中国地方政府治理创新“人去政息”现象研究

发布时间：2018-06-27 19:18

本文选题：地方政府 + 治理创新　；参考：《江南大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：中国加入世界贸易组织后,地方政府治理创新成为中国行政发展的大趋势,而公共服务是其最基本的立足点。围绕给企业和社会提供优质高效的公共服务,地方政府进行了广泛的治理创新,但成功的探索中伴随着挫折和困惑,其中引人注目的是不少治理创新出现“人去政息”现象,损耗了大量公共资源,有悖于国家治理体系与治理能力现代化的改革目标。中国地方政府治理创新“人去政息”现象是指在变革管理过程中地方政府实施的公共服务创新项目,因改革领导者离去而丧失创新成果的现象。我们把具有独创性、产生明显社会效果并至少持续一年的治理创新项目确定为研究对象。在此范围内以马克思主义国家政权理论、服务型政府理论、制度变迁理论和变革管理理论为支撑,集中考察其他条件相对不变的情形下改革领导者离去后治理创新成果丧失的现象。改革受挫源于领导者离去导致创新动力结构失衡,即延续创新的动力和收益小于其阻力和成本。动力结构失衡主要体现为两方面,主观上领导者创新动力往往来自于机会主义,包括干部考核体制的反向激励作用、劣质创新的动力不可持续以及创新领导者公益需要动力不足等;客观上源于创新外部动力缺失,包括上级领导不支持、巩固创新的法制化程度低以及群众不认可等。走出“人去政息”困境的逻辑应当是,提升巩固创新的法制化水平,通过建立终止创新责任追究制度,完善激励持续创新的干部考核机制;畅通群众参与改革决策与监督渠道,建立阻断机会主义的创新纠错机制;通过创办创新受益者论坛,建立与权威媒体沟通机制,开发支持创新者联盟的动力;在战略策略规划上,选择阻力小的边缘制度创新策略。归根结底,就是使改革建立在动力和收益大于阻力和成本的坚实基础上,才能保证创新成果不因领导者的离去而被遗弃。
[Abstract]:After China's entry into WTO, local government governance innovation has become the main trend of China's administrative development, and public service is its most basic foothold. Local governments have carried out extensive governance innovations around providing high quality and efficient public services to enterprises and society, but the successful exploration has been accompanied by setbacks and puzzles, among which many governance innovations have appeared the phenomenon of "people go to government and information". It wastes a lot of public resources, which is contrary to the reform goal of modernization of national governance system and governance ability. The phenomenon of local government governance innovation in China refers to the public service innovation project implemented by the local government in the process of change management, which loses the innovation achievement because of the departure of the reform leader. We identified innovative governance projects that are original, have significant social effects and last at least a year. In this scope, it is supported by the Marxist theory of state power, the theory of service-oriented government, the theory of institutional change and the theory of change management. This paper focuses on the phenomenon of governance innovation loss after the departure of reform leaders under the condition that other conditions are relatively unchanged. The failure of reform is due to the imbalance of innovation power structure caused by the leader's departure, that is, the motive force and benefit of continuing innovation are smaller than their resistance and cost. The imbalance of dynamic structure is mainly reflected in two aspects. In subjective terms, the innovation power of leaders often comes from opportunism, including the reverse incentive function of cadre appraisal system. The motive force of inferior quality innovation is unsustainable and the innovation leaders need insufficient motivation for public good. Objectively it comes from the lack of external motive power of innovation, including the lack of support from superior leaders, the low degree of legalization of consolidation of innovation and the disapproval of the masses and so on. The logic of getting out of the dilemma of "people going to politics and information" should be to raise the level of legalization of consolidation and innovation, to improve the cadre assessment mechanism that encourages continuous innovation by establishing the system of accountability for the termination of innovation, and to open up channels for the masses to participate in the decision-making and supervision of reform. Establish the innovation error correction mechanism of blocking opportunism; develop the motive force to support innovator alliance by establishing innovation beneficiary forum and establishing communication mechanism with authoritative media; choose marginal institutional innovation strategy with little resistance in strategic planning. In the final analysis, it is based on the solid foundation that the power and profit outweigh the resistance and cost, so as to ensure that the innovation is not abandoned by the departure of the leader.
【学位授予单位】：江南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D630

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