中国式分税制、中央税收征管权集中与税收竞争

发布时间：2018-12-15 02:46

【摘要】：本文以企业所得税制改革为研究对象,将中央政府的动态作用纳入中国地区间税收竞争关系的研究中。在理论上,本文认为,辖区问税收竞争假说相比"自上而下的税收标尺竞争"假说更适宜解释中国地区间税收策略互动关系;中国式分税制不存在类似于西方联邦体制中的纵向税收竞争问题;共享税制下中央政府有动机集中税收征管权来压缩地方政府税收竞争的空间。在实证上,本文采用动态空间工具变量模型检验了2002—2007年间中央税收征管权集中对地区间横向税收竞争的影响。实证结果显示,在所有权重下,地区间存在一定程度的横向税收竞争关系,中央税收征管权集中提高了实际税率;更为重要地,中央集中税收征管权降低了地区间横向税收竞争程度。
[Abstract]:This paper takes the enterprise income tax system reform as the research object, and brings the dynamic role of the central government into the study of the tax competition relationship among regions in China. In theory, this paper holds that the hypothesis of tax competition is more suitable to explain the interaction of tax strategies between different regions of China than the hypothesis of "top-down tax scale competition". The Chinese tax system does not have the vertical tax competition problem similar to the western federal system, and the central government has the incentive to concentrate the tax collection and administration right to reduce the space of local government tax competition under the shared tax system. Empirically, this paper uses the dynamic spatial tool variable model to test the influence of the centralization of the central tax collection power on the horizontal tax competition between regions from 2002 to 2007. The empirical results show that, under all the weights, there exists a certain degree of horizontal tax competition among regions, and the centralization of the central tax collection and administration power increases the effective tax rate; More importantly, the centralization of central tax collection power reduces horizontal tax competition between regions.
【作者单位】：厦门大学经济学院财政系;上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院;华中科技大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家社科重大项目(10zd&036) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71303083) 教育部人文社会科学研究基金青年项目(11YJC790039) 福建省社会科学规划项目(2014B110)的资助
【分类号】：F812.42

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