我国高校教师工资“计件”现象研究

发布时间：2018-04-12 16:47

本文选题：高等学校 + 计件工资　；参考：《华中科技大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：审视建国至今六十余年间我国高等教育的发展历程，其一直都是在不断改革中发展、在发展中不断进行改革而走到今天，，而在这场持续性的制度变迁浪潮之中，高校人事及分配制度改革则绝对是其主流。1952至2006年间，我国高校教师的工资制度经历了由建国初期的二元工资制向职务等级工资制、结构工资制、专业技术职务等级工资制以及岗位绩效工资制的转变。高校教师工资制度改革虽见成效，但未能尽善，当前我国高校教师工资制度中一个尤其引人关注的问题便是，教师考评机制过度“从量化”以及教师工资“计件”现象严重。计件工资制作为一种高能激励工资制度，理论认为其在特定的条件下能充分调动工人积极性，调和劳资双方之间的利益冲突并在很大程度上节省对工人的监督成本。然而，在高校教师的工作努力程度难以观察以及其产出质量难以衡量的前提下，计件工资是否适用则是一个值得研究的问题。对于高校教师工资“计件”现象，本文首先基于经验证据证明了这个问题的客观存在性，紧接着运用契约理论对其进行了解释和分析。本文的分析认为，我国高校作为一个生产性契约组织，当其难以对教师的劳动投入以及产出质量进行有效识别和衡量时，执行计件工资合约将会导致作为追求利益最大化代理人的教师的机会主义行为，即代理人的“质量”与“数量”权衡，其结果是“学术泡沫”以及低水平的教学质量；另外，本文的委托-代理分析则证明了，在对教师产出质量的不完全度量及存在不确定性风险的情形下，计件合约是面对现行大学评价体系“量化”激励的高校管理者（委托人）的最优选择，这就为现实中教师工资“计件”现象的普遍存在提供了合理解释。最后，作为政策性建议，本文认为基于对教师在职贡献独立评价记录的弹性一揽子支付可能是适合的。
[Abstract]:Examining the development course of higher education in China for more than 60 years since the founding of the people's Republic of China, it has been developing in the process of continuous reform, and it has been carrying on the reform in the course of development until today, and in this continuous wave of institutional changes,The reform of personnel and distribution system in colleges and universities is definitely its mainstream. During the period from 1952 to 2006, the salary system of college teachers in our country has experienced from the dual wage system in the early days of the founding of the people's Republic of China to the position rank wage system and the structural wage system.Professional and technical position grade salary system and the change of post performance wage system.Although the reform of teachers' wage system in colleges and universities has achieved good results, it has not been done well. At present, one of the most interesting problems in the system of teachers' wages in our country is the excessive "quantification" of teacher appraisal mechanism and the serious phenomenon of "piecework" of teachers' wages.The production of piecework wage is a kind of high energy incentive wage system. The theory holds that it can fully arouse the enthusiasm of workers under specific conditions, reconcile the conflicts of interests between employers and employees, and save the supervision cost of workers to a great extent.However, under the premise that it is difficult to observe the degree of university teachers' hard work and the quality of their output is difficult to measure, whether the piecework wage is applicable is a question worth studying.As for the phenomenon of "piecework" of college teachers' wages, this paper first proves the objective existence of this problem based on empirical evidence, and then explains and analyzes it by using contract theory.The analysis of this paper holds that, as a productive contract organization, colleges and universities in our country can not effectively identify and measure the quality of teachers' labor input and output when it is difficult to identify and measure the quality of teachers' labor input.The enforcement of a piecework wage contract will lead to opportunistic behaviour on the part of teachers as agents of maximum benefit, that is, the tradeoff between "quality" and "quantity" of agents, with the result of "academic bubbles" and low levels of teaching quality.The principal-agent analysis in this paper proves that in the case of incomplete measurement of teacher output quality and uncertainty risk,Piecework contract is the best choice for university managers (clients) who are encouraged by the current university evaluation system, which provides a reasonable explanation for the common phenomenon of "piecework" of teachers' wages in reality.Finally, as a policy recommendation, this paper suggests that the flexible package payment based on the record of independent evaluation of teachers' in-service contribution may be appropriate.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：G647

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