地方税收竞争、企业利润与门槛效应

发布时间：2018-06-13 03:38

本文选题：税收竞争 + 税收洼地　；参考：《中国工业经济》2017年07期

【摘要】：中国地方税收优惠正处于"一管就死,一放就乱"的两难困局,地方政府也面临着低有效税率与高公共投资的权衡取舍难题。本文新建一个嵌入地方政府借贷行为的理论模型,发现地方税收竞争对区内工业企业利润的影响取决于政府治理能力,"税收天堂"政策只在低治理能力地区才是占优策略。经分组FGLS回归证实,低治理能力地区的税收竞争行为显著提高了区内工业企业利润,高治理能力地区恰好相反。因此,地区间无差别的税收优惠政策并非最优,起点公平容易导致终点不公平。基于全样本的SCC-FE模型和面板门槛模型所做的稳健性回归结果显示,"税收洼地"对工业企业利润的影响仍然存在门槛效应。机制分析发现,相比低治理能力地区,高治理能力地区的公共品对企业边际贡献更大,而当地税收竞争却在更大程度上抑制了公共品增长。进一步地,异质性检验发现了不同所有制、规模、行业的工业企业受益能力的非均等化。以上结论对中国税收优惠垂直分权安排有重要政策含义,建议政府对地方税收优惠以选择性部分授权的方式替代"一刀切"清理或放权。
[Abstract]:China's local tax incentives are in the dilemma of "one management is dead, one is chaos", and local governments are also faced with the trade-off between low effective tax rate and high public investment. In this paper, a new theoretical model of local government borrowing behavior is built, and it is found that the influence of local tax competition on the profits of industrial enterprises in the region depends on the governance ability of the government, and that the "tax paradise" policy is the dominant strategy only in the areas with low governance ability. The results of FGLS regression show that the tax competition in low governance areas has significantly increased the profits of industrial enterprises in the region, whereas in high governance areas, the opposite is true. Therefore, no difference between regions is not the best tax preferential policy, the starting point is easy to lead to unfair destination. The robust regression results of SCC-FE model and panel threshold model show that there is still a threshold effect on the profit of industrial enterprises caused by "tax depression". The mechanism analysis shows that compared with the low governance area, the public goods in the high governance area contribute more to the margin of enterprises, while the local tax competition inhibits the growth of public goods to a greater extent. Furthermore, heterogeneity tests show that industrial enterprises of different ownership, scale and industry are not equal to each other. The above conclusions have important policy implications for the vertical decentralization of tax preferences in China. It is suggested that the government should replace the "one-size-fits-all" clean-up or decentralization of local tax preferences with selective partial authorization.
【作者单位】：暨南大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“税制结构与可持续经济增长:基于地方政府行为的研究”(批准号71573106)
【分类号】：F275.4;F812.42

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