开放经济下地方税收竞争与中央均等化转移支付

发布时间：2018-06-06 11:44

本文选题：地方税收竞争 + 开放经济　；参考：《华中科技大学学报(社会科学版)》2017年02期

【摘要】：以ZMW模型框架为基础的税收竞争理论的一个基本结论是,税收竞争会导致地方均衡税率过低和公共品供给不足,中央均等化转移支付则能对其矫正而提高经济效率。文章通过一个仅在所含辖区数量上存在差异的两国税收竞争模型,将相关研究从封闭经济拓展到开放经济情形。结论表明,开放经济税收竞争的效率损失随各国所含辖区数增加而增大,中央均等化转移支付既可能矫正也可能加大经济扭曲。当只有一国实行转移支付时,在其辖区数低于某水平时,有利于改善效率;高于该水平时,则加大效率损失。当两国都实行转移支付时,二者能相互促进;按照辖区数的可能组合,均衡状态下,两国对转移支付或都实行或都不实行,或对是否实行具有不确定性。
[Abstract]:A basic conclusion of the tax competition theory based on ZMW model is that the tax competition will lead to the low local equilibrium tax rate and the insufficient supply of public goods, and the central equalization transfer payment can correct it and improve the economic efficiency. By means of a model of tax competition between the two countries with only differences in the number of jurisdictions involved, this paper extends the research from closed economy to open economy. The conclusion shows that the efficiency loss of tax competition in open economy increases with the increase of the number of jurisdictions involved in each country, and the central equalization transfer payment may either correct or increase the economic distortion. When only one country carries out transfer payment, the efficiency is improved when the number of jurisdictions is below a certain level, and the efficiency loss is increased when it is above that level. When both countries implement transfer payment, the two countries can promote each other; according to the possible combination of the number of jurisdictions, in the equilibrium state, the two countries either implement or do not implement the transfer payment, or have uncertainty about whether to carry out the transfer payment.
【作者单位】：景德镇陶瓷大学管理与经济学院;
【基金】：江西省社科规划项目“财政竞争视角下的均等化转移支付的效率研究”(14YJ37) 江西省教科规划课题“转移支付与地方财政教育支出:激励效应及实证检验”阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：F812.42

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