上市公司高管在大股东单位兼职对公司价值影响的研究

发布时间：2018-09-18 11:08

【摘要】：高管（董事长或总经理）在大股东单位兼职是我国上市公司普遍存在的一个现象，，这一现象受到了监管部门、媒体和社会的广泛关注。大家关于高管在大股东单位兼职对上市公司价值影响的观点不尽相同。本文认为高管在大股东单位兼职作为一种公司治理现象，必然会与一些公司治理特征相联系。所以，本文从公司治理的角度出发，首先分析是那些因素可能会导致高管在大股东单位兼职现象的发生，然后从大股东的“侵占效应”和“监督效应”两方面分析了上市公司高管在大股东单位兼职对公司价值的影响。 本论文以上市公司2010年的数据为基础，分别选取了1312个董事长样本和1234个总经理样本进行实证分析。本文首先分析了公司治理的相关因素（所有权结构、性质等）对上市公司高管在大股东单位兼职的影响，本文的分析发现：大股东的两权分离度越高、股权制衡度越低的上市公司高管（董事长或总经理）越有可能在大股东单位兼职。此外，相对于非国有控股的上市公司，国有控股的上市公司的董事长更有可能在大股东单位兼职，而总经理在大股东单位兼职的概率却要低于前者（非国有控股的上市公司）。 本为的进一步分析了发现，上市公司的董事长在大股东单位兼职会同时产生“掏空效应”和“监督效应”，而这一现象主要存在于低治理水平的上市公司。在低治理水平的上市公司，董事长在大股东单位兼职所产生的“掏空效应”要大于“监督效应”，从而使得董事长在大股东单位兼职的上市公司的价值要小于董事长不在大股东单位兼职的上市公司。本文还发现总经理在大股东单位兼职现象的数量和对公司价值的影响都要比董事长小得多。
[Abstract]:It is a common phenomenon for senior executives (chairman or general manager) to work part-time in large shareholder units of listed companies in China, which has been widely concerned by the regulatory authorities, the media and the society. There are different views on the effect of executives' part-time work in large shareholders on the value of listed companies. As a phenomenon of corporate governance, executives' part-time work in large shareholder units is bound to be associated with some corporate governance characteristics. Therefore, from the perspective of corporate governance, the first analysis is that these factors may lead to the occurrence of part-time jobs in large shareholder units. Then, the paper analyzes the influence of senior executives' part-time jobs on the value of listed companies from the two aspects of "encroachment effect" and "supervision effect" of large shareholders. Based on the data of listed companies in 2010, this paper selects 132 chairman samples and 1234 general manager samples for empirical analysis. This paper first analyzes the influence of the related factors of corporate governance (ownership structure, nature, etc.) on the part-time work of executives in large shareholder units in listed companies, and finds that the higher the separation of the two rights of large shareholders, the higher the degree of separation between the two rights of large shareholders. Listed company executives (chairman or general manager) with lower equity checks are more likely to work part-time in large-shareholder units. In addition, the chairman of a publicly controlled company is more likely to work part-time in a large shareholder unit than a non-state-controlled listed company, while the probability of the general manager taking a part-time job in a large shareholder unit is lower than that of the former (non-state-controlled listed company). After further analysis, it is found that the chairman of the listed company will have "tunneling effect" and "supervision effect" at the same time in the majority shareholder unit, which mainly exists in the listed company with low governance level. In a listed company with a low level of governance, the "tunneling effect" caused by the chairman's part-time work in a large shareholder unit is greater than the "supervisory effect". Therefore, the value of the listed company in which the chairman of the board of directors is part-time is smaller than that of the listed company in which the chairman of the board is not in the majority shareholder unit. It is also found that the number of part-time jobs in large shareholders and the influence on company value are much smaller than that of chairman.
【学位授予单位】：新疆财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F224

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