纵向博弈、横向竞争与地方政府举债融资及其治理

发布时间：2018-06-14 12:40

本文选题：地方政府债务 + 纵向博弈　；参考：《当代经济科学》2017年05期

【摘要】：本文以中央与地方间的纵向博弈和地方政府间的横向竞争为理论框架,分析了地方政府举借债务的动因,基于空间面板模型的实证结果显示,信息不对称使中央政府对于地方政府的举债行为并没有形成强力有效的约束,而地方政府间的横向竞争则进一步加剧了债务规模的扩张。同时,地方政府举借债务也存在财政分权的体制因素,这集中体现在其举债规模与财力状况相关,而不同财力构成对于举债规模影响存在异质性:一般公共财力是正向影响,而政府性基金财力则是负向影响,显示出地方政府主动举债和被动举债是同时存在的。上述论断为地方政府举债融资的管控治理提供了一定的启示。
[Abstract]:Based on the vertical game between central and local governments and the horizontal competition between local governments, this paper analyzes the motivation of borrowing debt by local governments. The empirical results based on spatial panel model show that, Asymmetric information makes the central government do not form a strong and effective constraint on the borrowing behavior of local governments, and the horizontal competition between local governments further intensifies the expansion of debt scale. At the same time, there are institutional factors of fiscal decentralization in borrowing debt of local governments, which is mainly reflected in the fact that the scale of borrowing is related to the financial situation, and the influence of different financial structure on the scale of borrowing is heterogeneity: the general public finance is a positive impact. However, the financial resources of government funds have a negative impact, showing that local governments' active borrowing and passive borrowing exist at the same time. The above conclusion for the local government debt management and management of debt to provide some inspiration.
【作者单位】：青岛理工大学经贸学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金一般项目“分类限额管理下地方政府债务防风险与稳增长的平衡协调机制研究”(17BJY169)
【分类号】：F812.5

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