地方政府财政支出策略互动行为研究

发布时间：2018-03-29 11:33

本文选题：财政支出　切入点：策略互动行为　出处：《首都经济贸易大学学报》2017年03期

【摘要】：通过构建地方政府财政支出的完全信息静态无序离散型博弈模型,并对此博弈模型进行非参数估计,实证分析地方政府财政支出的策略互动行为及此策略互动行为对区域经济协调发展的影响。结果表明:地方政府财政支出在公共服务和正外溢效应比较大的领域,如教育、科学技术、文化体育与传媒、节能环保和金融监管的策略互动行为是策略替代的,在搭便车心理的影响下,这些领域地方政府财政支出的增加不利于区域经济的协调发展;而地方政府财政支出在公共安全和外溢效应比较小的领域,如医疗卫生、城乡社区事务、农林水事务和交通运输的策略互动行为是策略互补的;在协同发展的情况下,这些领域地方政府财政支出的增加会促进区域经济的协调发展。
[Abstract]:By constructing the static disorderly discrete game model of complete information of local government fiscal expenditure, the non-parametric estimation of the game model is carried out. This paper empirically analyzes the strategic interaction behavior of local government fiscal expenditure and its influence on the coordinated development of regional economy. The results show that the local government fiscal expenditure is in the areas where the public service and positive spillover effects are relatively large, such as education. The interactive behavior of science and technology, culture and sports and media, energy saving and environmental protection and financial supervision is replaced by strategy. Under the influence of hitchhiking psychology, the increase of local government financial expenditure in these fields is not conducive to the coordinated development of regional economy; However, the strategic interaction of local government expenditure in areas with less public safety and spillover effects, such as health care, urban and rural community affairs, agricultural and forestry water affairs and transportation, is strategic complementary; in the case of coordinated development, The increase of local government expenditure in these fields will promote the coordinated development of regional economy.
【作者单位】：首都经济贸易大学经济学院;
【分类号】：F812.45

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