零售商买方势力对制造商工艺创新的影响研究

发布时间：2019-03-15 10:29

【摘要】：本文的目的是研究零售商买方势力对制造商工艺创新的影响。文章构建了1×2的市场结构：上游为单一制造商,同时向下游两家零售商提供同一种产品,零售商在零售市场上进行古诺竞争。文中假设其中一家零售商为主导零售商,可以获得批发价格折扣,而另一家零售商为边缘零售商,是批发价格的接受者。本文将主导零售商所获得的批发价格折扣定义为零售商的买方势力。研究发现,买方势力对工艺创新的影响取决于创新效率,当制造商的工艺创新效率较高时,主导零售商买方势力的增加将抑制制造商的工艺创新；当工艺创新效率较低时,买方势力的增加会促进制造商的工艺创新。此外,当创新效率较高时,主导零售商的批发价格是其买方势力的减函数,边缘零售商的批发价格是主导零售商买方势力的增函数,主导零售商与边缘零售商批发价格之差也是主导零售商买方势力的增函数；当创新效率较低时,主导零售商的批发价格是其买方势力的增函数,边缘零售商的批发价格是主导零售商买方势力的减函数,主导零售商与边缘零售商批发价格之差也是主导零售商买方势力的减函数。产品的零售价格和总的销售量都不受买方势力的影响。另外,供应商利润是主导零售商买方势力的减函数。本文最后还引入了案例分析,以2003-2011年河北省和江苏省的医药产业数据为样本进行了研究,进一步证实了本文理论分析结论的合理性和正确性。
[Abstract]:The purpose of this paper is to study the influence of retailer buyer power on manufacturers' technological innovation. In this paper, a 1 脳 2 market structure is constructed: upstream is a single manufacturer, and two downstream retailers are provided with the same product. Retailers compete in the retail market for Cournot. It is assumed that one retailer can get wholesale price discount, while the other retailer is marginal retailer, which is the recipient of wholesale price. This paper defines the wholesale price discount obtained by the leading retailer as the buyer's power of the retailer. It is found that the influence of buyer's power on process innovation depends on the innovation efficiency. When the manufacturer's process innovation efficiency is high, the increase of buyer's power of leading retailer will restrain the manufacturer's process innovation; When the efficiency of process innovation is low, the increase of buyer's power will promote the manufacturer's process innovation. In addition, when innovation efficiency is high, the wholesale price of the leading retailer is the reduction function of its buyer's power, and the wholesale price of the marginal retailer is the increase function of the buyer's power of the leading retailer. The difference between the wholesale price of the leading retailer and the marginal retailer is also the increasing function of the buyer's power of the leading retailer; When innovation efficiency is low, the wholesale price of the leading retailer is the increasing function of the buyer's power, and the wholesale price of the marginal retailer is the reduction function of the buyer's power of the leading retailer. The difference between the wholesale price of the leading retailer and the marginal retailer is also the reduction of the buyer power of the dominant retailer. The retail price and total sales of the product are not affected by the buyer's influence. In addition, supplier profit is the dominant retailer buyer power reduction function. At the end of this paper, a case study is carried out based on the data of medical industry in Hebei Province and Jiangsu Province from 2003 to 2011, which further confirms the rationality and correctness of the theoretical analysis conclusion in this paper.
【学位授予单位】：东北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F724.2;F426.72

【相似文献】