“中国模式”下的地方政府行为——地方保护的产生和应对

发布时间：2018-06-14 07:45

本文选题：统合发展模式 + 地方政府　；参考：《学术界》2015年06期

【摘要】：对地方保护主义既有的研究将其产生的原因局限在地方政府的财政激励和政绩激励上,忽视了发展环境和模式对地方政府行为的影响。在"中国模式"的发展思路下,发展型地方政府以地方经济发展为己任,追求更高的财政收益,驱动着地方政府保护本地产业。"地方政府——属地企业"统合发展模式下形成的新型政企关系,为地方保护提供了载体和实施手段。区域竞争中形成的"囚徒困境"使地方保护政策在一定程度上成为地方政府的无奈之举。随着中国市场机制的逐渐完善,地方保护所反映的政府对经济的过度干预弊端丛生,因此需要借鉴其他东亚国家的经验,对"中国模式"进行反思,重新定位政府的职责。同时,通过司法领域的改革、建立一套国内贸易审查机制,也有利于限制地方保护行为。
[Abstract]:The existing research on local protectionism limits the causes to local government's financial incentive and achievement incentive, neglecting the influence of development environment and model on local government's behavior. Under the development thought of "Chinese model", the local government of developmental type takes the local economic development as its own responsibility, pursues higher financial revenue, and drives the local government to protect the local industry. " The new relationship between government and enterprise formed under the mode of integration and development of local government-dependent enterprises provides a carrier and means of implementation for local protection. "Prisoner's Dilemma" formed in the regional competition makes the local protection policy become the helpless action of the local government to some extent. With the gradual improvement of China's market mechanism, the local protection reflects the malpractice of excessive government intervention in the economy. Therefore, it is necessary to use the experience of other East Asian countries for reference, to reflect on the "Chinese model" and to reposition the responsibility of the government. At the same time, through the judicial reform, the establishment of a domestic trade review mechanism is also conducive to limit local protection.
【作者单位】：中国海洋大学法政学院;
【分类号】：D630;F812.7

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