当前我国权力监督的困境:党政权力“吸纳”监督权

发布时间：2018-05-12 03:05

本文选题：党政权力 + 权力监督　；参考：《天津行政学院学报》2016年01期

【摘要】：我国独特的双重双轨体制在建国初期政权巩固阶段以及改革开放初期"追赶式"经济发展阶段体现出明显优势,但伴随而来的党政权力一体化导致权力过分集中,二元化的国内外环境加剧了权力集中的趋势,部分权力"吸纳"了监督力量,导致权力监督部门效能弱化甚至无作为。从我国监督困境入手,探索当前体制下党政权力通过何种途径影响监督行为、消解监督功能;作为确保权力正常运行的一维,监督力量同时受到部门利益与传统政治文化的影响。党政权力从政治权力、经济利益以及文化心理方面部分消解了我国权力监督部门的效能,如何解决当前体制下权力监督问题是全面深化改革有效推行的前提与保证。
[Abstract]:The unique dual track system of our country shows obvious advantages in the stage of the consolidation of political power in the early period of the founding of the people's Republic of China and the stage of "catch-up" economic development in the early stage of reform and opening up, but the accompanying integration of party and government power leads to excessive concentration of power. The dualized domestic and foreign environment intensifies the trend of power concentration, and some of the powers "absorb" the supervisory power, which leads to the weakening or even inaction of the efficiency of the power supervision department. Starting with the difficult situation of supervision in our country, this paper explores the ways by which the power of the party and government can influence the supervision behavior and dispel the supervisory function under the current system, as a one-dimensional way to ensure the normal operation of the power. Supervisory power is influenced by both departmental interests and traditional political culture. The party and government power has partly eliminated the efficiency of the power supervision department in our country from the aspects of political power, economic interests and cultural psychology. How to solve the power supervision problem under the current system is the premise and guarantee of deepening the reform effectively.
【作者单位】：中共中央党校;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“马克思主义大众化与中国优秀传统文化社会化的协同推进机制研究”(15BKS020)
【分类号】：D630.9

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