上市公司违规处罚后会提高会计信息质量吗？

发布时间：2017-12-31 02:29

本文关键词：上市公司违规处罚后会提高会计信息质量吗？　出处：《南京大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：资本市场本质上是一个信息市场,高质量的信息披露是保障资本市场有效运转的基石。然而近年来我国证券市场上市公司的违规行为,尤其是信息披露违规行为频频出现、屡禁不止,不仅给广大投资者为带来了巨大的利益损失,而且对我国证券市场的稳定和健康发展构成很大威胁。证监会和交易所根据我国证券市场发展的实际状况并借鉴发达国家资本市场的经验,颁布并实施了一系列信息披露制度及监管制度,以规范上市公司的信息披露,并对违规公司给予处罚。违规公司在受到处罚后,可能会就此改过自新,积极提高会计信息质量；也有可能无视所受的处罚,为了实现特定利益继续知法犯法。基于此背景,本文选取了2000～2009年间沪深两市462次违规处罚事件,涉及290家上市公司作为研究对象,分析违规上市公司在受罚前后会计信息质量的变化情况,从而探讨监管机构的处罚效果以及可能对处罚效果造成影响的相关因素。经过研究发现：(1)监管机构的处罚能刺激公司提高信息披露水平,为投资者提供更为充分透明和客观真实的会计信息,有一定程度的效果。(2)适当加大处罚力度可使处罚效果更加明显。(3)若公司前一年处于亏损状态,扭亏为盈的动机会使得处罚效果有所折扣,但在重罚下公司仍会以“改正错误”——即提高信息质量为首要任务。(4)我国监管机构存在选择性执法的现象,但不公平的处罚并不能刺激公司改正错误,只有根据公司违规严重程度给予相应程度的处罚措施,才能促使公司从此次处罚中得到教训并在之后积极改正错误,为投资者提供高质量的会计信息。(5)资本市场可以识别违规企业的纠错行为,若公司受处罚后“知错不改”,将使投资者信心丧失并“用脚投票”,从而导致股票收益率大幅下跌；只有积极改正错误的态度能赢得投资者的信心,维护公司在市场中的形象和威信。本文对监管机构处罚效果及其影响因素的研究,将有助于理解证券市场现有监管机制的不足,并进一步完善我国信息披露理论和监管理论,为证券监管的发展提供理论参考。
[Abstract]:The capital market is essentially an information market, and high quality information disclosure is the cornerstone of ensuring the effective operation of the capital market. However, in recent years, the listed companies in the stock market of our country have violated the regulations. In particular, the frequent occurrence of information disclosure violations, repeated prohibitions, not only to the vast number of investors for the huge loss of interests. Moreover, it poses a great threat to the stability and healthy development of China's securities market. According to the actual situation of the development of China's securities market and the experience of developed countries' capital markets, the Securities Regulatory Commission and the Stock Exchange will learn from the experience of the developed countries. Promulgated and implemented a series of information disclosure system and supervision system to regulate the information disclosure of listed companies and to punish the illegal companies. Actively improve the quality of accounting information; It is also possible to ignore the punishment and continue to break the law in order to achieve specific interests. Based on this background, this paper selects 462 illegal punishment events in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets between 2000 and 2009, involving 290 listed companies as the research object. Analyze the changes of accounting information quality before and after the punishment of the listed companies in violation of the regulations. In order to explore the regulatory effect of punishment and possible impact on the effect of the relevant factors. After the study found that the punishment of the regulatory body can stimulate companies to improve the level of information disclosure. To provide investors with more transparent and objective accounting information, there is a certain degree of effect. 2) appropriate increase in penalties can make the punishment more obvious. 3) if the company is in a state of loss in the previous year. The motive of turning losses into profits will make the penalty effect less effective, but companies will still take "correcting mistakes"-that is, improving the quality of information as the primary task-under heavy penalties.) there is a phenomenon of selective enforcement by our country's regulators. But the unfair punishment can not stimulate the company to correct the mistakes, only according to the severity of the company violations to give the corresponding degree of punishment measures, in order to encourage the company to learn from the punishment and to actively correct the mistakes afterwards. Provide high quality accounting information for investors.) the capital market can identify the error-correcting behavior of illegal enterprises. If the company is punished, it will make investors lose their confidence and vote with their feet. As a result, the stock yield fell sharply; Only positive attitude to correct mistakes can win the confidence of investors and maintain the image and prestige of the company in the market. It will be helpful to understand the shortcomings of the existing regulatory mechanism in the securities market, and further improve the theory of information disclosure and supervision in China, and provide a theoretical reference for the development of securities regulation.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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