地方政府竞争:财政赤字扩张及其攀比效应——来自县域的证据

发布时间：2018-04-29 11:57

本文选题：地方政府竞争 + 财政赤字　；参考：《学术研究》2015年09期

【摘要】：地方政府竞争呈现阶段性特征,从廉价土地出让转化为依靠财政赤字膨胀和债务扩张。采用广东省及其相邻省区的沿边县域数据进行实证分析,结果表明:(1)地方政府间财政赤字存在"攀比效应",县域财政赤字呈现逐年攀升的趋势,相邻县域的空间溢出效果明显;(2)财政分权效应对财政赤字影响显著为正,地方政府呈现主动负债的特征;(3)县域经济发展水平对财政赤字影响显著,人均GDP较低的地区表现出对经济发展"不平等"的厌恶,其财政行为表现为明显的"赶超"冲动;(4)产业结构水平对地方政府财政赤字的影响具有双重性,呈现路径依赖效应。
[Abstract]:The competition of local governments is characterized by stages, from the transfer of cheap land to the expansion of fiscal deficit and debt. Based on the data of Guangdong Province and its neighboring provinces and counties, the results show that there is a "comparison effect" between local governments, and the county fiscal deficit is increasing year by year. The spatial spillover effect of adjacent counties is obvious (2) the fiscal decentralization effect is significantly positive to the fiscal deficit, and the local government has the characteristics of active debt. (3) the county economic development level has a significant impact on the fiscal deficit. The regions with low per capita GDP show a dislike of "inequality" in economic development, and their fiscal behavior shows that the impact of industrial structure level on the fiscal deficit of local governments is dualistic and path dependent.
【作者单位】：华南农业大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目“农村土地与相关要素市场培育与改革研究”(71333004) 国家社会科学基金项目“土地出让与地方政府债务问题研究”(12CJL017)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F812.7

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