公司雇佣检验与教育信号的关系研究
发布时间：2018-10-30 20:40
【摘要】： 筛选理论认为教育是显示劳动者劳动生产率的信号,教育水平起到区分不同能力劳动者的作用。但是随着经济社会的发展和教育规模的扩大,教育信号的这种作用在实际使用受到越来越多的干扰,使得公司越来越多的使用自己的更为有效的检验手段来挑选雇员。本文对公司的这种筛选行为做了初步的研究,我们探讨了雇主实施的雇佣检验是如何影响教育的信号作用的以及什么样的公司容易实施自己的雇佣检验。 文章第一章详述了本文的选题背景和意义,以及创新点。第二章介绍了相关理论研究,包括教育信号作用理论和筛选理论,以及对于雇主筛选的研究,这一部分的研究有利于我们深刻理解教育信号的作用机制,有利于我们分析雇佣检验对教育投资的影响。第三章和第四章介绍了本论文的研究方法以及数据和变量;第五章是基于两个回归模型的实证研究。 本文通过研究雇佣检验变量的引入对Micner函数中教育变量系数的变化,来考察雇佣检验的影响作用。研究的结果表明:雇主的雇佣检验抑制了教育的信号作用,同时公司的特征对是否实施雇佣检验有着广泛的影响。
[Abstract]:The screening theory holds that education is the signal of labor productivity, and the level of education plays a role in differentiating workers with different abilities. However, with the development of economy and society and the expansion of education scale, the function of education signal is more and more interfered in actual use, which makes companies more and more use their own more effective means of testing to select employees. This paper makes a preliminary study on the screening behavior of the company. We discuss how the employer's employment test affects the signalling effect of education and what kind of company is easy to carry out its own employment test. The first chapter details the background and significance of this paper, as well as innovation points. The second chapter introduces the relevant theoretical research, including the theory of educational signal function and the theory of screening, as well as the research on employer screening. This part of the research is helpful for us to understand the mechanism of the action of education signal. It is helpful for us to analyze the impact of employment test on education investment. The third and fourth chapters introduce the research methods, data and variables, and the fifth chapter is empirical research based on two regression models. In this paper, the effect of employment test is investigated by studying the change of educational variable coefficient in Micner function by introducing employment test variables. The results show that the employer's employment test inhibits the signalling role of education, and the characteristics of the company have a wide influence on whether or not to carry out the employment test.
【学位授予单位】：合肥工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：G40-05;F240;F224
[Abstract]:The screening theory holds that education is the signal of labor productivity, and the level of education plays a role in differentiating workers with different abilities. However, with the development of economy and society and the expansion of education scale, the function of education signal is more and more interfered in actual use, which makes companies more and more use their own more effective means of testing to select employees. This paper makes a preliminary study on the screening behavior of the company. We discuss how the employer's employment test affects the signalling effect of education and what kind of company is easy to carry out its own employment test. The first chapter details the background and significance of this paper, as well as innovation points. The second chapter introduces the relevant theoretical research, including the theory of educational signal function and the theory of screening, as well as the research on employer screening. This part of the research is helpful for us to understand the mechanism of the action of education signal. It is helpful for us to analyze the impact of employment test on education investment. The third and fourth chapters introduce the research methods, data and variables, and the fifth chapter is empirical research based on two regression models. In this paper, the effect of employment test is investigated by studying the change of educational variable coefficient in Micner function by introducing employment test variables. The results show that the employer's employment test inhibits the signalling role of education, and the characteristics of the company have a wide influence on whether or not to carry out the employment test.
【学位授予单位】：合肥工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2008
【分类号】：G40-05;F240;F224
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