城市经营的地方政府因素研究——基于动态控制论的理论构建
发布时间：2019-06-28 14:59
【摘要】：在政府作用研究中,纵向的央地关系构成了地方政府面对的最重要制度环境。运用动态经济分析方法,对中国地方政府在发展中存在的困境进行全新解释:在理论状态下,地方政府在发展中的资源投入,随着时间的推移呈现规律性变化;在现实状态下,对地方政府资源投入起关键性约束的因素,却是中央政府的选拔机制。对以上两种状态,本文分别构建了地方政府经营模型。研究发现:在现实中,地方政府的资源投入逐步递减是一个正常现象,但当对地方官员投入的激励不足并致使参数θ较小时,不仅地方政府致力于长期发展的动力过小,而且动力降低的速率加快;尤其是在一个社会评价机制边界过大、体制内收益明显小于体制外收益的条件下,地方政府愿意投入的资源减少,以至趋近于零。
[Abstract]:In the study of the role of government, the vertical relationship between central and local governments constitutes the most important institutional environment faced by local governments. By using the method of dynamic economic analysis, this paper makes a new explanation for the difficulties existing in the development of local government in China: in the theoretical state, the resource investment of local government in development changes regularly with the passage of time; in the realistic state, the key constraint factor on the input of local government resources is the selection mechanism of the central government. For the above two states, this paper constructs the local government management model. It is found that in reality, the gradual decline of local government resource investment is a normal phenomenon, but when the incentive to local officials is insufficient and the parameter theta is small, not only the motivation of local government to devote itself to long-term development is too small, but also the rate of power decline is accelerated. Especially under the condition that the boundary of a social evaluation mechanism is too large and the income within the system is obviously smaller than that outside the system, the resources that local governments are willing to invest are reduced to zero.
【作者单位】： 上海社会科学院应用经济研究所;上海社会科学院世界经济研究所;
【基金】：国家社科基金重点项目(15AGL004);国家社科基金一般项目(16BJY072)
【分类号】：D630
本文编号：2507385
[Abstract]:In the study of the role of government, the vertical relationship between central and local governments constitutes the most important institutional environment faced by local governments. By using the method of dynamic economic analysis, this paper makes a new explanation for the difficulties existing in the development of local government in China: in the theoretical state, the resource investment of local government in development changes regularly with the passage of time; in the realistic state, the key constraint factor on the input of local government resources is the selection mechanism of the central government. For the above two states, this paper constructs the local government management model. It is found that in reality, the gradual decline of local government resource investment is a normal phenomenon, but when the incentive to local officials is insufficient and the parameter theta is small, not only the motivation of local government to devote itself to long-term development is too small, but also the rate of power decline is accelerated. Especially under the condition that the boundary of a social evaluation mechanism is too large and the income within the system is obviously smaller than that outside the system, the resources that local governments are willing to invest are reduced to zero.
【作者单位】： 上海社会科学院应用经济研究所;上海社会科学院世界经济研究所;
【基金】：国家社科基金重点项目(15AGL004);国家社科基金一般项目(16BJY072)
【分类号】：D630
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