中国省对市财政转移支付的支出规模扩张效应的研究

发布时间：2018-06-07 02:25

本文选题：转移支付 + 政府规模　；参考：《南开大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：对转移支付和政府规模的研究是公共经济学热门的课题之一。随着国内要素流动性的增强,地方政府间逐渐展开竞争。由于我国地方政府没有税收立法权,这种竞争更多地反映到支出上,即地方政府的支出规模有内在扩大的倾向。一般而言,地方政府对公共品的偏好很难与中央政府完全相同。在追求本地利益的最大化的过程中,地方政府对具有外溢性的公共服务往往供给不足。如果中央政府使用转移支付来刺激地方政府在公共品上的供给,地方政府存在一定的机会主义——即人为操纵以获得最大规模的转移支付。转移支付的规模越大,预算约束对地方政府支出的限制越弱。我国地方政府拥有较少的收入而承担较大的支出责任,中央政府的转移支付在地方政府收入中占很大比重。本文指出在以经济表现为核心的政绩考核体制下,地方政府面临收入约束时,为了吸引要素流入获得更好的经济表现,会做出增大对基础设施的投入而减少对公共品的投入的决定。在这种情况下中央政府通过配套拨款或均等化转移支付可以激励地方政府增大对公共品的提供。在这一过程中,地方政府规模不可避免地扩张了。通过一个2003-2009年全国地级市(区)的面板数据模型,本文分析三类转移支付(税收返还,一般性转移支付和专项转移支付)对政府规模的影响,得出转移支付与地方政府规模之间存在正相关关系的结论。
[Abstract]:The research on transfer payment and government scale is one of the hot topics in public economics. With the enhancement of domestic factor mobility, local governments are gradually competing. Because our local government has no tax legislative power, this kind of competition is more reflected in the expenditure, that is, the local government's expenditure scale has an inherent tendency to expand. In general, local governments' preferences for public goods are hardly exactly the same as those of the central government. In the process of pursuing the maximization of local interests, local governments often supply insufficient public services with spillover. If the central government uses transfer payments to stimulate the supply of public goods to local governments, local governments have a certain degree of opportunism-that is, artificial manipulation to obtain maximum transfer payments. The larger the scale of transfer payments, the weaker the budgetary constraints on local government spending. Our local government has less income and takes more responsibility for expenditure. The transfer payment of the central government accounts for a large proportion of the local government income. This paper points out that in order to attract factor inflow and obtain better economic performance, local governments are faced with income constraints under the performance assessment system, which takes economic performance as the core. Decisions will be made to increase investment in infrastructure and reduce investment in public goods. In this case, the central government can encourage local governments to increase the provision of public goods through matching grants or equalization of transfer payments. In the process, local government scale inevitably expanded. Through a panel data model of national prefecture-level cities (districts) from 2003 to 2009, this paper analyzes the impact of three types of transfer payments (tax return, general transfer payment and special transfer payment) on the scale of government. The conclusion is that there is a positive correlation between transfer payment and the scale of local government.
【学位授予单位】：南开大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F812.45

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