晋升锦标赛与福利超载——中国地方债务问题与欧债危机的政治学比较
发布时间：2019-03-05 12:04
【摘要】：从政治体制根源来看,上级主导下的晋升锦标赛模式是中国地方债务蔓延的基本原因,借钱"搞建设"是具体诱发途径;代议民主制下的福利超载则是催生欧债危机的重要原因,南欧诸国普遍存在的举债"谋福利"现象是其现实反映。因此,在治理导向上,完善现行的晋升考核与问责机制,可有效抑制我国地方债务的持续高增长态势;而福利超载问题的解决则只能依赖代议民主体制的自我调适,目前尚未找到完备的解决方案。
[Abstract]:From the root of the political system, the promotion tournament model under the leadership of the superior is the basic reason for the spread of local debt in China, and borrowing money to "build up" is the specific way to induce it. The overloading of welfare under representative democracy is an important cause of the debt crisis in Europe, and the phenomenon of "seeking welfare" in the countries of southern Europe is the reflection of its reality. Therefore, in the direction of governance, improving the current promotion assessment and accountability mechanism can effectively restrain the sustained high growth of local debt in China; But the welfare overload problem can only rely on the self-adjustment of representative democratic system, and has not yet found a complete solution.
【作者单位】： 南开大学周恩来政府管理学院政治学系;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金青年项目“城市化进程中的居住现象及对社会稳定的影响研究”(项目号:12CZZ017)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：D0;F810.5
[Abstract]:From the root of the political system, the promotion tournament model under the leadership of the superior is the basic reason for the spread of local debt in China, and borrowing money to "build up" is the specific way to induce it. The overloading of welfare under representative democracy is an important cause of the debt crisis in Europe, and the phenomenon of "seeking welfare" in the countries of southern Europe is the reflection of its reality. Therefore, in the direction of governance, improving the current promotion assessment and accountability mechanism can effectively restrain the sustained high growth of local debt in China; But the welfare overload problem can only rely on the self-adjustment of representative democratic system, and has not yet found a complete solution.
【作者单位】： 南开大学周恩来政府管理学院政治学系;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金青年项目“城市化进程中的居住现象及对社会稳定的影响研究”(项目号:12CZZ017)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：D0;F810.5
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