地区人才吸引力、教育财政支出与高校本地生源占比

发布时间：2018-05-03 13:51

本文选题：地区人才吸引力 + 教育投资回报　；参考：《湘潭大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文检验了一种导致我国高校本地生源占比地区间差异的机制,并且以此为例,说明地方分权(分级办学)对公共品分配的影响。高考招生是否公平是重大的社会议题,是影响人力资本积累、地区收入差距和社会和谐的重要因素。各省平均高校本地生源占比差距较大,一些观点认为某些地区的高校优先招收本地学生,造成了各地高等教育机会不均等,对外地考生不公平。另一些观点则认为,经济发展水平较高的地区,基础教育发展较好,师资力量雄厚,生源质量较好,因此高校愿意投放更多的招生指标。本文利用2012—2015年中国1204所普通高校(本科)招生计划面板数据,研究地区人才吸引力和教育财政支出对高校本地生源占比的影响,进而验证地方政府利益对公共品分配的影响。我们将高校在各省投放的生源比例作为被解释变量,将虚拟变量“是否本地生源”作为解释变量,地方吸引力与是否本地生源的交互项和教育支出与本地生源交互项作为主要检验变量。为了排除生源质量、高校知名度,高校属地的经济发展水平等因素,我们构建了普通最小二乘(OLS)模型、固定效应模型(FE)控制生源地因素、高校因素、高校属地因素,尽量解决内生性问题,得出稳健结论。我们认为地方政府利益影响教育公共品分配:地方政府为了发展经济,获得政绩,回收教育投资收益,采取偏向本地考生的招生策略。对于地区人才吸引力较低,留不住人才的地区,地方政府更愿意招收本地学生发展当地经济;对于教育支出占一般公共支出比例较高的地方政府,教育投资的机会成本更大,地方政府更迫切地回收教育投资收益,更倾向于本地考生。实证结果显示,在控制了生源质量、高校质量后,高校的本地生源占比仍然显著高于外地生源平均占比。地区人才吸引力高的地区,倾向本地考生的程度更弱,教育财政支出占比较高地区的高校,倾向本地考生的程度更强。本文通过高校招生的例子,说明地方分权不仅会影响公共品供给的数量、类别,还会影响公共品的分配。最后,本文依据研究结论提出政策建议,中央财政资金应该在平衡公共服务供给、分配问题中发挥更大作用。
[Abstract]:This paper examines a mechanism that leads to regional differences in the proportion of local students in colleges and universities in China, and takes this as an example to illustrate the influence of decentralization on the distribution of public goods. The fairness of college entrance examination is a major social issue and an important factor affecting the accumulation of human capital, regional income gap and social harmony. There is a big difference in the proportion of local students in each province. Some views suggest that the preferential admission of local students in some regions has resulted in unequal opportunities in higher education and unfair to non-local candidates. Others think that in areas with higher economic development level, basic education develops better, teachers are strong, and the quality of students is better, so colleges and universities are willing to put in more enrollment targets. Based on the panel data of enrollment plans of 1204 universities (undergraduate) in China from 2012 to 2015, this paper studies the influence of local talent attraction and educational expenditure on the proportion of local students in colleges and universities. Then verify the impact of local government interests on the distribution of public goods. We take the proportion of students that colleges and universities put in each province as the explained variable, and the fictitious variable "whether the local student source" as the explanatory variable. The interaction between local attractiveness and local students and the interaction between education expenditure and local students are the main test variables. In order to exclude the factors such as the quality of students, the popularity of colleges and universities, the level of economic development of the dependent territories of colleges and universities, we have constructed the ordinary least squares OLS model, the fixed effect model (FEE) to control the factors of students' origin, and the factors of the dependent territories of colleges and universities. Try to solve the endogenetic problem and draw a steady conclusion. We believe that the interests of local governments affect the distribution of educational public goods: in order to develop the economy, obtain achievements, and recover the income from investment in education, local governments adopt the strategy of recruiting students in favor of local candidates. Local governments are more willing to recruit local students to develop the local economy in areas where local talents are less attractive and cannot be retained. For local governments, where education expenditure accounts for a higher proportion of general public expenditure, the opportunity cost of education investment is higher. Local governments are more eager to recover income from investment in education and are more inclined to local candidates. The empirical results show that after controlling the quality of students, the proportion of local students in colleges and universities is still significantly higher than that in other places. In the regions with high attractiveness of talents, the degree of preference to local candidates is weaker, and higher education expenditure accounts for higher education expenditure, and the degree of preference for local candidates is stronger. This paper shows that decentralization not only affects the quantity and category of public goods, but also affects the distribution of public goods. Finally, according to the conclusions of the study, the paper puts forward some policy suggestions that the central financial funds should play a greater role in balancing the supply and distribution of public services.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：C964.2;F812.45

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