要素占有、权力分配与宏观税负:以中国封建史为例

发布时间：2018-04-29 14:54

  本文选题：土地所有权 + 权力分配　； 参考：《财政研究》2015年03期

【摘要】：我们构造了一个动态博弈模型对封建史上农民的税负进行了研究。研究表明,在土地等生产要素和公权力为封建统治集团垄断下,均衡条件下,封建统治者的最优税负仅给农民以保留效用。如遭遇重大自然灾害,农民连保留效用都得不到,只能揭竿而起。研究还为中国封建史上周期性的王朝改朝换代、王朝更替总伴随着周期性的农民暴动、农民暴动往往和重大自然灾害在时间上重舍等现象提供了一个理论的诠释,为儒学的"民本"思想提供了一个合理的解释。我们的研究对于设定当前合理的宏观税负水平提供了可资借鉴的政策含义。
[Abstract]:We construct a dynamic game model to study the tax burden of farmers in feudal history. The study shows that under the monopoly of feudal ruling group such as land and public power, the optimal tax burden of feudal rulers can only be reserved for farmers. Such as major natural disasters, farmers can not even retain utility, can only rise up. The study also provides a theoretical explanation for the periodic dynasty change in the feudal history of China, which is accompanied by periodic peasant riots, peasant riots and major natural disasters in time. It provides a reasonable explanation for the thought of "people first" in Confucianism. Our research provides the policy implications for setting a reasonable macro tax burden.
【作者单位】： 中央财经大学会计学院;广西财经学院;
【分类号】：F812.9
，

本文编号：1820410