中央对地方转移支付机制的优化研究——基于财政激励的视角

发布时间：2018-07-10 14:08

本文选题：财政支出结构 + 转移支付机制　；参考：《财政研究》2015年10期

【摘要】：在一个多任务委托—代理分析框架中,本文分析了中央转移支付激励机制对地方政府获取转移支付收入行为及其支出偏好的影响:为保证地方政府在发展属地经济以获取公共财政收入的行为努力为正,应逐渐规范地方政府非公共财政收入的行为,同时要清理、规范乃至杜绝地方政府以获取更多专项转移支付为目的的游说行为;中央政府不应对经济建设支出行为给予过多激励,否则地方政府的基本公共服务支出行为将难以保证。实证分析发现:近些年来,尽管我国专项转移支付比例有所下降,但依然有进一步下降的空间;地方财政支出结构的主要问题是经济建设支出偏向较为严重,而基本公共服务支出缺口较大;一般性转移支付对缩小地区间经济发展差距的效果非常显著,但税收返还却部分地抵消了这种正向调节效应。本文还提出了优化转移支付激励机制的对策性建议。
[Abstract]:In a multitasking delegation-agent analysis framework, This paper analyzes the influence of the incentive mechanism of central transfer payment on the local government's behavior of obtaining transfer payment income and its expenditure preference: in order to ensure the local government's behavior in developing territorial economy to obtain public financial revenue, Local governments should gradually regulate the behavior of non-public financial revenue, at the same time, to clean up, regulate and even eliminate the local governments to obtain more special transfer payments as the purpose of lobbying; The central government should not give too much incentive to the behavior of economic construction expenditure, otherwise the basic public service expenditure behavior of local government will be difficult to guarantee. Empirical analysis shows that in recent years, although the proportion of special transfer payments in China has decreased, there is still room for further decline; the main problem of the local fiscal expenditure structure is that the economic construction expenditure bias is more serious. The gap of basic public service expenditure is large, and the effect of general transfer payment on narrowing the gap of regional economic development is very significant, but tax return partially offset this positive adjustment effect. The paper also puts forward some suggestions to optimize the incentive mechanism of transfer payment.
【作者单位】：中南财经政法大学财政税务学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“促进基本公共服务均等化的中央财政转移支付机制优化研究”(13BGL033) 中国博士后科学基金面特别资助项目(2015T80859)的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：F812.45

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