地方政府在社会抗争事件中的“摆平”策略

发布时间：2018-03-02 00:24

  本文关键词： 抗争政治 地方政府 行为策略 摆平　出处：《政治学研究》2016年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】："抗争政治"是当代中国政治研究中的一个重要解释概念。现有研究大多基于公民及公民社会立场,较少关注抗争事件中另一个重要行动者——地方政府的行为及其内在策略。少数探讨抗争事件中地方政府行为的研究,则主要关注地方政府某些特定的行为模式,注重对微观过程的分析与解释,而较少涉及具体有效的行为策略。当代中国地方政府在应对社会抗争事件时主要运用了"摆平"的行为策略,即地方政府较为被动、消极地履行社会管理职能;根据对特定社会抗争事件是否超出管辖范围的可能性估计,选择性进行应对;在应对社会抗争事件时,运用拖延、收买、欺瞒、要挟、限制自由等方式,尽量实现属地社会表面上的暂时性稳定。这是因为,受到"上下分治"以及"经济发展主义"和"有限任期"、"一票否决"等体制机制的共同影响,地方政府运用制度框架内的方式应对社会抗争的动力较小,甚至无法使用。同时,刚性压制的方式受到了中央的严格控制,并且可能造成更严重的社会抗争。"
[Abstract]:"protest politics" is an important explanatory concept in contemporary Chinese political research. Most of the existing studies are based on the position of citizens and civil society. Less attention is paid to the behavior of the local government, another important actor in the protest event, and its internal strategies. A few studies on the behavior of the local government in the protest event are mainly concerned with some specific behavior patterns of the local government. Attention is paid to the analysis and explanation of microcosmic process, but less to the concrete and effective behavior strategy. The local government in contemporary China has mainly used the "levelling" behavior strategy when dealing with the social protest event, that is, the local government is more passive. To passively perform social management functions; to selectively respond to the possibility of whether a particular social protest event is outside the jurisdiction; to use procrastination, buy-in, deception and coercion in dealing with social protest events; Restrictions on freedom, etc., in order to achieve as much temporary stability as possible on the surface of the territorial society. This is due to the joint effects of "partitioning", "economic developmentalism" and "limited tenure" and "one-vote veto" and other institutional mechanisms, Local governments have little or no incentive to respond to social protests in a way that is within the framework of the system. Meanwhile, rigid repression is strictly controlled by the central authorities and may lead to more serious social protests. "
【作者单位】： 浙江大学公共管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重大招标项目“地方政府社会管理创新的制度化研究”(13&ZD040)的研究成果
【分类号】：D63
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本文编号：1554247