我国保荐制度创新研究
发布时间:2018-03-19 18:44
本文选题:保荐制度 切入点:保荐人 出处:《武汉理工大学》2013年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:保荐制度是旨在规范上市公司信息披露行为的制度安排,对证券市场的健康发展意义重大。作为破解我国中小型企业融资困境的重要手段,中小板、创业板等市场发挥的作用也日益深远。然而,在具体实践过程中,我国的保荐制度在保荐机构与保荐代表人权责分配等方面出现了一些问题,给投资者埋下了巨大隐患,也使得我国现行保荐制度面临现实拷问。从海外实践来看,英国、美国、香港等地区已在保荐制度安排上积累了重要经验,这为我国推进保荐制度建设提供了宝贵的借鉴价值,但必须认识到,保荐制度要从基本国情出发,因地制宜地进行合理设计,只有如此才能使创设保荐制度的预期目的得以实现。本文正是以此为逻辑起点,在回顾了我国现行保荐制度运行状况的基础上,通过构建动态博弈模型,尝试找出保荐制度相关问题滋生的制度根源,同时也寄望于根据博弈模型的均衡分析结果,为证券监管部门在改革和完善保荐制度的进程中提供一些合理的建议。 本文在第一部分着重论述了选题的背景和意义,并对国内外相关研究文献进行了系统梳理,并从中为本文的写作奠定了逻辑起点;第二部分则在介绍了保荐制度基本内容的基础上,以制度经济学为主要依托,探究了保荐制度的制度起源,并对保荐制度的基本特征和制度价值进行了全面论述;第三部分对我国现行保荐制度的运行状况进行了较为系统的剖析,并从中挖掘出了我国保荐制度亟待解决的三个主要问题,即违规识别、违规责任划分和违规处罚三方面的问题;第四部分是本文的比较分析部分,笔者在介绍美国、英国和香港各自采用的保荐制度后,从监管机构作用、制度实施范围和双重制三个方面总结了我国保荐制度的主要不同点;第五部分是本文的创新点和重点所在,本部分主要运用了博弈论的研究方法,通过构建和分析IPO申报与审核的博弈模型,找出了影响发行申报与审核过程中的参与方决策的主要因素,进而为监管机构的最优监管策略提供了参考依据;第六部分则是以博弈分析的基本结论为依据,尝试性地为我国现行保荐制度的进一步完善提出了若干建议,本文认为,只有从提高保荐人的准入资格、建立督导期更长的信息跟踪监督制度、完善保荐人的责任追究机制、促成“保荐单保制”以及推行强制责任保险制度这五个方面着手,才能深入挖掘保荐制度的制度效能;在本文的第七部分,笔者对论文的主要结论进行了回顾,同时也归纳和总结了本文的创新之处以及进一步研究的方向。
[Abstract]:The recommendation system is a system arrangement aimed at standardizing the information disclosure behavior of listed companies, which is of great significance to the healthy development of the securities market. However, in the concrete practice process, the recommendation system of our country has some problems in the distribution of the rights and responsibilities between the sponsor organization and the sponsor representative, which has laid a huge hidden danger to the investors. From overseas practice, Britain, the United States, Hong Kong and other regions have accumulated important experience in the arrangements of the sponsorship system, which has provided valuable reference value for our country to promote the construction of the sponsorship system. However, we must realize that the sponsor system should be reasonably designed according to the basic national conditions, and only in this way can the expected purpose of establishing the sponsorship system be realized. This paper takes this as the logical starting point. On the basis of reviewing the current operating conditions of the sponsor system in China, this paper attempts to find out the institutional root of the problems related to the sponsorship system by constructing a dynamic game model, and at the same time hopes to find out the results of the equilibrium analysis according to the game model. It provides some reasonable suggestions for the securities supervision department in the process of reforming and perfecting the recommendation system. In the first part of this paper, the background and significance of the topic are discussed, and the related research literature at home and abroad is systematically combed, which lays a logical starting point for the writing of this paper. In the second part, on the basis of introducing the basic contents of the recommendation system, based on the institutional economics, the author probes into the origin of the sponsorship system, and comprehensively discusses the basic characteristics and the system value of the sponsorship system. The third part has carried on the comparatively systematic analysis to our country present sponsor system movement condition, and has excavated out our country sponsor system urgently needs to be solved three main problems, namely the violation identification, The 4th part is the comparative analysis part of this paper. After introducing the recommendation system adopted by the United States, Britain and Hong Kong, the author starts with the role of the regulatory body. Three aspects of system implementation scope and dual system summarized the main differences of the sponsorship system in China. Part 5th is the innovation and focus of this paper, this part mainly uses the research methods of game theory. By constructing and analyzing the game model of IPO declaration and auditing, this paper finds out the main factors that affect the decision of the participants in the process of issuing declaration and auditing, and then provides a reference for the optimal regulatory strategy of the regulatory body. The 6th part is based on the basic conclusion of the game analysis, and puts forward some suggestions for the further improvement of the current sponsor system in our country. Only by establishing the information tracking and supervising system with a longer supervision period, perfecting the accountability mechanism of the sponsor, promoting the "recommendation order guarantee system" and carrying out the compulsory liability insurance system, can the system efficiency of the recommendation system be excavated deeply; In the 7th part of this paper, the author reviews the main conclusions of the paper, and summarizes the innovation of this paper as well as the direction of further research.
【学位授予单位】:武汉理工大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F832.51
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