two-channel can set reasonable price of entity channel and e-commerce channel, and entity channel can help e-commerce channel to develop rapidly. A certain level of compensation can increase sales volume, reduce the risk caused by the short life cycle characteristics of electronic products, optimize the retailer's level of sales channel structure, and coordinate the level of channel conflict.
Fifth, there is a vertical conflict between the two-channel retailers and suppliers. This paper coordinates the two-channel retailers and manufacturers by means of revenue sharing contract. The results show that the overall profit of the supply chain coordinated by the revenue sharing contract increases, the profit of the dual-channel retailers and manufacturers also increases, and the overall supply chain is optimized.
【学位授予单位】:东华大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F224;F274;F426.63

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