上市公司高管薪酬激励效率研究

发布时间：2018-11-10 11:31

【摘要】：现代企业制度下,薪酬激励是现代企业激励高管最重要的方式之一,企业所有权和经营权相互分离,由于经营者和所有者之间存在目标不一致和信息不对称等问题,在所有者完全监督不可能做到的情况下,如何激励经营者就成为一个非常重要的问题。高管,即企业的高级管理人员,在企业中充当代理人的角色,他们的经营决策直接关系到企业的业绩和未来的成长。目前,企业高管的激励问题已成为非常流行的话题,上市公司的高管激励也成为关系上市公司经营效率的基本问题。因此探明高管薪酬激励的效果,探索更为合理的高管激励措施,减少由于道德风险所导致的代理成本,使之更加公平合理更趋完善,从而提高上市公司经营绩效,确保我国的企业能够长期稳定发展,在国际化竞争中立于不败就显得尤为必要。本文将以实证研究为主,以2008-2010年在沪深两市上市的中国上市公司为样本,通过对高管薪酬激励效率相关概念及委托代理理论、人力资本理论、产权理论等相关理论的梳理,运用三阶段DEA方法和SFA方法对我国上市公司高管薪酬激励效率进行探究,旨在为企业进行高管薪酬激励设计、提高企业绩效提供必要的理论支持和参考依据。本文主要得出以下结论：第一,三阶段DEA方法剔除环境变量与随机误差后所得效率评价结果比传统DEA计算结果相对较准确,同时,对比分析显示三阶段DEA方法所得效率评价结果与考虑环境变量的SFA所得结果趋于一致,但整体高管激励效率并不高。年平均纯技术效率保持相对稳定的状态,且纯技术效率相对较高,说明高管薪酬激励的管理相对有效,规模效率低是影响综合技术效率的主要原因。第二,由于不同公司治理环境以及不同的外部市场约束等因素,导致即使是相同的公司治理机制,对高管的影响也会具有明显差异,若只是简单套用,而不能加以本士化,就会造成公司股权激励水土不服的状态。第三,通过SFA方法对上市公司高管薪酬激励效率进行评价,发现高管人均现金薪酬仍是推动企业价值提升的主动力,可通过适当加大相应投入进一步提高激励效率；而高管股权激励的激励效率还不明显,因此需要加强高管股权激励力度和深度,增加股权激励的合理性与规范性,使股权激励措施真正起到激励效果。第四,环境变量中,流通股第一大股东持股比率与资产负债率对高管薪酬激励效率具有积极的影响作用,独立董事比例与企业规模对高管薪酬激励效率产生负面影响。
[Abstract]:Under the modern enterprise system, salary incentive is one of the most important ways to motivate executives in modern enterprises. The ownership and management rights of enterprises are separated from each other, and there are some problems such as inconsistent objectives and asymmetric information between managers and owners. How to motivate the operator becomes a very important problem under the condition that the owner can not supervise completely. Executives, the senior managers of the enterprise, act as agents in the enterprise, and their business decisions are directly related to the performance and future growth of the enterprise. At present, the incentive problem of enterprise executives has become a very popular topic, and the executive incentive of listed companies has become a basic problem related to the operational efficiency of listed companies. Therefore, to find out the effect of executive compensation incentive, to explore more reasonable incentive measures, to reduce the agency cost caused by moral hazard, to make it more fair, reasonable and perfect, so as to improve the operating performance of listed companies. To ensure the long-term and stable development of Chinese enterprises, it is necessary to stand undefeated in the international competition. This paper will focus on empirical research, taking the listed companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2008 to 2010 as samples, combing the related concepts of executive compensation incentive efficiency, principal-agent theory, human capital theory, property rights theory and so on. This paper probes into the efficiency of executive compensation incentive of listed companies in China by using three-stage DEA method and SFA method in order to provide the necessary theoretical support and reference basis for the design of executive compensation incentive and the improvement of enterprise performance. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: first, the efficiency evaluation results obtained by three-stage DEA method, excluding environmental variables and random errors, are more accurate than those of traditional DEA calculation results, and at the same time, The comparative analysis shows that the efficiency evaluation results obtained by three-stage DEA approach tend to be consistent with those obtained by SFA considering environmental variables, but the overall executive incentive efficiency is not high. The average annual pure technical efficiency is relatively stable and the pure technical efficiency is relatively high, which indicates that the management of executive compensation incentive is relatively effective, and the low scale efficiency is the main reason that affects the comprehensive technical efficiency. Second, due to different corporate governance environment and different external market constraints, even the same corporate governance mechanism, there will be significant differences in the impact on executives, if it is simply applied, but not the local. Will cause the company's stock right to encourage the state of resistance. Thirdly, through the SFA method to evaluate the incentive efficiency of executive compensation in listed companies, it is found that the per capita cash compensation of executives is still the main driving force to promote the value of enterprises, and the incentive efficiency can be further improved by appropriately increasing the corresponding input. However, the incentive efficiency of executive equity incentive is not obvious, so it is necessary to strengthen the intensity and depth of executive equity incentive, increase the rationality and standardization of equity incentive, so that equity incentive measures really play an incentive effect. Fourthly, among the environmental variables, the ratio of the largest shareholder holding and the asset-liability ratio of circulating shares have a positive effect on the incentive efficiency of executive compensation, while the proportion of independent directors and the scale of the enterprise have a negative impact on the incentive efficiency of executive compensation.
【学位授予单位】：中南林业科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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