农村电子政务市场化建设中“寻租”风险研究

发布时间：2018-05-26 04:17

本文选题：农村电子政务 + 市场化建设　；参考：《湖北工业大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文的研究对象为农村电子政务市场化建设中的“寻租”风险,以公共选择理论、委托代理理论、博弈论、寻租理论以及风险理论作为理论依据和分析工具,尝试从新的研究视角,剖析农村电子政务市场化建设中的“寻租”风险产生的背景、“寻租”风险源的形成、可能导致的后果、成因,及风险防范,为警示农村电子政务市场化建设中的“寻租”风险的防范提供依据。首先,阐述农村电子政务市场化建设中的电子政务项目建设外包过程中“寻租”风险产生的背景,分析农村电子政务市场化建设中“寻租”风险源的形成。研究论述农村电子政务市场化建设中“寻租”风险可能导致的后果以及农村电子政务市场化建设中“寻租”风险的成因,农村电子政务市场化建设中的“寻租”风险可能导致农村电子政务市场化建设中资源配置的扭曲、引发高昂的垄断和管制成本、损害政府运行的效率和公平性且阻碍农村电子政务市场化进程的推进,并且“寻租”风险损害政府形象,降低政府声誉和公信力、破坏社会风气,降低公共生活的道德标准、破坏社会的规范体系,引发其他层面上寻租行为并且直接危害广大农村农民的根本利益,破坏农村社会的和谐发展。其次,深层次分析政府中负责农村电子政务的涉农主管部门及其公职人员作为“理性经济人”,利益驱动是“寻租”风险产生的根本原因,农村电子政务市场化建设制度的缺陷是产生“寻租”风险的客观条件,权力腐蚀性是“寻租”风险产生的内在动机,电子政务项目建设外包过程中形成的“委托—代理”关系是产生“寻租”风险的诱导因素。再次,通过对农村电子政务市场化建设中可能产生“寻租”风险的两方及三方博弈进行分析验证。最后,提出防范农村电子政务市场化建设过程中“寻租”风险的措施,包括:从加强公职人员的道德素养下手,提高涉农政府主管部门自身的职业修养;提高政府公务员待遇,增强涉农政府主管部门公职人员对腐败的抵制能力;降低涉农政府主管部门及其公职人员主动设租、寻租的意愿;建立健全政府的管理与运行机制,堵塞“寻租”风险产生的漏洞;构建腐败风险防控的监督机制,加大对违法者的经济处罚力度。研究有效防范“寻租”风险的措施,以期从根本上有效的防范农村电子政务市场化建设中“寻租”风险的产生。
[Abstract]:The research object of this paper is the risk of rent-seeking in the market-oriented construction of rural e-government, with public choice theory, principal-agent theory, game theory, rent-seeking theory and risk theory as the theoretical basis and analysis tool. This paper tries to analyze the background of "rent-seeking" risk, the formation of "rent-seeking" risk source, the possible consequences, causes, and risk prevention in the construction of market-oriented rural e-government from a new perspective. To warn rural e-government market construction in the "rent-seeking" risk prevention to provide the basis. Firstly, the background of "rent-seeking" risk in the process of outsourcing the construction of e-government project in rural e-government market construction is expounded, and the formation of "rent-seeking" risk source in the construction of rural e-government marketization is analyzed. This paper discusses the possible consequences of "rent-seeking" risk in the market-oriented construction of rural e-government and the causes of the "rent-seeking" risk in the market-oriented construction of rural e-government. The risk of rent-seeking in the construction of marketization of rural e-government may lead to the distortion of the allocation of resources in the construction of market-oriented rural e-government, and lead to high monopoly and control costs. It damages the efficiency and fairness of the government operation and impedes the advancement of the marketization process of rural e-government, and the risk of "rent-seeking" damages the image of the government, reduces the reputation and credibility of the government, destroys the social atmosphere, and lowers the moral standards of public life. It destroys the standard system of the society, causes the rent-seeking behavior on other levels and directly endangers the fundamental interests of the majority of rural farmers, and destroys the harmonious development of the rural society. Secondly, it is deeply analyzed that the agricultural departments in charge of rural e-government and their public officials, as rational economic people, are the fundamental reasons for the risk of rent-seeking. The defects of the market-oriented construction system of rural e-government are the objective conditions to produce the risk of rent-seeking, and the causticity of power is the intrinsic motive of the risk of rent-seeking. The "principal-agent" relationship formed in the outsourcing process of e-government projects is the inducing factor of the risk of rent-seeking. Thirdly, the paper analyzes and verifies the two parties and three-party game that may produce the risk of rent-seeking in the construction of rural electronic government. Finally, the paper puts forward some measures to prevent the risk of rent-seeking in the process of market-oriented construction of rural e-government, including: to strengthen the moral literacy of public officials, to improve the professional accomplishment of the government departments concerned with agriculture, and to improve the treatment of government civil servants. To strengthen the ability of public officials of the government departments in charge of agriculture to resist corruption; to reduce the willingness of government departments in charge of agriculture and their public officials to set up rent and seek rent voluntarily; and to establish and improve the management and operation mechanism of the government. To plug the loopholes of rent-seeking risk, to construct the supervision mechanism of corruption risk prevention and control, and to increase the economic punishment of violators. This paper studies the effective measures to prevent the risk of rent-seeking in order to prevent the risk of rent-seeking in the construction of rural e-government market.
【学位授予单位】：湖北工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D422.6;D63

【相似文献】