政治周期、政府补贴和产能过剩

发布时间：2018-03-22 16:37

本文选题：政治周期　切入点：政府补贴　出处：《投资研究》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文检验了中国特有的政治周期——省级党代会和企业过剩产能之间的关系。发现在党代会召开的当年及之后两年,企业的过剩产能生成和银行贷款显著增加。本文还发现企业累积过剩产能越多,政府给予补贴越多。证据表明,地方政府官员对辖区企业的过度投资进行了机会主义的干预,以利于其政治晋升;而政府补贴弱化了企业出清过剩产能的内在动力,使过剩产能日渐积累。本文为我国过剩产能现象提供了较完整的微观解释框架,为地方政府干预造成产能过剩提供了新的微观领域证据。
[Abstract]:This paper examines the relationship between the provincial Party Congress and the excess capacity of enterprises, a unique political cycle in China. This paper also finds that the more excess capacity the enterprise accumulates, the more the government subsidizes. The evidence shows that local government officials have intervened opportunistically in the overinvestment of enterprises in the jurisdiction. The government subsidy weakens the internal power of enterprises to clear out excess capacity and makes excess capacity accumulate day by day. This paper provides a more complete microscopic explanation framework for the phenomenon of excess capacity in China. It provides new micro-domain evidence for local government intervention resulting in overcapacity.
【作者单位】：广西财经学院金融与保险学院;
【基金】：广西经济与金融研究院,《广西高等学校数理金融高水平创新团队及卓越学者计划》资助(桂教人[2014]49号)
【分类号】：D630;F124;F812.45

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