地方政府治理转型的激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-05-13 17:14

本文选题：地方政府 + 治理转型　；参考：《中国海洋大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：构建国家治理体系、实现治理能力现代化目标的提出,标志着治理上升为中国政府的核心命题。治理转型扎根于治理理论。治理理论源自西方,在中国语境下以国家治理的面貌出现,强调治国理政的内涵。中西方的治理理论都具有转型的意蕴。地方政府治理转型是指地方政府的角色定位、职能范围、工具手段从传统管制型政府向公共服务型政府转变的微观过程。治理转型的参与主体呈现多元化,中央政府负责描绘治理转型的宏观图景,地方政府则是执行中央理念、实现治理转型的关键力量,两者构成一种委托代理关系。治理转型从治理理念、治理目标、治理主体、治理体制、治理职能、治理规则、治理手段等诸方面对地方政府提出客观要求,但是诺斯悖论表明地方政府可能会成为阻碍治理转型的因素,因此关注委托代理模式下中央政府对地方政府的激励机制。当前地方政府的激励机制包括行政发包制、行政分权、财政分权以及官员晋升锦标赛四种。基于中央政府治理理念阐发的模糊性特点、激励机制的目标多元和信息不对称现象突出、现有激励机制谋利逻辑等因素,地方政府业已形成依赖经济绩效的惯性,政府系统外部主体对地方政府激励效应有限,重视正向激励轻视负向激励设计,现有激励机制促使地方政府选择性执行,地方政府难以主动追求治理转型,需要对地方政府的激励机制加以优化。通过借鉴霍姆斯特姆和米尔格兰姆的多任务委托代理模型以及授权模型研究结论,表明中央和地方的分权程度、委托代理模式的完备程度、激励方式种类的多寡是影响地方政府激励机制的重要因素,因而可以从深化行政和财政分权、完善委托代理模式、增加激励方式种类尝试改造地方政府的激励机制,促使其谋求治理转型。
[Abstract]:The establishment of national governance system and the realization of the goal of modernization of governance capability indicate that governance has become the core proposition of the Chinese government. Governance transformation is rooted in governance theory. The theory of governance originated from the West and appeared in the context of Chinese government, emphasizing the connotation of governing the country. The governance theory of China and the West has the implication of transformation. The transformation of local government governance refers to the micro process of the transformation of local government from traditional government to public service government. The central government is responsible for describing the macro picture of governance transformation, while the local government is the key force to carry out the central concept and realize the governance transition, which constitutes a principal-agent relationship. The transformation of governance puts forward objective requirements to local governments from aspects of governance concept, governance objectives, governance subjects, governance systems, governance functions, governance rules, governance means, etc. But the North Paradox shows that the local government may be the factor that hinders the transformation of governance, so it pays attention to the incentive mechanism of the central government to the local government under the principal-agent model. At present, the incentive mechanism of local government includes administrative contract system, administrative decentralization, fiscal decentralization and official promotion championship. Based on the fuzziness characteristics of the central government governance concept, the diversity of the objectives of the incentive mechanism and the asymmetry of information, and other factors such as the profit seeking logic of the existing incentive mechanism, the local government has formed the inertia of relying on the economic performance. The external main body of the government system has limited incentive effect on local government, and pays attention to the positive incentive and despises the negative incentive design. The existing incentive mechanism urges the local government to carry out selectively, and the local government is difficult to pursue the governance transformation actively. The incentive mechanism of local government needs to be optimized. By referring to the research conclusions of the multi-task principal-agent model and the authorization model of Holmstum and Milgram, the paper shows the degree of central-local decentralization and the completeness of the principal-agent model. The number of incentive modes is an important factor affecting the incentive mechanism of local governments, so we can deepen administrative and fiscal decentralization, perfect the principal-agent model, increase the types of incentive ways to try to reform the incentive mechanism of local governments. Impel it to seek the transformation of governance.
【学位授予单位】：中国海洋大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D630

【相似文献】