政府研发补贴的信号效应研究

发布时间：2018-04-28 05:22

本文选题：政府补贴 + 研发投入　；参考：《中共江苏省委党校》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：由于研发具有外溢性和高风险性等特点，企业在研发过程中时常会遇到融资难题。政府对研发企业进行补贴则可以在一定程度上弥补企业研发资金不足的问题，从而对社会产生巨大收益。然而，政府资金又是有限的，单凭政府的力量显然无法满足整个社会的需要。因此，如何引导社会资金流向社会所需的研发项目成为了重要的研究课题。本文认为，政府补贴不仅对企业研发投入产生挤入或挤出，还会对企业产生认证效果，从而起到向外部投资者传递投资信号的作用。为了准确的描述政府研发补贴的信号效应，深入分析背后的作用机理，本文使用信息经济学中的信号传递模型，在对研究项目分类的基础上，通过设定有质量信号的补贴和无质量信号的补贴两种情景，分别讨论政府补贴与金融机构贷款之间的相互作用过程。研究发现，如果政府补贴仅能对项目做出基础研究和应用研究的区分，那么政府补贴的传递信号对金融机构来说就是无效的。如果政府在做出补贴决策之前，设置一定质量门槛，从而向外部投资者传递质量信号，那么此时的政府补贴就会引导金融机构资金流向对社会有利的研发项目，产生信号效应。为了在经验研究中对上述命题予以验证，本文以中国的高技术产业为研究对象，使用1998~2008年的行业面板数据，运用面板数据模型分析了政府研发补贴的信号效应。行业层面的实证研究结果表明，，政府研发补贴对企业获得金融机构贷款会产生积极作用，而且企业规模和行业技术水平均会对这种正向信号效应产生积极影响，而所有权特征则会弱化信号效应。地区层面实证研究表明，在国有企业比重较高以及市场化程度较低的地区，政府补贴引导金融机构贷款的作用程度明显减弱或不显著，这说明国企改革和市场化进程都会对本地区的资金配置效率具有重要影响。进一步使用的面板GMM估计的检验表明实证研究的结果是可靠和稳健的。本文的研究结论也为地方政府制定RD补贴政策提供了有益的参考，政府在做出补贴决策前，可以通过设定质量门槛，对申请项目进行筛选。经过深入的调研和审查后，做出科学的补贴决策，并以公开的方式向社会传递信息，从而缓解企业与外部投资者之间的信息不对称问题，提高整个社会的创新投入和能力。
[Abstract]:Because R & D has the characteristics of spillover and high risk, enterprises often encounter financing problems in the process of R & D. The government subsidy to R & D enterprises can make up for the shortage of R & D funds to a certain extent, thus producing huge benefits to the society. However, government funds are limited, and government power alone can not meet the needs of society as a whole. Therefore, how to guide social funds to the social R & D projects has become an important research topic. This paper holds that government subsidies not only squeeze in or squeeze out the R & D input of enterprises, but also produce certification effects on enterprises, thus playing the role of transmitting investment signals to external investors. In order to accurately describe the signal effect of government R & D subsidy and analyze the mechanism behind it, this paper uses the signal transmission model in information economics to classify the research project. The interaction between government subsidies and loans from financial institutions is discussed by setting the two scenarios of subsidies with quality signals and subsidies without quality signals. It is found that if government subsidies can only distinguish between basic research and applied research, the signaling of government subsidies is ineffective for financial institutions. If the government sets a certain quality threshold before making the subsidy decision, then the government subsidy will lead the financial institutions to flow the funds to the socially beneficial R & D projects and produce signal effect. In order to verify the above proposition in the empirical study, this paper takes the high-tech industry in China as the research object, uses the industry panel data from 1998 to 2008, and analyzes the signal effect of the government R & D subsidy by using the panel data model. Empirical results at the industry level show that government R & D subsidies have a positive impact on enterprises' access to financial institutions' loans, and that both the size of enterprises and the level of industry technology will have a positive impact on this positive signal effect. Ownership features weaken the signal effect. The empirical research at the regional level shows that in the areas where the proportion of state-owned enterprises is high and the degree of marketization is low, the role of government subsidies in guiding the loans of financial institutions is obviously weakened or not significant. This shows that the state-owned enterprises reform and market-oriented process will have an important impact on the efficiency of capital allocation in the region. The further use of panel GMM estimates shows that the results of the empirical study are reliable and robust. The conclusion of this paper also provides a useful reference for local governments to formulate Rd subsidy policy. Before making subsidy decision, the government can screen the application items by setting the quality threshold. After deep investigation and examination, scientific subsidy decision is made, and information is transmitted to the society in an open way, so as to alleviate the problem of information asymmetry between enterprises and external investors, and to improve the innovation investment and ability of the whole society.
【学位授予单位】：中共江苏省委党校
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F273.1;F812.45

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