地方政府竞争对公共服务供给影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-29 03:03

本文选题：公共财政　切入点：地方政府竞争　出处：《浙江财经大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：地方政府对于GDP的竞争在我国是一个普遍现象，这种竞争在一定程度上促进了经济的增长，但对公共服务的供给会产生怎样的影响呢？财政联邦主义传统观点认为，地方政府间的非合作行为竞争可促进公共服务供给的效率，相应提升居民的福利水平。同时，也有学者提出“逐底竞争”（race to the bottom），主要指地方政府通过降低税率等优惠政策来吸引投资，这种竞争将以降低财政收入为代价，影响地方政府对公共服务的供给能力。而我国的地方政府间竞争对公共服务的供给的影响机制是什么，会产生怎样的影响，需要我们进行系统研究。这对于规范我国地方政府竞争，优化地方公共服务供给结构与扩宽公共服务供给渠道提供一定的依据，对促进我国公共服务的有效供给有着重要意义。本文研究地方政府竞争主要是地方对于GDP的竞争，借鉴前人理论的基础上，分析这种竞争对于我国教育、医疗、社会保障方面的公共服务供给影响。在梳理地方政府竞争对公共服务影响的相关文献的基础上，描述我国地方政府竞争的体制性特征、主体性特征和财政支出特征，分析现行制度安排下地方政府竞争对公共服务供给影响机制，包括政绩考核、晋升博弈、任期短暂以及预算管理等因素的影响；借用Oates和Schwab（1988）财政分权模型和马光荣、杨恩艳（2010）模型中的部分假设，分析地方GDP竞争对公共服务供给影响，，认为地方政府对于GDP的偏向行为将抑制公共服务（如教育、医疗和社会保障）供给。本文选择教育、医疗和社会保障三方面的公共服务供给水平为被解释变量，地方政府竞争为解释变量，人均GDP、财政分权、受教育程度和人口密度为控制变量，通过我国2000-2012年省级面板数据进行实证分析，计量结果验证了前文的模型分析与影响机理分析，但同时发现，地方政府竞争对不同经济带的公共服务供给会产生相反的作用，地方政府竞争抑制了东部公共服务供给，促进了中西部地区公共服务的供给；基于上述分析，从官员考核指标体系、财政体制等方面提出优化地方政府竞争、改善公共服务供给的政策建议。
[Abstract]:The competition of local government for GDP is a common phenomenon in our country, this kind of competition has promoted the economic growth to a certain extent, but how will the influence on the supply of public service? The traditional view of fiscal federalism is that non-cooperative behavior competition among local governments can promote the efficiency of public service supply and the welfare level of residents. Some scholars have also suggested that "bottom-by-bottom competition" means that local governments attract investment through preferential policies such as lower tax rates, which will be at the expense of lower fiscal revenues. What is the influence mechanism of the competition between local governments on the supply of public services, and what kind of influence will it have on the supply of public services? It is of great significance to standardize the competition of local governments, optimize the supply structure of local public services and broaden the supply channels of public services, and it is of great significance to promote the effective supply of public services in China. This paper studies the competition between local governments and GDP. Based on the previous theories, this paper analyzes the influence of this competition on the supply of public services in education, medical care and social security in China. On the basis of combing the relevant literature on the influence of local government competition on public service, this paper describes the institutional characteristics, subjective characteristics and fiscal expenditure characteristics of local government competition in China. This paper analyzes the influence mechanism of local government competition on the supply of public service under the current system arrangement, including the influence of the factors such as performance assessment, promotion game, short tenure and budget management, and borrows the fiscal decentralization model and Ma Guangong's model of fiscal decentralization from Oates and Schwabu 1988. Based on some hypotheses in Yang Enyan's 2010) model, this paper analyzes the influence of local GDP competition on the supply of public service, and concludes that local government's biased behavior towards GDP will restrain the supply of public service (such as education, medical treatment and social security). This paper chooses the public service supply level of education, medical treatment and social security as explained variable, local government competition as explanatory variable, per capita GDP, fiscal decentralization, education level and population density as controlling variables. Through the empirical analysis of provincial panel data from 2000 to 2012 in China, the econometric results verify the above model analysis and influence mechanism analysis, but at the same time, it is found that local government competition will have the opposite effect on the public service supply in different economic zones. The local government competition inhibits the supply of public services in the east and promotes the supply of public services in the central and western regions. Based on the above analysis, this paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to optimize the competition of local government and improve the supply of public service from the index system of official assessment and the financial system.
【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D630;F812.2

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