品牌家纺企业多渠道选择与协调机制研究

发布时间：2018-10-05 21:37

【摘要】：在全球化竞争的网络经济时代,电子商务成为制造企业的发展平台与生存方式,为中国制造企业的发展带来了新的契机；但在传统零售与网上直销并存的双渠道供应链中,制造商既是传统零售商的供应商同时又是其直接竞争者,致使渠道冲突成为关注的焦点问题；不仅如此,电子商务环境下营销渠道的选择与协调又在很大程度上决定着供应链的成功与否。鉴于此,本文在渠道和谐与利润最大化的双重要求下,以品牌家纺企业为核心,运用博弈论、运筹学、市场学及产业经济学等学科的理论和方法,基于品牌家纺企业营销渠道的特点,研究了在传统零售渠道基础上引入网上直销渠道时,定价策略与补偿激励对营销渠道选择的影响；在传统零售与在线直销并存的双渠道供应链中,研究了如何设计合同以实现供应链协调并保证渠道成员双赢。本文首先从供应链渠道冲突的角度出发,通过对品牌家纺企业多渠道销售模式现状的扫描,引出多渠道冲突问题,并分别从定义、产生的原因以及应对策略等方面综述了国内外学者对多渠道冲突的研究情况。接着以企业实施多渠道策略的动机为分类以及,对渠道选择的视角进行了分类与总结。最后从价格协调策略、库存协调策略、信息共享协调策略、纵向契约协调策略和渠道横行协调策略五个方面对现有的多渠道协调策略分别进行了总结。然后,构建了零售商在线下零售渠道为顾客提供销售努力,制造商补偿其销售努力投入的线上线下双渠道供应链模型,分析了基于销售努力补偿策略下的两种定价权策略(零售商有线下定价权与零售商无线下定价权)对供应链利润的影响。在此基础上,又分析了两阶段博弈与三阶段博弈(即线上线下定价的先后顺序)对供应链利润的影响。通过分析发现,在一定条件下,线上线下双渠道供应链能够实现零售商与制造商收益的改进。并且总结出品牌家纺企业制造商最优的渠道模式与策略为：两阶段博弈(即零售商在制造商确定其线上直销价格后再制定其线下分销价格)下,给予零售商线下渠道定价权和销售努力进行补偿的线上线下双渠道模式。最后,在确定了品牌家纺企业制造商最优的渠道模式与策略的基础上,通过进一步的研究发现,销售努力补偿合同虽然能够改善制造商与供应链的利润,但此时零售商的利润却明显下降了,导致零售商没有动力与制造商签订销售努力补偿合同来优化双渠道供应链的整体效益。并在分析了导致零售商利润下降的具体原因的基础上,提出了相应的协调策略。结果表明：销售努力补偿与线上收益共享的组合合同不能是供应链达到协调；销售努力补偿与线上线下返利的组合合同在一定的条件下能够协调并保证渠道成员双赢；销售努力补偿与再补偿的组合合同能够协调并保证渠道成员双赢。
[Abstract]:In the era of global competition network economy, electronic commerce has become the development platform and survival mode of manufacturing enterprises, which brings a new opportunity for the development of Chinese manufacturing enterprises, but in the dual channel supply chain where traditional retail and online direct sales coexist, The manufacturer is not only the supplier of the traditional retailer but also its direct competitor, which causes the channel conflict to be the focus of attention. The choice and coordination of marketing channels in the environment of e-commerce determines the success of supply chain to a great extent. In view of this, under the dual requirements of channel harmony and profit maximization, this paper takes the brand home textile enterprises as the core, applies the theories and methods of game theory, operational research, market science and industrial economics, etc. Based on the characteristics of marketing channels of brand textile enterprises, this paper studies the influence of pricing strategy and compensation incentives on the choice of marketing channels when the traditional retail channels are introduced into online direct selling channels. In the dual channel supply chain in which the traditional retail and online direct sales coexist, this paper studies how to design the contract to realize the coordination of the supply chain and ensure the win-win situation of the channel members. This paper starts from the angle of supply chain channel conflict, through scanning the current situation of multi-channel sales mode of brand home textile enterprise, leads to the problem of multi-channel conflict, and defines it separately. The causes and coping strategies are reviewed in this paper. Then, it classifies and summarizes the perspective of channel selection based on the motivation of implementing multi-channel strategy. Finally, the existing multi-channel coordination strategies are summarized from five aspects: price coordination strategy, inventory coordination strategy, information sharing coordination strategy, vertical contract coordination strategy and channel horizontal coordination strategy. Then, the online and off-line supply chain model of retailers providing customers with off-line retail channels and manufacturers compensating for their investment in sales efforts is constructed. This paper analyzes the influence of two pricing power strategies (retailers' wired pricing power and retailer's wireless pricing power) on the profit of supply chain based on the compensation strategy of sales effort. On this basis, the influence of two-stage game and three-stage game (i.e. the order of online and offline pricing) on the profit of supply chain is analyzed. It is found that under certain conditions, both online and offline supply chains can improve the profit of retailers and manufacturers. And it concludes that the optimal channel mode and strategy for manufacturers of brand textile enterprises are two-stage game (that is, retailers determine their online direct selling prices before setting their off-line distribution prices). Give retailers offline pricing power and sales efforts to compensate the above-line and off-line dual-channel mode. Finally, on the basis of determining the optimal channel mode and strategy for the manufacturers of brand textile enterprises, through further research, it is found that although the contract of compensation for sales efforts can improve the profits of manufacturers and supply chains, However, the retailer's profit has declined significantly, resulting in the retailer has no incentive to sign a sales effort compensation contract with the manufacturer to optimize the overall benefits of the two-channel supply chain. On the basis of analyzing the specific reasons that lead to the decline of retailer profit, the corresponding coordination strategy is put forward. The results show that the combination contract of sales effort compensation and online revenue sharing cannot be the coordination of supply chain, the combination contract of sales effort compensation and online and offline return can coordinate and guarantee the win-win situation of channel members under certain conditions. Sales effort compensation and re-compensation of the combination of contracts can coordinate and ensure a win-win channel member.
【学位授予单位】：东华大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F426.86;F274;F224

【参考文献】