官员变更、金融发展与企业税收规避
发布时间：2018-09-06 11:04
【摘要】：政治与经济的关系一直是学术研究的焦点之一(Durnev,2011),宏观经济政策的执行与波动,是微观企业行为的基础和重要影响因素之一,政治对微观企业财务行为的影响日益受到学界的重视(徐业坤等,2013)。企业的行为内生于其所处的制度环境之中,而政治环境的影响尤为明显。我国地方政府在地区的经济增长中发挥着重要作用,地方政府掌握着信贷、政府补贴等资源分配以及行政审批的权力,且在执行过程中有着较大的自由裁量权,地方政府间的竞争体制和财政分权体制往往被人们认为是解释和理解"中国经济奇迹"的重要制度安排,上级政府会根据地方的各项经济指标对地方官员进行考核,据以决定官员的晋升与否(周黎安,2007),地方政府因此有很强的激励去发展地方经济。官员变更往往会导致政策的不连续性,从而带来政策不确定性,新任官员在考核机制下,很可能对企业进行干预以实现个人晋升的目标,税收既是地方财政收入的重要来源,同时也是官员政绩考核的重要指标,由于在税收征管过程中,地方政府拥有较大的自由裁量权(刘慧龙和吴联生,2014),因此官员变更势必会对企业的税收规避行为产生影响。本文收集了 2009——2013年中国各城市的市委书记变更数据和A股非金融类上市公司数据,考察了地方官员变更对企业税收规避行为的影响。本文发现,总体而言,地方官员变更会显著抑制当地企业的税收规避行为;进一步的研究表明,在金融发展水平高的地区,官员变更对税收规避的抑制程度更显著。官员变更对企业税收规避的抑制作用仅显著存在于国有企业中,且对地方国有企业中的影响尤甚,而在民营企业中并不显著。同时,官员变更对税收规避的抑制作用还会受到官员异质性的影响,如果新任地方官员属于外地调任或者非正常换届时,抑制作用会更为明显。本文的进一步检验还发现在晋升压力较大以及财政压力较大的地区,官员变更对企业税收规避的抑制程度更为显著;在官员变更当年地方国有企业的税收规避程度减少越多,则在下一年得到的政府补贴越多。本文的研究发现从企业税收规避层面为官员变更如何影响微观企业行为提供了新的经验证据,结合地区金融发展水平、产权性质、国有企业层级等外部制度环境的研究,有助于加深了解政府如何干预企业;其次,本文的研究丰富了企业税收规避的文献,是对制度环境因素如何影响企业税收规避的有益补充;最后,结合研究结论,本文同时对监管机构和企业提出相应建议。
[Abstract]:The relationship between politics and economy has always been one of the focuses of academic research (Durnev,2011). The implementation and fluctuation of macroeconomic policy is one of the basic and important influencing factors of micro-enterprise behavior. The influence of politics on micro-enterprise financial behavior has been paid more and more attention by academic circles (Xu Yechun and others). The behavior of the enterprise is born in its institutional environment, and the influence of the political environment is especially obvious. Local governments in China play an important role in regional economic growth. Local governments hold the power of resource allocation, such as credit, government subsidies, and administrative examination and approval, and have greater discretion in the process of implementation. The competition system among local governments and the fiscal decentralization system are often considered to be important institutional arrangements for interpreting and understanding the "Chinese economic miracle." Local officials will be assessed by higher levels of government according to various local economic indicators. Local governments have a strong incentive to develop the local economy by deciding whether or not to promote officials (Zhou 2007). The change of officials often leads to the discontinuity of policies, which leads to policy uncertainty. Under the appraisal mechanism, new officials are likely to intervene in enterprises to achieve the goal of personal promotion. Tax is an important source of local revenue. At the same time, it is also an important indicator of official performance assessment. Because local governments have greater discretion in the process of tax collection and management (Liu Hui-long and Wu Lian-sheng 2014), the change of officials is bound to have an impact on the tax evasion behavior of enterprises. In this paper, we collect the data of the changes of party secretaries of cities in China from 2009 to 2013 and the data of A-share non-financial listed companies, and investigate the influence of the change of local officials on the tax evasion behavior of enterprises. This paper finds that, in general, the change of local officials will significantly inhibit the tax evasion behavior of local enterprises; further research shows that in areas with a high level of financial development, the degree of restraint of official change on tax evasion is more significant. The inhibitory effect of official change on tax evasion exists only in state-owned enterprises, especially in local state-owned enterprises, but not in private enterprises. At the same time, the restraining effect of official change on tax evasion will also be affected by the heterogeneity of officials. If the new local officials are transferred to other places or abnormal transfer, the inhibitory effect will be more obvious. The further test of this paper also found that in the areas where the pressure of promotion and financial pressure is greater, the degree of tax evasion of enterprises is more significantly inhibited by the change of officials, and the more the degree of tax evasion of local state-owned enterprises decreases in the year of the change of officials, The more government subsidies they receive next year. In this paper, we find that tax evasion provides new empirical evidence on how the change of officials affects micro-enterprise behavior, combining with the study of the external institutional environment, such as the level of regional financial development, the nature of property rights, the level of state-owned enterprises, and so on. It is helpful to understand how the government interferes with enterprises. Secondly, the research of this paper enriches the literature of corporate tax evasion and is a useful supplement to how institutional environmental factors affect corporate tax evasion. Finally, combined with the conclusions of the study, At the same time, this paper puts forward the corresponding suggestions to the regulators and enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D630;F275.4;F832.51
，
本文编号：2226158
[Abstract]:The relationship between politics and economy has always been one of the focuses of academic research (Durnev,2011). The implementation and fluctuation of macroeconomic policy is one of the basic and important influencing factors of micro-enterprise behavior. The influence of politics on micro-enterprise financial behavior has been paid more and more attention by academic circles (Xu Yechun and others). The behavior of the enterprise is born in its institutional environment, and the influence of the political environment is especially obvious. Local governments in China play an important role in regional economic growth. Local governments hold the power of resource allocation, such as credit, government subsidies, and administrative examination and approval, and have greater discretion in the process of implementation. The competition system among local governments and the fiscal decentralization system are often considered to be important institutional arrangements for interpreting and understanding the "Chinese economic miracle." Local officials will be assessed by higher levels of government according to various local economic indicators. Local governments have a strong incentive to develop the local economy by deciding whether or not to promote officials (Zhou 2007). The change of officials often leads to the discontinuity of policies, which leads to policy uncertainty. Under the appraisal mechanism, new officials are likely to intervene in enterprises to achieve the goal of personal promotion. Tax is an important source of local revenue. At the same time, it is also an important indicator of official performance assessment. Because local governments have greater discretion in the process of tax collection and management (Liu Hui-long and Wu Lian-sheng 2014), the change of officials is bound to have an impact on the tax evasion behavior of enterprises. In this paper, we collect the data of the changes of party secretaries of cities in China from 2009 to 2013 and the data of A-share non-financial listed companies, and investigate the influence of the change of local officials on the tax evasion behavior of enterprises. This paper finds that, in general, the change of local officials will significantly inhibit the tax evasion behavior of local enterprises; further research shows that in areas with a high level of financial development, the degree of restraint of official change on tax evasion is more significant. The inhibitory effect of official change on tax evasion exists only in state-owned enterprises, especially in local state-owned enterprises, but not in private enterprises. At the same time, the restraining effect of official change on tax evasion will also be affected by the heterogeneity of officials. If the new local officials are transferred to other places or abnormal transfer, the inhibitory effect will be more obvious. The further test of this paper also found that in the areas where the pressure of promotion and financial pressure is greater, the degree of tax evasion of enterprises is more significantly inhibited by the change of officials, and the more the degree of tax evasion of local state-owned enterprises decreases in the year of the change of officials, The more government subsidies they receive next year. In this paper, we find that tax evasion provides new empirical evidence on how the change of officials affects micro-enterprise behavior, combining with the study of the external institutional environment, such as the level of regional financial development, the nature of property rights, the level of state-owned enterprises, and so on. It is helpful to understand how the government interferes with enterprises. Secondly, the research of this paper enriches the literature of corporate tax evasion and is a useful supplement to how institutional environmental factors affect corporate tax evasion. Finally, combined with the conclusions of the study, At the same time, this paper puts forward the corresponding suggestions to the regulators and enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D630;F275.4;F832.51
，
本文编号：2226158
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