当代中国决策问责的内在逻辑及优化策略

发布时间：2018-06-10 13:59

本文选题：决策问责 + 责任主体　；参考：《政治学研究》2017年03期

【摘要】：实现国家治理现代化,建立以决策问责为核心的责任政府是关键。然而,当前中国以责任政府建设为目标的问责实践却呈现出“重执行、轻决策”的特征,对决策失误缺乏有效的责任追究,造成了决策失误多发与决策问责缺乏并存的现象。从主体与责任的视角观察,造成这一现象的根本原因有两个方面:一是决策责任主体的多元性形成了主体间的内在张力,导致责任追究中的“多只手难题”;二是决策责任类型的多样性形成了各责任类型的不同适用情形,导致责任追究中的“多责任混乱”。对此,应当以明晰公共决策的责任主体和明确公共决策的责任类型为着力点,在厘清集体决策责任与个人决策责任界限的基础上,通过建立科学的决策责任终身追究制度和责任倒查机制,实现决策问责制度的优化重构。
[Abstract]:To realize the modernization of national governance and to establish a responsible government with decision-making accountability as the core is the key. However, at present, the practice of accountability aiming at the construction of responsible government in China shows the characteristics of "emphasizing execution, neglecting decision-making" and lacking effective responsibility investigation for decision-making mistakes, which results in the coexistence of frequent decision-making errors and lack of decision-making accountability. From the point of view of subject and responsibility, there are two basic reasons for this phenomenon: first, the pluralism of the subject of decision-making responsibility forms the internal tension between the subjects, which leads to the "multi-hand problem" in the investigation of responsibility; Second, the diversity of the types of decision-making responsibility forms the different applicable situations of each responsibility type, which leads to the confusion of multi-responsibility in the investigation of responsibility. In view of this, we should focus on clarifying the responsibility subject of public decision-making and the type of responsibility of public decision-making, on the basis of clarifying the boundary between collective decision-making responsibility and individual decision-making responsibility. Through the establishment of a scientific system of lifelong investigation of decision-making responsibility and a mechanism of responsibility inversion, the optimization and reconstruction of decision-making accountability system can be realized.
【作者单位】：深圳大学当代中国政治研究所;浙江大学中国地方政府创新研究中心;
【分类号】：D63

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