我国高校仪器设备资源内部共享激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-05-11 20:21

本文选题：高校仪器设备资源 + 资源共享　；参考：《西安建筑科技大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：我国高校仪器设备资源内部共享已经践行数年，相较于日渐丰富的实践经验累积，深入系统的理论研究尚显不足。本文以设计高校内部仪器设备资源共享激励机制为主要目标，针对仪器设备资源共享产生的成本分担和收益分配问题，从高校管理者的角度出发重点解决对二级院系和科研学者参与仪器设备资源共享分别实施激励的问题。在经济学和管理学的研究框架下运用学科前沿理论通过数学建模手段进行定量分析，，主要得出了以下结论。 1、通过高校成员仪器设备资源共享行为的特征分析及博弈结果可知，高校管理者提供一定的奖励能够调动其内部成员仪器设备资源共享积极性。这种奖励主要用于补偿参与仪器设备资源共享主体的损失，而奖励程度和方式是影响参与共享双方博弈结果的重要因素。 2、在不同信息状态和风险态度下的高校-二级院系激励契约优化程度各异，以此为基础根据二级院系仪器设备资源水平的高低分别针对“强院”和“弱院”实施有的放矢的激励手段。为了实现高校整体效用最大化，一个有效的激励方式是给予仪器设备资源水平较高的二级院系更多的科教利益分享，同时给予仪器设备资源水平较低的二级院系更多的经济利益分配激励。 3、通过引入内在互惠动机的改进委托－代理理论模型论证，发现高校管理者设计仪器设备资源共享不完全激励契约来表达对科研学者的善意，能够实现改进的帕累托最优，并以此为基础设计的高校-科研学者柔性激励机制能够实现将“弱惠型”科研学者诱导为“强惠型”。基于高校科研学者内在共享动机的激励机制能够为实践中高校的仪器设备资源共享向纵深发展提供理论依据。４、从资源动态整合的角度通过战略联盟和结构兼并两条路径整合高校仪器设备资源，能够充分发挥资源柔性和柔性激励机制的特点，开拓我国高校仪器设备资源共享的可持续发展道路。
[Abstract]:The internal sharing of instrument and equipment resources in colleges and universities in China has been practiced for several years. Compared with the accumulation of more and more practical experience, the deep and systematic theoretical research is still insufficient. This paper aims at designing the incentive mechanism for the sharing of instrument and equipment resources in colleges and universities, aiming at the problems of cost sharing and income distribution arising from the sharing of instruments and equipment resources. From the point of view of university administrators, the problem of encouraging secondary departments and researchers to participate in the sharing of instrument and equipment resources is solved. Under the framework of economics and management research, quantitative analysis is carried out by mathematical modeling method based on the frontier theory of discipline, and the following conclusions are obtained. 1. Through the characteristic analysis and game result of the sharing behavior of instrument and equipment resources among university members, it can be concluded that university administrators can arouse their enthusiasm for sharing instrument and equipment resources by providing certain rewards. This kind of reward is mainly used to compensate for the loss of the participants in the sharing of instrument and equipment resources, and the degree and the way of the reward are the important factors that affect the game result of both parties involved in the sharing. 2. Under different information state and risk attitude, the degree of incentive contract optimization of colleges and departments is different. On this basis, according to the level of instrument and equipment resources of the second grade colleges and departments, the author carries out targeted incentives for "strong hospitals" and "weak hospitals" respectively. In order to maximize the overall utility of colleges and universities, an effective incentive way is to give more scientific and educational benefits to the secondary colleges and departments with the higher level of instrument and equipment resources. At the same time, give the lower level of instruments and equipment resources of secondary colleges and departments more economic benefits distribution incentives. 3. By introducing the improved principal-agent model of intrinsic reciprocal motivation, it is found that the incomplete incentive contract for university administrators to design instruments and equipment resources to express goodwill towards scientific research scholars, can achieve the improved Pareto optimal. The flexible incentive mechanism designed on the basis of this theory can be used to induce "weak benefit" researchers to "strong preferential type". The incentive mechanism based on the internal shared motivation of scientific research scholars in colleges and universities can provide a theoretical basis for the deep development of the sharing of instrument and equipment resources in colleges and universities in practice. 4. From the point of view of dynamic integration of resources, integrating instruments and equipment resources of colleges and universities through two paths of strategic alliance and structural merger can give full play to the characteristics of resource flexibility and flexible incentive mechanism. To develop the sustainable development of instrument and equipment resources sharing in colleges and universities in China.
【学位授予单位】：西安建筑科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：G647

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