中国财政配套性转移支付过程中的动态博弈研究
发布时间：2018-09-10 18:27
【摘要】：财政配套性转移支付是中国现行中央对地方财政转移支付体系中一种占有较大比重的转移支付形式，是实现公共服务均等化和弥补财政失衡的重要政策工具。由于中国现行的财税体制和中央对地方财政转移支付制度还不完善，，因此在财政配套性转移支付的过程中，中央政府和地方政府由于目标函数的差异，存在动态的合作博弈行为。在博弈中，中央基于财政体制惯性与现状、全国性公共产品供给和引导地方对于公共问题治理等基本逻辑，向地方政府拨付财政配套性转移支付；而地方基于财政资源不足、官员晋升以及博弈长远利益的逻辑，想方设法获取中央财政配套性转移支付。在博弈过程截面上看，中央运用转移支付政策法规、配套资金支付时间前置和财政配套性转移支付资金监管等策略来调动地方财政的积极性实现中央的政策目标，地方政府利用举债、空转以及虚假申报和配套等策略来筹措配套资金获取中央的财政转移支付，弥补地方财政缺口。财政配套性转移支付过程的博弈在一定程度上提升了公共产品的供给水平，也派生出财政资源替代效应、财政横向失衡、扰乱地方在财政支出自主性，衍生出一些腐败行为。
[Abstract]:Fiscal transfer payment is an important policy tool to realize the equalization of public services and to make up for the imbalance of public finance, which is a form of transfer payment with a large proportion in the current financial transfer payment system between the central government and the local government. Since China's current fiscal and taxation system and the central-to-local fiscal transfer payment system are still not perfect, in the process of fiscal matching transfer payment, the central government and the local government have different objective functions. There is dynamic cooperative game behavior. In the game, the central government, based on the inertia and current situation of the financial system, the supply of national public goods and the basic logic of guiding the local government to deal with public problems, allocates the fiscal matching transfer payment to the local government, while the local government is short of financial resources. Officials' promotion and the logic of game long-term interests, try to obtain the central finance supporting transfer payment. In the cross-section of the game process, the central government uses the policies and regulations of transfer payment, the supporting fund payment time leading and the financial supporting transfer payment fund supervision to mobilize the enthusiasm of local finance to achieve the central policy goal. The local government makes use of the strategies of borrowing, idling, false declaration and matching to raise the supporting funds to obtain the central financial transfer payment and make up for the gap of the local finance. The game of fiscal matching transfer payment improves the supply level of public goods to a certain extent, and also derives the substitution effect of financial resources, the horizontal imbalance of finance, disrupts the autonomy of local fiscal expenditure, and gives rise to some corrupt behaviors.
【学位授予单位】：南昌大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F812.45
本文编号：2235262
[Abstract]:Fiscal transfer payment is an important policy tool to realize the equalization of public services and to make up for the imbalance of public finance, which is a form of transfer payment with a large proportion in the current financial transfer payment system between the central government and the local government. Since China's current fiscal and taxation system and the central-to-local fiscal transfer payment system are still not perfect, in the process of fiscal matching transfer payment, the central government and the local government have different objective functions. There is dynamic cooperative game behavior. In the game, the central government, based on the inertia and current situation of the financial system, the supply of national public goods and the basic logic of guiding the local government to deal with public problems, allocates the fiscal matching transfer payment to the local government, while the local government is short of financial resources. Officials' promotion and the logic of game long-term interests, try to obtain the central finance supporting transfer payment. In the cross-section of the game process, the central government uses the policies and regulations of transfer payment, the supporting fund payment time leading and the financial supporting transfer payment fund supervision to mobilize the enthusiasm of local finance to achieve the central policy goal. The local government makes use of the strategies of borrowing, idling, false declaration and matching to raise the supporting funds to obtain the central financial transfer payment and make up for the gap of the local finance. The game of fiscal matching transfer payment improves the supply level of public goods to a certain extent, and also derives the substitution effect of financial resources, the horizontal imbalance of finance, disrupts the autonomy of local fiscal expenditure, and gives rise to some corrupt behaviors.
【学位授予单位】：南昌大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F812.45
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 张澍;财政联邦主义理论的新发展[J];财经科学;2004年05期
2 刘溶沧,焦国华;地区间财政能力差异与转移支付制度创新[J];财贸经济;2002年06期
3 周美多;颜学勇;;中国专项转移支付的政治逻辑:问题、原因与出路[J];当代财经;2008年09期
4 赵晓宏;;国内一般性转移支付研究综述[J];地方财政研究;2007年10期
5 徐轶;谢欣;;地方财政项目配套资金问题初探[J];地方财政研究;2009年05期
6 张光;;中国政府间财政关系的演变(1949-2009)[J];公共行政评论;2009年06期
7 平新乔;从中国农民医疗保健支出行为看农村医疗保健融资机制的选择[J];管理世界;2003年11期
8 陈玲;贺婷婷;;地方配套资金存在的问题及建议——县域金融机构涉农贷款增量奖励资金检查的思考[J];财政监督;2012年22期
9 马国贤;;“营改增”试点与财政监督研究[J];财政监督;2013年18期
10 宋超,绍智;完善我国专项转移支付制度的初步研究[J];经济研究参考;2004年51期
本文编号：2235262
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/guanlilunwen/shuishoucaizhenglunwen/2235262.html
